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This dissertation focused on citizen advocacy groups
as an intervention strategy for affecting change in the
policy process.

The analysis is of a specific intervention

in school desegregation policy by a citizen advocacy group.
The purpose of this research was to identify the conditions

2

under which a citizen advocacy group can intervene; the
constraints to a successful intervention; and the attributes of a successful interven"tion.
The case study was of the community Coalition for
School Integration, a citizen advocacy group which existed
in Portland, Oregon betw,sen 1977 and 1980.
approach was used.

It involved

fif~y

A multi-method

interviews with mem-

bers of the Coalition, school administration, school board
and the media.

In addition, historical and document ana1y-

sis of secondary data and extensive literature review was
done."

The theoretical framework guiding this research was

Iannaccone's dissatisfaction theory of governance,
DIS/ID/STO/OS.

DIS is evidence of community changed dis sat-

isfaction reflected in voting behavior leading next to
incumbent school board member defeat (ID) followed within
two years by involuntary superintendent turnover (STO)
and outside succession (OS).

Rothman's (1968) models of

community organization practice were used to analyze the
intervention of the Coalition.
The findings do confirm the DIS/ID/STO/OS theory of
governance, but also suggest that community intervention is
an intervening variable between the stage of dissatisfaction
and incumbent defeat.

The analysis of the intervention

identifies six conditions necessary for community intervention: timeliness of the issue, financial resources, 1eadership, organizational support, staff, and media coverage.

3

The major constraints were the lack of trust between the
policy-making body and the citizen advocacy groups, and
.~

the political environment of the community.

Attributes of

successful intervention were: focused ad¥ocacy, multiple
intervention strategies, and permanency of the organization.

The impact of the citizen advocacy group's inter-

vention is discussed, as are recommendations for future
research.
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INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this study is to analyze a specific
"

intervention in school desegregation policy by a citizen
advocacy group.

Social science research has investigated

citizen participation, the public policy process and school
desegregation as separate phenomena in a democratic political system.

Citizen participation has been a focus of

research in the fields of community organization (Alinsky,
1971; Rothman, 1968), political science (Donovan, 1973;

Moynihan, 1969), planning (Arnstein, 1969; Hallman, 1968),
education (Davies, 1974; Iannaccone and Lutz, 1978; Gitt6ll,
1979), and the politics of school desegregation in politi-

cal science (Crain, 1968; Levy, 1971; Kirby et al.,
1973).

While these elements have been identified as significant to an understanding of the democratic policy process,
they have not been dealt with in an integrated fashion.
The study of

th~

public policy process requires an inter-

disciplinary approach to understand how policies are
initiated, enacted, implemented, and evaluated (Dror, 1971;
Dye, 1978; MacRae, 1976; Wildavsky, 1979).

A synthesis

of these critical elements as applied to an actual contemporary issue should provide a more complete understanding
of the policy process, intervention, and change. Specifically,
. !

2

it will identify the conditions under which a citizen
advocacy group can intervene to affect a change in policy;
the constraints to a successful intervention; and the attributes of a successful intervention.
·

)

This study begins with a review of these various
fields of study: citizen participation, school

desegregatio~

and the policy process.

Chapter II describes the research

design and methodology.

Chapter III provides the historical

analysis of school desegregation policy in Portland, Oregon
from 1962 to 1977.

Chapter IV analyzes the development of

conununity dissatisfaction with the school desegregation
Folicy.

Chapter V contains an analysis of the citizen

advocacy group and its intervention strategies, developed
through the application of Rothman's (1968) models of
conununity organization practice.

Chapter VI assesses the

impact of the intervention on the policy.

Chapter VII

concludes with a discussion of the findings and their
implications for developing a theory of educational policy
intervention by advocacy groups.

'::,
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CHAPTER I
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE
Citizen Participation
in Education
Citizen participation in federal programs became a
major factor with the passage of the Economic Opportunity
Act of 1964 which mandates the "maximum feasible participation"of the poor in planning and administering the various
programs which comprised the community action component of
the federal anti-poverty effort.

One of the foundations

of America's democratic society is that citizens have a
right to participate in the political, economic, and social
life of that society.

Part of the historical struggles in

political participation in the United states has been that
of women and blacks to gain the right to vote.

The signif-

icance of the Economic Opportunity Act was that it targeted
',:

a specific population for inclusion in the policy process
(Donovan, 1973).

The Economic Opportunity Act stated that

"community action programs should be developed, conducted,
and administered with the maximum feasible participation
;

..,

i";

\

)

. I

of residents of the areas and group to be served" (U.S.,
Congress, Economic Opportunity Act i Pub. L. 88-452, 88th
Cong., 2d sess

u

,

1964).

The federal mandate of citizen participation was a

4

result of several historical forces at work in the United
States during the 1950s and 1960s: the Civil Rights movement
with its focus on voting rights for blacks in the South
(Carmichael and Hamilton,' 1968); the discovery of the
economic and social

of big city ghettos by private

p~oblems

foundations (Spiegel, 1969); the federal government's experience with poor communities in its urban renewal programs
(Bellush and Hausknecht, 1967); and the implementation of
new social work practices directed at organizing and mobilizing the poor (Cloward and Ohlin, 1960; Marris and Rein,
1967; ,Moynihan, 1969).

All of these forces influenced the

federal government in its decision to involve the poor in
the War on Poverty.
Citizen participation in education began with the
feder-al programs of Head Start, Follow Through and Title I
of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act, which mandated citizen involvement through the establishment of
citizen advisory committees and the employment of local
residents (Fantini, 1970).

Since then, institutionalized

citizen participation in federally supported education
programs has grown to one million citizens who are members
,

;

,
",

.. :"

.',,-

of local school councils and advisory committees in the
United States (Davies, 1978).
In the years since the passage of the Economic Opportunity Act, citizen participation has expanded in a series
of federal government programs, such as Model Cities and

5

community Block Development Grants.

Participation has

grown beyond the poor and minority communities to include
all citizens.
One of the persistent difficulties since the call for
"maximum feasible participation" 'Has a clear definition of
citizen

participa.,~.ion

(Donovan, 1973; Moynihan, 1969).

In

order to clarify some of the issues involved in citizen
participation, Sherry Arnstein (1969) developed a typology
of citizen participation in the "form of a ladder, each
rung corresponding to a degree of citizen's power in determining plans or programs" (Davies, 1974, p. 12).

Partici-

pation ranges on a continuum from the lowest rungs which
represent token or superficial participation to the highest
rungs where there is substantial citizen control through
>-::

a transfer of decision-making power (Arnstein, 1969).
The question of how citizens should participate or
to what degree should they decide policy, has been sharply

.~ ;
'.'.;

;

:.:

debated among advocates of citizen participation.

Most

citizens participate in federal programs at the lowest
rungs of the ladder in an "informing" and "consultation"
capacity--meaning that they may be heard and their advice
considered, but they lack the power to ensure that their

1"'\

views will be heeded (Arnstein, 1969).

Although support

for substantial citizen control exists, there is no evidence
that a significant transfer of decision-making power has
occurred.

Arnstein (1969) notes that "community action

6

programs are characterized by empty ritual of participation
with no redistributic;h of power occurring to the poor"
(p. 216).
,

.

Researchers evaluating citizen participation in edu~

cation found little or no impact on redistribution of
decision-making power.

One report concluded:

A genuine commitment to community participation
requires extensive attention to structures at the
individual school and district level which encourage and support direct community roles in the
selection and review of personnel, the determination of priorities in the allocation of resources,
and the development of educational options.
(Gittell, 1979, p. 49)
.

"',,

Don Davies, the

di~ector

of a three-year study of community

organizations for the National Institute of Education, said
that "despite new organizations and impressive statistics,
little power has been transferred to parents and citizens"
(1978, p. 12).
Supporters of the "in::ormation and consultation" role
for citizens in education point to the number of citizens
active on committees and as school volunteers.

Parents work

in Parent-Teacher Associations (PTA) and volunteer in their
;

"

.', .~

children'S classes.

Citizens vote in school board elec-

tions and on school tax levies.

Some citizens serve on

the school board, which can be an elected or appointive
position.
,'to

At present, there are 100,000 school board mem-

bers in the United States (Salisbury, 1980).
The issue of the nature of the impact of citizen
participation on federal programs and local school policies
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is unresolved.

Advocates of substantial citizen contI:ol

although recognizing that redistribution of power has not
occurred, still push for more meaningful citizen participation in the policy process.

Others argue that citizens are

,)

already active on citize;,n advisory committees, but they

.,

lack evidence as to the significance of that involvement

····i

(Gittell, 1979).

While the debate over the nature and

purpose of citizen participation continues, federally mandated citizen participation remains.
Two new forms of citizen participation that have
appeared since 1970 are "child advocacy groups such as New
Yorkis Advocates for Children and the Massachusetts Advocacy Center, and grassroots neighborhood associations such
as the South Central Planning Council in Los Angeles"
(Davies, 1978, p. 12).

These new advocacy groups are

determined to change or modify school practices and policy
in order to improve educational opportunity and school
performance by intervention in the decision-making process
(Davies, 1978; Gittell, 1979; Grant, 1979).
Although the nunIDers of citizens participating in
school issues has grown in the past decade, so has the
influence of other participants in the educational policy
process.

The power of education professiqnals has increased,

the role of the school board has

change~

and federal govern-

ment programs and court decisions have impacted school
.,.~

policy.
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Education Professionals, School Boards
and School Policy
The public policy process at the local school district
involves a series of participants: the school board, school
,"

,

administration and teachers, and various publics.

School

boards have the legal authority to establish educational
policy for local school districts (Zeigler and Jennings,
',;

1974).

Education professionals operate the schools--admin-

istrators, teachers, aides,

counselors,~d

support staff.

At the beginning of the public school movement in the
United States, lay committees of citizens established the
curriculum, hired the teachers, and raised the money to
operate the schools (Katz, 1975).

During the period 1850-

1890 schools moved away from local community control to an
increasing pattern of centralization.

As one educational

historian commented:
Thus, the growth of stronger central school boards
and appointment of superintendents meant the decline
of Jeffersonian "small unit" democracy and the rise
of a meritocracy of city-wide policy-makers and of
highly paid city school administrators. (Cronin,
1973, p. 59)
Since the turn of the century, the role of the education
professional has continued to expand.

There are several

indicators of this shift in power from school boards to the

,

education professionals.

,

and through collective bargaining now influence many aspects

.'.,

, "

First, teachers have organized

of educational policy (Davies,

1978~

Fantini,

1970~

Gittell

9

et al., 1979).

Second, school superintendents also have a

strong influence on educational policy.
;
,

'\

,i

In theory, the

school board establishes policy, but in practice, education
professsionals control policy "because institutional and
behavioral norms of school governance promote the authority
of professionals" (Tucker and Zeigler, 1978, p. 19).

The

education professionals are the professional managers who
implement the policy decisions and the school board is the
"citizen legislative body with representative functions"
(Tucke~

and Zeigler, 1978, p. 19).

'Third, the school board is composed of lay volunteers,
who may be elected or appointed.
ship is a part-time job.

For most, board mernber-

Most school boards do not have

their own staff and thus depend on the administration.

Two-

thirds of the school boards delegate the agenda-setting
function to the administration.

Tucker and Zeigler's study

(1978) of school boards found that administrative recornrnendations were adopted in ninety-nine percent of the decisions
made by formal vote and that nearly eight-five percent of
board votes were unanimous (p. 20).

However,

lcc~l

school

boards continue to exercise control over most routine and
episodic decisions, such as personnel matters (e.g., teacher
contracts) and economic concerns (e.g., bond issues, school
budgets and buildings) (Iannaccone and Cistone, 1974).
As discussed in the section on citizen participation,
federally mandated programs desire to redistribute decision-
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making power to citizens.

The next question is: do citi-

zens influence the school board through voting behavior?
The answer is that very few citizens vote in school board
elections.

In a recent study of school boards, it was

found that school elections have a low voter turnout with
only fifteen to thirty percent of those eligible voting
",

(Tucker and Zeigler, 1978).

Those that do vcte are indi-

viduals with greater than average wealth, education
social and occupational status.

~nd

Also, in many states

school board elections are held independent of state primary and general elections.
Tucker and Zeigler (1978) conclude that although
citizens elect the board and have at least the potential
for influence, in reality the citizens enter the process
after the issue has been defined.
The public does not exercise influence over school
district officials and rarely achieve policy goals
as a direct result of their participation. The
reform goal of insulating school district governance
from mass citizen participation and influence has
been well met.
(p. 23)
In summary, education professional exercise the most influ'ence over educational policy, followed by the school board
which continues to exercise influence over routine and
'episodic decisions.

Citizens, according to Tucker and

Zeigler (1978) exercise the least amount of influence •

,

.
"
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Federal Government, the Courts
and School Desegregation
The federal mandate of citizen participation created
citizen involvement in a variety of education programs.
':;

i

Although federal education programs "provide on the average

~

less than eight percent of the cost of running local
schools" (Davies, 1978, p. 12), they shape policies through
federal requirements regarding desegregation, the handi.

,

capped and sex equity which have impact on entire school
districts.

On the issue of school desegregation the federal

courts and government also have given new legitimacy to
citizen participation.
Citizen groups in desegregating cities have participated in developing desegregation plans, mobilized
public support, participated in carrying out the
plan, monitored and reported on compliance, performed child advocacy and protection services, and
have been involved in educational improvement.
(Davies, 1978, p. 12)
Background on School Desegregation
At the judicial level, the Supreme Court's landmark
decision in the 1954 Brown vs. Board of Education ruling
declared that separate educational facilities based on race
are inherently unequal.

:

;

To separate them [black children] from others of
similar age and qualification solely because of
their race generates a feeling of inferiority as
to their status in the community
(347 u.S. 483)
Early targets for desegregation were Southern districts
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which ran dual systems for blacks and whites.

The South's

schools were de jure segregation, segregation which exists
as a result of some type of government action.
j
.....:;

Usually it

was a result of school board policies and practices.

As

the courts looked at northern school districts, cases were
brought against school systems characterized by de facto
segregation, segregation which existed in fact, but was not
traceable to or resulting from direct government action.
More recently, the courts have become concerned about
racially isolated schools and school districts.

Racial

isolation refers to schools or districts where a majority
of one racial minority predominates, even if this racial
imbalance results from residential patterns combined with
neighborhood schools.

Many state and federal courtz. c;;»:e

ruling against racial imbalance so that no school in a
system may depart substantially from the district-wide
racial proportions (Pascal, 1977).
However, some large cities face district-wide segregation since greater than eighty percent of their school
population are minority students.

The Supreme Court has

been unwilling to "mandate a school desegregation plan that
crosses the political or legal boundaries of a school district" (Rossell, 1978, p. 134).

This decision has set

limits on large urban school district's options for desegregation.

13
In the absence of a national plan to desegregate
all school districts, individuals can choose to
comply or evade the local desegregation plan simply
by moving outside the boundaries of the school
system or enrolling in a private school.
(Rossell, 1978, p. 134)
In addition to the courts, Congress passed legislation
(Title IV of the Civil Rights Act of 1964) which authorized
federal assistance to school boards, school districts, and
other governmental units legally responsible for the operation of pubic schools, to aid those bodies in their desegregation efforts.

The then Department of

Healb~,

Education

and Welfare (now the Department of Education) had the
.. ':

primary responsibility for ensuring equal educational opportuni ty for all students in public

school~,.

The federal government's principal tool to enforce
desegregation of elementary and secondary schools
is Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.* The
Office of Civil Rights is responsible for monitoring federally-funded public elementary and secondary
school districts, eliminating all vestiges of unlawful discrimination, and ensuring equal educational
opportunity.
(U.S. Commission on Civil Rights,
1979, p. 14)
The Office of Civil Rights monitors the progress of desegregation in both court-ordered and board-ordered school
desegregation plans.
Various options are available to communities on ways
*Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits
discrimination on the basis of race, color, or national
origin by recipients of Federal funds. If a Federal agency
should find illegal discrimination as a result of a hearing,
it is authorized to terminate or refuse funding or use other
legal means to ensure compliance with the provision of Title
VI.
(U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, 1979, p. 8)
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to implement desegregation, whether to remedy de jure or
de facto segregation.

Desegregation may be implemented as

a result of a court order or a board decision.
regation plan

m~y

The deseg-

be either a voluntary or mandatory plan.

Christine Rossell (1978) in a recent article on school
desegregation defines the various terms.
Terms such as mandatory and voluntary desegregation
are often confused with court-ordered and boardordered desegregation. The terms mandatory and
voluntary refer to the degree of parental choice,
whereas the terms court-ordered and board-ordered
refer to the source of the order to desegregate.
Court-ordered plans can be either mandatory (as
in Boston and Pasadena) or voluntary (as in Milwaukie, Houston and San Diego). In the latter
plans, the oourts have ruled that the school districts have fulfilled their constitutional obligations by implementing a voluntary busing plan,
although such plans rarely result in more than a
ten point reduction in segregation. Board~ordered
plans can also be mandatory (as in Berkeley and
Seattle) or voluntary. The latter are typically
called minority to majority transfer programs.
(Rossell, 1978, p. 160).
Patterns in Northern School Desegregation
In a survey of ninety-one northern cities experiencing
school desegregation between 1963 and 1969, Kirby, Harris,
Crain, and Rossell (1973) found the first demand for school
'. ,

desegregation was made in 1963-64 by local chapters of the
National Association for the Advancement of Colored People
(NAACP) concerning "perceived inequities in the entire school

, !

system" (Kirby et al., 1973, p. 23).

The group that made

the demand wanted more than procedural or symbolic actions
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on the part of the school system.

They demanded that "white

students and teachers participate in improved education for
Negroes" (Kirby et al., 1973, p. 23).
Seventy-five percent of the ninety-one cities surveyed responded that their school systems did nothing or
took only symbolic or procedural actions in response to
civil rights groups' demands (Kirby et al., 1973, p. 35).
An example of a symbolic-procedural action was usually the
appointment of a committee to study the problem.

Fifty-

five percent of the ninety-one cities surveyed had school
boards that decided to appoint a committee to study the
-

problem (Kirby et al., 1973, p. 39).
The responses • • • suggest that school systems
felt the problems were not of their own making,
nor were the solutions their responsibility.
School systems were not initiators or leaders in
the school desegregation process. They had to
be prodded.
(Kirby et al., 1973, p. 37.)
Kirby attributes part of the lack of response to school
districts' long tradition of assimilation, meaning that
schools help to socialize or integrate immigrants into
American society.

The belief in assimilation is buttressed

in the practice by a "color-blind" policy of treating all
students equally.

As a result of these beliefs, most

northern school districts did not believe that theirs was
a segregated school system,

They responded to the demands

of civil rights groups by saying that "their school was
indeed desegregated.

By this the school system meant that

16
it was not supporting segregation or unequal education"
(1973, p. 67).
Although pressure from civil rights groups, other

,\~...

,

minority organizations and white liberals produced some

.~

symbolic-procedural action, Kirby et ale (1973) found that
such pressure was less likely to bring about a
busing program or the establishment of racial quotas
--actions which are more administrative in nature.
Integration actions require an ideological and
philosophical commitment on the part of school system officials which, although not impervious to
controversy and pressure, are not as vulnerable to
it. (p. 50)
They conclude by identifying several factors ascri tical
in those school districts where actual desegregation was
implemented by the school system.

They were: leadership

of the superintendent, an involved mayor playing a "liberal"
role, and the support of civic leaders.

In contrast, the

total amount of civil rights activity and white citizen
opposition had very little impact on school desegregation
decisions (1973, pp. 14-15).

They concluded that very lit-

tle desegregation actually occurred from the many programs
initiated from 1966-68 and that most desegregation in
northern big cities has happened since 1968.
This concludes a brief review of the desegregation
environment.

As indicated earlier, however, there is a

larger context within which change occurs and can be
analyzed.

It is to this policy process that we now turn.
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The Policy Process
The policy process concerns how decisions are made
in a political system.

Jones (1970) states that the policy

process "suggests a highly relative'and pluralistic decisionmaking system characterized by compromise, incrementalism,
and continual adjustment" (p. 9).

Lindblom (1968) views

the policy process as an "extremely complex analytical and
::.,

political process to which there is no beginning or end"
(p. 4).

Anderson (1975) defines policy process as "a pur-

posive course of action followed by an actor or set of
actors in dealing with a problem or matter of concern"
(p. 3).

For Dye (1978) public policy is the "description

and explanation of the causes and consequences of govern\""

;,","

, .
,

"";

~", ;~,

ment activity" {p. 5).

He adds,

This involves a description of the content of public
policy; an assessment of the impact of enviJ:'onmental
forces on the content. of public policy; an analysis
of the effect of various institutional arrangements
and political processes on public policy; an inquiry
into the consequences of various public policies
for the political system; and an evaluation of the
impact of public policies on society, in terms of
both expected and unexpected consequences. (p. 5)
The key elements in these definitions of the policy
process are action and change.

One model, Jones

I

(1970),

demonstrates how changes occur in existing policy, as well
as how policy develops.

The first stage in the policy

process is identification of the problem to government.
The second stage is the formulation of the policy to address
the problem by government.

The third stage is the adoption

I;.,
rrsar

~

rili

nl
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or legitimation, of the policy by government.

The fourth

~.~:'i~~

i:'::~

stage is application, in which the govern.ment acts to
impleme.nt a program.

Then the fifth stage is evaluation

where someone or some group recommends changes of adjustments in the policy, which sets the stage for the process
to modify itself, or to begin again.

This process is not

static nor linear, but is an evolving, fluid process.

The

dynamic of this model presented by Jones (Figure 1) indi:

""

cates that after the evaluation stage, other issues may
arise which cause the policy to be reformulated and for the
process to repeat itself.

Wildavsky (1979) describes the

policy process as not so much problem solving, but problem
succession.

As Dye (1978) pointed out in his definition

of the policy process, unexpected consequences of policies
produce a demand for a new or revised policies in response
to recently identified needs.
Id~ntification

I

Formulation

. r. .

(First cycle)

Leg~t~mat~on

.1

.

App 1 ~cat~on----------__

.

Evaluat~on

I

Reformulation

I

Legitimation

,.;

(Second and
subsequent
cycles)

;

Figure 1.
p. 123.

Changes in. existing policy (Jones, 1970,

Although models provide a framework for policy analysis,
··:·f~
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policy is initiated, implemented, and evaluated in a politi-

[

cal system.

Policy impacts people, resources, and values.

The policy process blends politics and planning.
implies a rational decision-making model.

Planning

The rational

decision-making model assumes that policy-makers have sufficient information.
This rationality assumes that the value preferences
of a society as a whole can be known and weighted.
It is not enough to know and weigh the values of
some groups and not others. There must be a complete
understanding of societal values. Rational policymaking also requires information about alternative
policies, the predictive capacity to foresee accurately the consequences of alternate policies, and
intelligence to calculate correctly the ratio of
costs to benefits. Finally, rational policy making
requires a decision-making system that facilitates
rationality in policy formation.
(Dye, 1978, p. 28)
Policy making i.n a political environment must consider
group interests, and political values, as well as financial
resources, environmental factors, and structural constraints.
One of the critics of the rational decision-making model,
Charles Lindblom (1959), argues that the political system
,

fj

in the United States does not permit the rational model.
He developed a different model to explain the policy process,
the incremental model.
"Incrementalism views public policy as a continuation
of past government activities with only incremental modifications" (Dye, 1978, p. 32).

Policy makers accept current

programs and agree to continue previous policies, for several
reasons: (1) they lack the time and resources to pursue all
alternative policies; (2) they accept present policies
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because the impact of new programs is unpredictable;
(3) previous investment in buildings or organizational

structure is difficult to abandon; and (4) it is politically expedient.

Small changes mean less conflict in the

organization and more stability.
No one model explains all aspects of the policy pro",l

.i

cess.

The policy process, according to Wildavsky (1979),

ideally should be a hybrid of "2/3 politics and 1/3 planning" (p. 125).

He would combine the rational

~nd

incre-

mental models for purposes of explaining the process.

The

Jones .(1970) model incorporates the dynamic, changing
aspects of the policy process.

Critical factors in that

process are: key actors, group interests, environmental
facto;:s, institutional system, economic resources, and
socif!3tal values.
process.

Each factor plays a part in the policy

The key actors are those people who are respon-

sible for the policy, as well as those people who May oppose
or seek to change the policy.
decisions.

Groups are affected by policy

The previous sections identified the following

groups active in education policy at the local level: PTAs,
Citizen Advisory Committees, grass-roots neighborhood
groups, public interest groups, and advocacy organizations.
Additional

grou~s

are business groups, taxpayers, and reli-

gious organizations.

(Lutz and Iannaccone, 1969)

Environ-

mental factors include social, economic, and cultural
issues which ha'\Te the potential to affect the policy process.
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For example, economic fluctuations affect all policy decisions, but frequently policy makers have little control
OV~L

these fluctuations.

The institutional system is the

organizational structure in which policy is made.

An

example from education 1emonstrates the interrelationships
among governmental units.

Local school districts have

local autonomy and authority.

However, they are connected

to state and federal levels of government through joint
administration of programs and federal guidelines over
certain programs.
'Economic resource refers to an important constraint
on all policy-making.

The allocation of resources

lim5-+:s program development and implementation.

Policies

can be established but programs never implemented, if the
financial resources are reduced.

Finally, societal values

can serve as a constraint or motivating force on the policy
process.

Values such as freedom and equality differ in

meaning to the public.

People's attitudes towards these

values lead to support of or opposition to a policy.

Regard-

ing school desegregation, some citizens have opposed desegregation programs on the basis of freedom of choice, while
others have supported them on the basis of equality.
The Intervention Syr.thesis
The focus of this study is on intervention in the
policy process.

Anderson's definition of the policy process
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(1975) as "purposive course of action followed by an actor
or set of actors in dealing with a proble>': or matter of
concern."

Intervention is a "purposive attempt to create

a situation of change" (Wiseman, 1979, p. 4).

Much of

policy analysis has focused on intervention strategies
internal to organizations, i.e., organizational development.
(Argyris, 1970; Chin and Benne, 1972).

Littie research has

focused on understanding the dymamics of policy intervention, from beginning to end.

Wiseman (1979) calls for the

study of standpoints and activities of those persons
who do view society normatively, both the people
involved in making social policy and those whose
lives are touched in one form or another by policy
int.erventions--with the clear goal of developing
a theory of policy intervention. (p. 4)
The type of policy intervention to be examined in this
study is intervention by a citizen advocacy group, seeking
to change a desegregation policy of the local school district.

There are various strategies available to a citizen's

group seeking a change in policy.

Iannaccone's theory of

dissatisfaction and Rothman's models of community organization practice will provide the theoretical and analytical
framework to examine the intervention of the citizen's
advocacy group.
The dissatisfaction theory of governance (Iannaccone,
1978) describes how voting behavior can change policy.
Citizen dissatisfaction with educational policy has the
"capacity to redirect local school government through changes
in participating groups" (p. 131).
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Dissatisfaction (due to either the exhaustion of
citizen satisfaction with a previous policy mandate or changes in citizen expectations and demands
for education programs) leads to traumatic political change and the subsequent adaptation of the
school organization. (Iannaccone, 1978, p. 130)
Dissatisfaction theory's premise is that a gap grows
between the two dimensions of society, the governmental and
the societal.

The political system, over time, becomes

closed to citizen demands.

The governmental dimension

moves towards "increased stability, perpetuation of the
elite, and continuance of the same political ideology and
related program values in schools" (Iannaccone, 1978,
p. 130).

At the same time, the community undergoes changes

due to "demographic mobility, generational transitions,
and educationally altered expectations" (Iannaccone, 1978,
p. 130).

Citizen dissatisfaction grows until public opposi-

tion forms which leads citizens to vote out the incumbents.
In summary, DIS/ID/STO/OS, the dissatisfaction theory, seeks
to explain the political change and adaptation of the school
organization due to citizen dissatisfaction.
dence of community changed dissatisfaction

DIS is evi-

reflect~'d

in

voting behavior leading next to incumbent school member
defeat (ID) followed within two years by involuntary superintendent turnover (STO) and outside succession (OS).
The weakness of this theory rests in thE assumption
that a change in school board members will result in a
policy redirection.

School board elections are not part i-

san; many factors contribute to incumbent defeat.

Analysis
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shows that very few voters participate in school board
elections.

This lack of participation raises questions as

to the effectiveness of the vote and the political system
in changing policies in local school districts.
Intervention Strategy
Rothman's

mod~ls

of community organization practice

suggest more direct intervention strategies for citizens
concerned about policy change.

This comparative framework

provides a basis for analysis of intervention by
organizations.

co~nunity

Rothman provides four different models

describing the practice of community organization (Figure 2).
A combination of the theory of dissatisfaction with
a comparison of the social action and social reform modes
of intervention provides the theoretical and analytical
framework for this study.

Figure 2 illustrates the com-

posite framework to guide the analysis of the intervention
strategies used by a citizen's advocacy group to change
the desegregation policy of the Portland, Oregon school
district.
..,
~
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ORGANIZATION/
Individual
Examples
Peace Corps,
Vista

1. Locality" Development which "presupposes that community change may be
pursued optimally through broad participation of a wide spectrum of
people at the local community level."

2. Social Planning where "rational,
METRO
deliberatively planned, and controlled
(regional planning
change has a central place in problembody)
solving."
Alinsky

3. Social Action "presupposes a disadvantaged population that needs to be
organized, perhaps in alliance with
others, in order to make adequate
demands on the larger community for
increased resources or treatment more
in accordance with social justice or
democracy. II

League of
Women Voters

4. Social Reform involves activity by a
"group or coalition of interests
which acts vigorously on behalf of
some community segment which is at
risk or disadvantaged."

Figure 2. Models of community organization practice: definitions and examples (Rothman, 1968 in
Zaltman, 1972, pp. 474-75, 488).
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Initial Decision bY1Legitimate Authority
TIME
OrganiZe~ral

t.

Elite and

External Fac,s

Clos~tem

________ Time

,

DISSATISFACTION

Voting

Social action/social
reform models

Figure 3. Theory of dissatisfaction with social
action/social reform models of community organ ization.*
*Laurence Iannaccone, "The Dissatisfaction Theory of Governance: Implications for Practice and Research," in
Pu£lic Participation in Local School Dist.ricts: The
Dissatisfaction Theory of Governance, eds. Laurence
Iannaccone and Frank W. Lutz (Lexington, Mass.: Lex~
ington Books, 1978).
Jack Rothman, "Three Models of Community Organization
Practice," in Creating Social Change, eds. Gerald
Zaltman, Philip Kotler, and Ira Kaufman (New York:
Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1972).

.
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CHAPTER II
RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY
Iannaccone's dissatisfaction theory of governance and
Rothman's models of community organization practice provide
the theoretical framework to analyze the developmental process of citizen dissatisfaction and the policy intervention
by the Community Coalition for School Integration in Portlandi Oregon.
The purpose of this study is to test the adequacy of
the Iannaccone and Rothman framework as an explanation of
community intervention in the policy process.

The findings

also may contribute towards a theory of policy intervention.
This study searches for an explanation of the citizen
advocacy group's intervention in the Portland, Oregon school
district's policy-making process regarding desegregation
policies.·

The case study focuses on the developmental

process of citizen dissatisfaction with the school desegregation policy.

The dissatisfied citizens formed the

Community Coalition for School Integration (CCSI), hereafter
referred to as the Coalition, which then studied and made
recommendations for changes in the district's desegregation
policy.
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The problem statement of this study is:
How do citizens intervene in the policy
process to address perceived inequities?
The questions that guide this research in addressing the
problem statement follow:
1.

What are the conditiotis under which a citizen's
advocacy group can intervene to affect a change
in the policy?

2.

What are the constraints to successful intervention?

3.

What are the attributes of successful intervention?
Methodology

A naturalistic case study is the research methodology
selected for this study of policy intervention by a community organization.

Naturalistic research is the "investi-

gation of phenomena within and in relation to their
naturally occurring contexts" (Brandt, 1972, p. 7).

This

method was selected because it involves exploratory research,
the searching out of issues in a natural situation.

Its

greatest power comes from the fact that this kind of
research is relatively non-obtrusive, meaning that the
researcher intrudes less in the reality of the world under
study.

Proponents of naturalist research (Brand, 1972;

Guba, 1978; W8bb et al., 1966) believe another strength
lies in its heuristic approach to research problems.
Researchers begin their study without preconceived
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ideas to collect data on a variety of factors and begin to
form conclusions from a series of observations.

This kind

of research sees multiple-cause reality, not a single cause
and effect relationship.

Because the world is composed of

many realities, this approach is closer in accurately
representing the real world in its research.
The strengths of naturalistic research--its realism,
its heuristic quality, its multiple-reality approach--offset
the disadvantages inherent in this research approach.
Field work does not provide controls on people or the setRepresentativeness is a problem because the emphasis

ting~

is on in-depth analysis of groups or a system.

The field

researcher does not select a sample vi individuals to
intp.r'iriew, but obtains detailed data about particular
people.
One answer to the problem of \ <\.iiditj in this kind
of

~esearch~

due to the lack of control or representative-

ness, is the use of triangulation.

"Validity is provided

by cross-checking different data sources and by testing
perceptions against those of participants" (Guba, 1978,
p. 63).

Triangulation technique uses a multi-method

approach to corroborate one set of data with another.
Support for a multi-methcd approach is found with Webb
et ale (1966):
Once a proposition has been confirmed by two or
more independent measurement processes, the uncertainty of its interpretation is greatly reduced.
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The most persuasive evidence comes through a triangulation of measurement procedures. (Webb et
al., 1966, p. 3)
Researchers look for confirmability, an agreement among a
variety of sources, before reaching a conclusion in their
findings.
Other issues related to naturalistic research methods
are: (1) Effects of interviews upon interviewees (Simon,
1969, p. 24):

all the interviews and observations were

conducted by the author.

The research relies on the evi-

dence of other data sources--newspapers, board minutes,
Coalition documents, and subsequent events to correct any
bias.

(2) Observer bias: the research was not involved in

the events of 1977-79 either through the Coalition or the
school district.

The researcher sought to include all

perspectives on these events from persons supportive of the
Coalition to persons critical of the intervention.
iability over time: this is an ex-post-facto study.

(3) VarIndi-

viduals were interviewed approximately eighteen months after
the intervention.

A series of intervening events between

September, 1979 (conclusion of study time) and Summer, 1980
(interviews conducted) may have affected people's interpretation of the Coalition's intervention.
Chapter VII for further discussion.)

(See Conclusions,

Although some time

had passed since the intervention, many people were still
involved in the desegregation issue.

The subject was timely

and people welcomed the opportunity to talk.

Many of the
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interviews lasted more than one and one-half hours because
of their interest in the topic.
In addition to triangulation techniques, this case
study through its use of the Rothman models of community
organization which is basea on empirical evidence, will link
the findings of this

C~5e st~dy

to the work of Rothman, as

well as other citizen advocacy research.
Method of Gathering Data
The research bases for this study were historical and
document analysis, interviews, and

revil='~l

1. Historical/document analysis.

of literature.

A review of the

Oregonian, Oregon Journal, and Portland Observer news
articles on school desegregation between 1962 and 1977;
documents such as the Schwab Committee report (1964), Model
Cities Education report (1969), City Club report (1972),
Schools for the City report (1975), and the U.S. Office of
Civil Rights, School Desegregation in Portland (1977).
In addition, minutes and tapes of critical school
board meetings were examined.

A review was made of Coali-

tion meeting minutes, memos, and working documents of the
Research Committee, as well as Coalition correspondence.
The Coalition files are located in the office of the Metropolitan Human Relations Commission.
2.

Interviews.

The interviews were focused and

conducted during the summer and fall of 1980.

An

interview

1
1

.J
f
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guide was used for all the Coalition interviews.
Appendix A.)

(See

In addition to the interviews with Coalition,

school board, school administration, and media persons,
there were several interviews with people involved in
previous community efforts to affect desegregation policy.
They provided background information of the time period,
1962-1977.
3.

Review of literature.

Extensive reading was com-

pleted in the fields of community organization, school
desegregation, social change, educational governance, and
urban politics in order to test the generalizability of the
field work with empirical evidence from other research.
The data for this case study were collected between
March, 1980 and October, 1980.

The interviews were con-

ducted from June-September, 1980.
views were taped.

The majority of inter-

There were fifty interviews involving

Coalition members, the school board, district administrators, the media, and Black United Front leaders.

At the

conclusion of each interview a brief description of the
interview was written.

There was also a review of each

interview to look for themes or issues that the interviewee
had identified.

Some of the information gathered from one

interview was used to verify or to obtain a reaction from
another interviewee.

The interviews with board and dis-

trict administrators were oriented to their perspective on
the Coalition,_their role in the sequence of events, their
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assessment of the impact of the Coalition and some general
comments on the politics of education in Portland.
A similar procedure was followed during all interviews.

Each individual was called.

The purpose of the

study was explained and they were asked for an appointment.
There were two people who declined to be interviewed, a
Coalition member and a school board member.

Both cited

reasons of time pressures and that their point of view
could be gathered from other interviews.

Two board members

were unavailable for interviews; one had died and the other
had moved out of state.

All interviewees were guaranteed

confidentiality and completed an informed consent release.
(See Appendix B.)
Thirty-one Coalition members were interviewed, including two staff persons.

The Coalition members were selected

according to several criteria.

First, all of the Coalition

leadership were selected, including the Committee Co-Chairs
and the Task Coordinating Committee.

Second, a broad per-

spectiveof members representing the racial, geographic,
and philosophical diversity of the Coalition were sought.
Four key Coalition members were asked to identify people
on the basis of the criteria.

The group that was inter-

viewed was selected from that list.

The remaining criterion

was the degree of involvement during the entire eighteen
month period.

(The only exceptions were Task Coordinating

Committee members, some of whom were not active for the
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entire time period.)
Because individuals are not named in this study,
documentation of the interviews has been coded.
views are cited by date.

All inter-

If more than one interview was

conducted on the same date, then interviews are listed in
alphabetical order, based on the order of the interviews.
For example, interview 6/10/80a was the first interview
of that day.
This is an ex-post-facto study.

People were asked

to analyze and discuss events with the hindsight they had
gained from a year's distance from the issue.

Some of the

Coalition members were still very involved in desegregation
issues, while others har

. ;.1plet.ely withdra'ffl from any kind

of involvement.
~.~alysis

The analysis of documents, pewspaper reports, Coalition, and school board materials took place between March,
1980 and December, 1980.
Public

Informat~on

The school district, through its

Office, maintains a newsclipping file,

board minutes, and tapes of the meetings.

The Coalition

files contain all minutes of meetings, working papers for
the research committee and final report, letters of membership, financial records, correspondence, questionnaires
from participants in a series of Community Forums, desegregation research from other cities, and the interviews and
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data analysis on the Administrative Transfer Program, a
study conducted by Oregon Attitudes, Inc.

In addition, the

Oregon Historical Society supplied several taped interviews
01:

long-time activists in the black community, which were

part of their Oral History Project.

The most difficult

information to obtain was history of blacks in Portland.
Blacks in Oregon (1978) and The Growth of a City (1979)
were consulted, but the most current and reliable resource

is the black weekly newspaper, the Portland Observer (1970present) •
. The material was organized in two ways: (1) by time
period and (2) by subject matter.

The three time periods

were: 1962-1977 (School Desegregation History in Portland);
June, 1977-January, 1979 (Formation and Study

Phas~

of

Coalition); and January, 1979-September, 1979 (Aftermath
and Impact Phase of the Coalition).

The first time period

was divided into subject areas of national civil rights and
desegregation events; desegregation action in Portland;
citizen groups active in desegregation policy, Model Cities
and Citizens Committee for Better Schools; the two school
desegregation plans, the Schwab Committee report and Schools
for the 70s; and the state and federal changing role.

Most

of the data were gathered from newspapers, school documents,
and citizen group primary source materials.

Several infor-

mant interviews provided personal insights to this historical analysis.
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The sec!ond time period covered the community opposi- '
tion to the Boise-King plan and the active period of the
Coalition.

The framework for analysis of this time period

was the models of community organization practice (Rothman,
1968).

The interviews provided the main body of data for

this analysis.
school

b~~rd,

They were divided into Coalition members,
and school administration interviews.

The

Coalition members' questions were keyed to specific variables of the Rothman models (e.g., what strategies did the
Coalition adopt to change the situation; what other
strategies were considered?).

These questions were keyed

to the variables concerning basic change strategy and
characteristic change tactics and techniques.

(See

Appendix C.)
The third time period, January, 1979-September, 1979
was the assessment of the impact of the policy intervention

by the Coalition.

Again, interviews were the main source

of data with documents and newspaper articles being secondary.

The

5uhje~t

,,">.·:as of this time period were the series

of events: board rejection of the Coalition recommendation
on pairing, school board elections, Coalition visit to
Seattle, Coalition/Board/District working committees,
Office of Civil Rights ruling, Black United Front, appointment of Coalition Co-Chair to school board, proposed Black
United Front boycott, and the August, 1980 short- and longterm resclutions on desegregation by the school board.
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Some of the issues were known at the beginning of the
research while others emerged from the interviews and
document analysis.

The analysis is divided into two parts:

first, an analysis of the intervention based on the practice variables of the Rothman models and second, an analysis
of the impact of the intervention on the school system and
community, based on two criteria--(l) changes in the formal
rules of the educational system and educational practices
affecting these children and (2) alteration of the network
of activities at the federal, state, school district, and
school levels that shape services to children (Moore, 1980).
In summary, this study is based on a multi-method
data base, using historical and document analysis, interviews and references to relevant empirical studies.

The

next chapter is a historical analysis of school desegregation policy in Portland, Oregon.

":,l

CHAPTER III
HISTORICAL ANALYSIS OF SCgOOL DESEGREGATION POLICY,
PORTLAND, OREGON
"De Facto Segregation": 1954-1965
The Supreme Court called for an end to segregated
schools in 1954, but not until 1965 did Portland public
schools initiate a desegregation plan.
Prior to World War II, Portland had a small population of blacks.

A study of Blacks in Oregon (1978) states:

Negroes were virtually banned from the state until
the Second World War, at first by law and later by
severe employment discrimination. During the war
years, Portland experienced a much smaller migration than other west coast cities. (p. 38)
In 1940, 2,565 blacks lived in Oregon, with the majority
residing in Portland.

By 1950, the number had increased,

accompanied by a pattern of residential segregation in
Portland.

In 1950, one half of Portland's 9,500 blacks

were housed in census tracts #22 and #23 in the Williams
Avenue-Albina districts (MacCol1, 1979).

"A 1957 Report

on the Negro in Portland: A Progress Report 1945-1957"
said that "90% of the realtors won't sell a house to a
Negro in a white neighborhood" (City Club, 1957, p. 259).
The concentration of blacks in some Portland schools was
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due, therefore, to discrimination in housing.

The school

board had adopted a "color blind" policy in 1954, when it
stated that it had a policy of equal education and that it
would take no action regarding segregation in Portland
public schools (City Club, 1980).
National Association for the Advancement
of Colored People (N~~CP)
By 1960, Portland's black population had increased
to 15,636, with 78% of that population housed in the Albina
area (Portland Public Schools, 1978).

On April 20, 1962,

the Oregon Journal's front page carried the headline,
IISchoo1s Here Hit as Racist."

The N&'l\CP had named Portland

as one of the Western cities which segregated public
schools.

The local NAACP chapter in Portland asked the

school board to end IIde factoU segregation.

A schoQ1 offi-

cia1 responded:
I am not sure what they class as a segregated school.
In our policy we have not segregated children, we
have put schools where children are and have established boundaries. (Oregon Journal, 4/20/62, p. 1)
The NAACP continued to pressure the school board.

In Octo-

ber, 1962 the NAACP president said the only issue is "the
fact of segregation.

The Portland schools are not in com-

p1iance with the 1954 Supreme Court decision.
'.;

.. ,'

refuses to see the problem.

The Board

There can be no solution until

a problem is accepted" (Oregonian, 10/11/62, p. 32).

The

national NAACP organization had instructed all the local
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chapters to advise them if a lawsuit was necessary to bring
about the end of segregated schools in their local community.
In May, 1963, a 125-member Portland Citizens Committee
on Racial Imbalance in the Public Schools urged the school
board to undertake a study to "determine if a large number
of the city's Negro elementary students are being harmed
by being concentrated in de facto segregated schools"
(Oregonian, 6/25/63, p. 1).

Neither the Oregonian or

Oregon Journal's editorial pages were supportive of the
NAACP or the citizens' committee, stating that the "proposed remedies could be worse than the situation now
complained of" (Oregonian, 6/5/63, Editorial page).
Race and Education Committee
On ,TD-ne 25, 1963, the school board voted to appoint
a committee of citizens to study and report back to the
board by Janua::. 1, 1964 its findings on the city's racially
imbalanced public schools (Oregonian,

6 /25/63).

The Com-

mittee on Race and Education (the Schwab committee, named
after its chairman) concluded an eighteen-month study,
reporting that Portland's schools were not providing children of all races with equal educational opportunity
(1964).

The guiding desegregation policy of the Portland

Public Schools was established with the unanimous adoption
of the report of the Committee on Race and Education in
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December, 1964.

The school district became committed:

to take every reasonable step consistent with sound
educational practice to encourage the integration
of students of all races and to decrease the concentration of minority students in particular
schools which occurs because of residential patterns. (Board statement, 12/64)
The recommendations of the Schwab committee became the
first desegregation plan in the schools and were imp1emented in 1965-66.

The key recommendation established

the Model School program, a compensatory education program
in nine Albina schools.

Elements of this program were

lowered teacher-pupil ratio to 1:20, preschool programs,
additional funds for field trips, and increased support
peI.'sonnel, i. e., teacher aides and community agents.
The Schwab committee endorsee the continuation of the
district's neighborhood school concept.

At the same time,

it recommended the concept of a transfer program.

The

transfer program was an administrative program, with transportation provided for children selected by the district
as well as for children whose parents desired the transfer
on a space-available basis (Schwab, 1964).

Although the

Schwab committee stressed the goal of reducing segregation
in Portland Public Schools through the Administrative
Transfer

Pr~0ram,

the major portion of the funds was spent

on the compensatory education component, Model Schools
(City Club, 1972).
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Community Response to Desegregation
Plan: 1965-1970
The school board's adoption of the Schwab committee
report did not satisfy the NAACP.

The Portland NAACP chap-

ter opposed the Model Schools approach as one sustaining
racial isolation and imbalance
Parents

an~

~O:r.eq(")n.ianf

11/16/64).

citizen groups in Albina criticized the Model

Schools approach for perpetuating segregation and the open
enrollment plan (the Transfer Program), because both black
and white parents could request transfer of their children.
This'was of major concern in the Jefferson High School
attendance area, where it was feared white parents would
send their students elsewhere, further decreasing the white
population at that school (Oregonian, 4.'7/65).

Between

1964 and 1969 the Administrative Transfer Program expanded
from 250 to 605 students, but "90% of the Negroes were still
con.fined to a handful of schools [in Albina]" (Oregonian,
3/1/66, p. 13).
Model Cities Education Committee
During the period, 1964 and 1969, major education and
civil rights legislation was enacted which increased funding sources and federal requirements for local school
districts:

OEO- War on Poverty (1964), Elementary and Sec-

ondary Education Act (1964), Civil Rights Act (1964), and
then Model Cities (1967).

These acts were viewed as
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attempts to change the social, economic, and educational
opportunities of the disadvantaged in the united States.
These programs also required citizen participation either
through citizen advisory boards or as employees of the
various programs.
parent advisory

All Title I, ESEA programs required

co~mittees

(PAC), as did Head Start.

Portland received a planning grant in 1967-68 from
the Department of Housing and Urban Development to develop
proposals with the participation of citizens from the target
area (essentially Albina) for programs that would revitalize
the community (the Model Cities program).

After a lengthy

citizen involvement process, the Model Cities Education
Committee submitted a plan to the Model Cities C.i..ti..:en
Planning Board, which asked for some specific changes in
education and made some definite recommendations to the
school board.

Specifically, Model Cities asked the school

board to approve:
1.

the establishment of a Community Education Liaison
Board to review all policies related to schools in
the Mociel Cities area;
2. the hiring of 196 aides for Model Cities area
schools;
3. the expansion of pre-school programs in Model Cit:i..es
area;
4. the creation of a computer sciences program at
Jefferson High School. (Model Cities Education Report, 1969, p. 18)
J:n addition, the entire report of the Model Cities Education
Committee recommended a grade exchange plan, to further
integration of the schools.

This cross-busing plan would

convert all Albina's schools into

7th~·8th

grade centers for
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all the children of the district.

Model Cities children,

K-6, would be bused out to schools in the remainder of the
city.

It also called for the school board's commitment to

total integration by 1970 and an end to the Model Schools
program.

The committee's final proposal was for the estab-

lisr\Ylent of an Experimental Learning Center in the Model
Cities area, with an innovative life-learning program open
to the entire district (Model Cities Education Report,
1969).
The Education Committee critized the district's
approaches to community involvement in desegregation
programs.

On community involvement, the Education Commit-

tee charged that "citizens of the Model Cities neighborhoods
have historically been left out when plans have been made
directly affecting the education of their children" (Oregonian, 1/13/69, p. 16).

With regards to the Administrative

Transfer Program, they stated:
It is the opinion of the committee that the oneway busing to the suburbs is highly inadequate
because it has little effect on the segregated
public schools.* (Model Cities report, 1969,
p. 10)
The reaction of the school board to the Model Cities'
request and recommendations was immediate.

They labeled

it as "vicious, irresponsible and inaccurate document" not a

i.'"

*One-way busing to the suburbs began with the 1968-69
school year with about 100 students busing to Lake Oswego,
Parkrose, and David Douglas school districts (Oregonian,
8/20/68, p. 15).
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"community effort, but the opinion of a few people" (Oregonian, 1/8/69, p. 1).

They saw it as an attack on the

"very foundation upon which the Board had built its edllca.tional policies and programs."

The Oregonian described the

Board as "angry, stunned and hurt" over the accusation of
"unresponsiveness to community needs and desires, particularly those of the Albina area" (Oregonian, 1/13/69,

~.

16).

Three days later, the school board said it could not
act on the "four proposals" submitted by ·'0del Cities for
approval for HUD funds "without implying endorsement of the
entire education component" (Oregonian, 1/16/69, p. 35).
Tha controversy ended in April, 1969 when the Model Cities
l:';

Planning Board withdrew its request for a Citizens Education
Lidison Board, rather than risk additional delays in application for federal funding.
The school beLl. \.'0. "then approved the othar three proposals (teacher aides, preschool programs, and a computer
science program at Jefferson High School).

The Model Cities

Education Committee, however, recommended that the Planning
Board withdraw all four proposals, because "it is essential
that parents play a policy rather than an advisory role in
order to assure that schools reflect tr_ needs of the community" (Oregonian, 4/2/69, p. 19).

That view of the role

of the community was unacceptable to the board.
The school board would not endorse the Citizens
Education Liaison Board, which, as proposed, would
function at a policy-making level. Policy making,
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as well as educational planning, is and will remain
in the hands of the school board. (Oregonian,
4/2/69, p. 19)
In the spring of 1969, when Model Cities Education
Committee trIed to implement their educational programs,
Portland Public Schools board

wo~ld

request for federal funds from HUD.

not endorse their
The

dile~ma

was that

the school district did not need the money, but Model Cities
needed the cooperation of the school district to effectively
use their funds to help the Model Cities area population.
The alternative was to start their own school district
(Interview, 10/6/80).

After this initial controversy with

the school board, Model Cities never became involved in any
major educational reform or planning effort, but channeled
its funds to support school programs, such as teacher aides
in Model Cities area schools.
Citizens Committee for Better Schools
Within a few months of Model Cities' report (June,
1969), a second citizens' group emerged to urge the school
board to work on integration of the schools.
~

I

~
o
,;','

This Citizens

Committee was formed from a local community action agency
conference on urban issues.

It began as an ad hoc task

force on education in 1966.

After extensive research on

successful integration efforts nationwide, it sought support
from various organizations for integration in Portland's
schools.

When they addressed the board in June, 1969, they
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had pledges of support from twenty-eight community groups.
The committee was composed of white and black members representing such groups as churches, American Civil Liberties
Union (ACLU), PTAs, and civil rights organizations.

--

The Citizens Committee urged the board "to work as
fast as possible to reduce the Negro concentrations at
about eight of the city's schools (50-90%)" (Oregonian,
6/24/69, p. 9).

They also asked the board to "name a citi-

zen group to study the possibilities for fuller and speedier
integration, including the possible establishment of junior
highs and possibly busing of white students as well as
,

-,'

-,

\.\

black" (Oregonian, 6/24/69, p. 9).
One board member responded to the committee "It must
be the board's first order of business to develop an
integration plan and achieve it without delay" (Oregonian,
6/24/69, p. 9).

At that time, approximately 600 students

were bused within the district and 200 students bused to
the suburbs.
dominantl~

All the students being bused were from pre-

black schools.

One perspective on the situation

was that the board really did not want to have the communi'i:y
propose another approach to desegregation and used the fact
...:

~',

.

of hiring of a new superintendent to delay action on the
recommendations of the Citizens Committee.
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Desegregation Plan #2: "Schools
for the Seventies"
During early 1969, the school board was searching for
a new superintendent.

They were looking for someone who

could address the "problems of growing militancy and unrest
among students, teachers and citizens, plus outmoded
"

..;

management and buildings" (PPS, 1978, p. 10).

The school

board selected a superintendent whose main strengths were
management and organization.

He also

h~d

had experience

in desegregation in his previous superintendency (Oregonian,
2/26/69) •
The new superintendent submitted a master plan for
Portland Public Schools to guide the future direction of
the district.
integration.

Its stated purpose was to achieve school
The key elements of the "Schools for the

Seventies" plan were:
1. Reorganization and Decentralization: to divide the
district into four administrative areas, each with a similar percentage of Black students;
2. Establishment of upper grade centers (middle
schools) that would be racially desegregated;
3. Provision of Early Childhood Centers in racially
isolated neighborhoods;
4. Limit of 25% minority students in middle and high
schools.

(Schools for the Seventies Plan, 1970)

The public responded to the plan immediately.

The
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Urban League gave it unanimous endorsement, followed by an
endorsement from the Portland Association of Teachers
(Oregonian, 1/23/70, 1/24/70).
the public on January 21, 1970.

The plan was introduced to
The Citizens Committee for

Better Schools voiced several concerns about the plan.
plan called for the establishment of citizen advisory
mittees in each of the new area subdistricts.

The
-X;:':1-

The Citizens

Committee recommended that the advisory boards be composed
of 50% black and 50% white; also, that the Area Citizen
Advisory Committees (ACACs) be appointed through an independent committee, not by the school board.

On the role

of ACACs, the Citizens Committee for Better Schools said
"We think the duties should be substantial, for we believe
boards with no real voice would create more community dissatisfaction than no boards at all (Oregonian, 3/15/70, p. 34).
The school district conducted a series of public
meetings to elicit citizen comments on the "Schools for the
70s II plan.

".:

The plan was taken to the citizens in a series of
four carefully planned public hearings scheduled in
each of the four proposed areas of the city. The
for.mat for these hearings consisted of a narrated
slide presentation, pack:~ts of information on the
plan which were handed out to all participants,
and a panel of Board members and the superintendent
to answer questions. Detailed notes were taken of
all citizen comments, although the notes were not
consistently summarized for presentation in a workable way to the Board for its review. (Douglas,
1978, p. 3)

'.j

The four hearings attracted approximately 2,000 people.

.,,
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The account in the Oregonian of February 3, 1970, following
one of the public hearings, is representative of citizen
concerns.
• • • Citizens ask if reorganization plan can go to
a vote of the people instead of being decided by the
school board.
• • • A spokesman from the Jefferson High School
student body objected to any plan which would disrupt
the student balance that was then prevailing at
Jefferson (55% white, 43% black, 2% Oriental).
• • • A citizen objected to the plan because it
would break up Albina. 'split up the black forces.'
He also wondered why busing couldn't occur both
ways--of both black and white students.
(Oregonian, 2/3/70, p. 7)
A fifth public meeting was held in Albina in order to obtain
citizen input from that area.
Dissatisfaction with the plan was expresseCi. by several
different groups.

The Portland Federation of Teachers (PFT)

stated it had no evidence yet of "commitment to teacher or
community involvement in the planning of edu=ational
improvement and change prior to decision making by the
school board" (Oregonian, 3/5/70, p. 20).

A survey by the

PFT and several local organizations showed Albina residents
opposing the

pla~

by 2-1.

Of the 424 people surveyed, 60

percent opposed the way the plan divided Albina, opposed
busing for racial integration, and opposed the 25 percent
limit on black student attendance.

Two-thirds of those

surveyed wanted Jefferson High School maintained as a community school and not subject to the 25 percent black
student limit-(Douglas, 1978, p. 4).
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The chairman of the NAACP Education Committee labeled
the "Schools for the 70s" :;:>lan "a scheme to weaken and
frustrate black unity" and attacked the "racist philosophy
of placing small numbers of blacks among whites."

This

long-time critic of school board policy on desegregation
...... -..

l;
.. '

f·.· ·
:::

of Albina area schools described the previous efforts of
the board:
The Race and Education Commission, which I call the
racist and Negro Lackey Commission, was the forerunner of this plan. Model Schools is just a subplantation to keep the blacks enslaved. (Oregonian,
3/16/70, p. 15)
Some citizens also opposed the middle school plan because
it would destroy neighborhood schools and result in children
being bused away from their neighborhood.
A March 6, 1970 editorial in the. Oregonian said the
public hearings had disclosed that there was "widespread
apprehension that the superintendent's recommendations are
a 'fait accompli' rather than a plan for Board approval,
rejection or amendment" (Editorial page).
On March 23, 1970, the school board adopted the proposed reorganization plan.

Except for changes regarding

the number of subdistricts and their boundaries (three
instead of four), the plan remained largely unchanged from
its original form.

The board decided to appoint the ACAC

members rather than follow the Citizens Committee recomroendation of appointment by an independent committee.
The board also reaffirmed it.s December, 1964 stand

52
on its open enrollment policy, stating:
Any student may, upon request of his parents or
guardian, transfer to and attend any other high
school (or middle school) in the school district,
provided that space exists, and provided further
that such a transfer does not unduly increase the
concentration of minority students in that high
school or in the high school from which the student seeks to transfer. In order to avoid racial
isolation of minority students, no high school or
middle school shall have a minority student
enrollment which exceeds 25%.
(Board resolution
No. 3553, 3/23/70)
In a footnote to the resolution, the board stated that the
25% limit was drawn from "extensive studies and experience
both in Portland and elsewhere as a desirable upper limit
to minority concentration" (Board resolution No. 3553,
3/23/70) •
Implementation of Schools for the
Seventies Plan: 1970-1977
Tax Levies
In order to convert to middle schools, the district
needed to secure funds for the remodeling of buildings.
The plan would convert seventeen existing schools and
build three new ones to serve as middle schools.

The district

embarked on a series of budget elections to raise the necessary funds.
In October, 1971, the superintendent said "both Portland's educational and building needs

[were] stymied

this year with the defeat of four key money measures by the
public."

Two teacher organizations interpreted tr..e tax
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levy failures differently.

The Portland Association of

Teachers said "it was not a vote against the schools, but
• • • a result of voter's disaffection with a heavy reliance on property taxes in funding education" (Oregonian,
9/29/71, p. 1).
Federal of

However, the

Tea~hers

pres.:i.d~·"·"1t

called for the

of the Portland

fi~ing

of the superin-

tendent and the rnajori ty of the boat"d members.

He said

the defeat of the levy was "due to the erosion of confidence
in the schools and the Board, not the tax structure"
(Journal, 9/29/71, p.1).
Although a citizens group formed to help with the
next budget election, the school
margin in May, 1972.
have spoken.

le~J

failed by a slim

The superintendent said, "The people

The problems remain.

As a result of this

vote, Portland is no longer competitive with the better
school systems in our state" (Oregonian, 5/24/72, p. 1)
This series of defeats meant that the district could not
pursue its planned development of middle schools.
Early Childhood Centers
Although the defeat of the tax levies slowed the
implementation of middle schools, the conversion of Albina
grade schools to Early Childhood Education Centers (ECECs)
began.

[:,

Irvington grade school was the second Model School

to be converted to a K-5 Early Childhood Center.
grade school had been the first.

Eliot
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Between 1972 and 1977, Humboldt, King, and Sabin
would be converted to Early Childhood Centers, with the
remaining Albina elementary schools, Vernon and Woodlawn,
converted to ECECs in the 1977-78 school year.

Boise

grade school was the only K-8 grade school in the Albina
area, mainly due to a strong coalition of parents and
neighborhood residents who lobbied the school district to
retain it as a Basic Skills Center (Willamette Week,
4/17/78, p. 1).
All upper grades in the Albina area schools had been
removed in the conversion to ECECs, thus all area students
from fifth through eighth grade had to transfer out of the
neighborhood.

The absence of new middle schools in close

proximity to Albina produced an increase in administrative
transfer students.

In 1972-73, when the ECEC conversion

began, there were 725 students in the administrative
transfer program, 475 of whom were in-district elementary
students.

In 1977-78, the admir.istrative transfer program

totalled 2,888 students, 2,009 of whom were in-district
elementary transfer students (PPS, 1978).
Middle Schools
At the same time, there were eleven middle schools
by 1977-78, but only two of them (Columbia-Whitnker and
Fernwood) served as assigned middle schools for Albina residents.

Various neighborhoods had rejected middle schools
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for their area.

The bv" .. 1 had adopted a policy of never

placing a middle school in an area where the parents
rejected the concept.

In the Wilson and Roosevelt High

School areas, the citizens had rejected middle school pro-

I

posa1s (Oregonian, 7/11/78).
Some of the reasons for community opposition to middle
schools is cited in an article on Fernwood Middle School.
Opponents of middle schools • • • have consistently
been charged with opposing middle schools because
they offer the district an opportunity to increase
racial integration. This is so because middle schools
are one step removed from neighborhood schools (typically, students from three elementary schools are
bused to one presumably central middle school). Combining students from three schools gives the district
the chance to put students from mostly white schools
together with students from integrated schools • • • •
Many white parents don't like their children removed
from the close-by neighborhood school and bused to
a school considerably farther away, even if that
school isn't in the black community. nVillamette
Week, 7/2/79, p. 7).
There was dissatisfaction on the part of black parents as
well, because no middle schools had been created in Albina.
Therefore, their 6th, 7th, and 8th grade students were all
bused out of their neighborhoods.
Citizen Advisory Committees (ACACs)
Three Area Citizen Advisory Committees were created
as a result of the board's adoption of the "Schools for the
70s" plan.

In 1974, the superintendent, speaking to the

National Committee for Citizens in Education, reported that
citizen involvement and decentralization were operating
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well in Portland.

He said that 25,000 citizens were dir-

ectly involved in everyday operations of the school (Journal, 6/25/74).
The Area Citizen Advisory Committees were a key part
of the school district's community involvement process.
The Schools for the City, a citizen committee formed in
1972 to assist with that year's budget election, evaluated
the ACACs from 1970-75.

They concluded that although the

advisory committees have "clearly influenced Board decisions and administrative actions • • . • two major blocks
remain to be overcome."

The first major block was that the

"whole process is rigidly controlled by the School Board."
'I'he second block concerns the advisory committee's uncertainty over its actual role in educational decision-making.
(Schools for the City, 5/19/76, p. 20) They specifically
recommended strengthening of the Advisory Committees:
1. Particular attention be paid • • • to inclusion
of citizens in planning policy changes from
initial consideration to conclusion of the process;
2. ACAC's need to function in a more independent
manner • • • also be advocates for the public;
3. Review panel members (who select ACAC's men~ers)
be chosen • • • so that their selection is not
controlled solely by the School Board.
(Schools for the City, 5/19/76, p. 20).
Another citizen commented in a Letter to the Editor about
the need for some changes in the citizen advisory process.
Area advisory committees should be elected. Local
advisory committees should either be elected, or
all interested parents should be allowed to serve
and vote on issues. Further, all advisory committees should be given more quality information and
cOpies of all policy proposals and budget
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recommendations. Committees should be involved in
all stages of budget formation, teacher and principal selection criteria and hiring, and review and
development of school programs and curricula.
(Oregonian, 7/11/78, p. c6).
In summary, the major criticism was that the area advisory
committees were consulted frequently too late in the
decision-making process to provide input and to have an
impact.
Federal and State Decisions
on Desegregation Policy
On March 22, 1974, the State Board of Education
adopted Policy No. 4171 on "Racial Imbalance in Public
Schools."

The policy stated:

It is the affirmative duty of each local school district which has a substantial racial minority student
enrollment to formulate policies, and to plan,
implement, and evaluate educationally sound and
feasible programs, to prevent or eliminate racial
isolation in its schools, and to achieve and maintain an integrated education program characterized
by mutual respect, awareness of cultural diversity,
and responsiveness to the needs of all students.
Racial isolation exists in a district if the combined enrollment of Black, Native American, MexicanAmerican and Asian-American students in any school
of the district is in excess of fifty percent (50%)
of the school's total enrollment.
(State Board of
Education Policy No. 4171, 1974)
In direct response to the State Boardis policy, the Portland School Board reaffirmed their 1964 and 1970 actions
on policies and programs to reduce racial isolation of
minority students in its schools.

It also directed the

superintendent to encourage and increase administrative
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transfers "to the fullest extent practicable" and to continue the conversion of selected elementary schools to
Early Childhood Centers.

They instructed the superintendent

to recommend steps to reverse increasing minority enrollment
when it is in excess of 25%, and to analyze the situation
when any school reaches 10%.

(School Board Minutes,

5/22/75)
Although the federal government through the courts
and legislation had defined that no school in a system
I

'"

should depart substantially from district-wide

rac~a1

proportions (Pascal, 1977), the major struggle for state
and local boards of education was how to achieve this racial
balance.

Racial balance and desegregation at this time

refer to the "physical mixing of the races without regard
to the relative status of the two groups" (Gordon, 1977).
There was growing concern with the legal concept of
racial isolation.

In a review of legal decisions, one

education writer noted that "racial balance as a numerical
goal will not necessarily improve the quality of education
in the public schools • • • the problems must be solved by
educators, not lawyers, legislators and the courts" (Oregonian, 4/3/77, p. 1).

Other community studies of desegre-

gation have demonstrated that community involvement was a
key ingredient in both a successful desegregation and
improved educational program (Crain, 1968; Kirby, 1973).
Portland was not under a court-ordered desegregation
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ruling to integrate its schools.

The board had initiated

its own plan, as a result of the Schwab committee and community pressure in 1964.

Portland through the years had

stressed the fact that its desegregation plan was voluntary.
However, according to a September, 1977 staff report of the
u.S. Commission on Civil Rights, the desegregation plan was
limited in scope and effect.
Desegregation in Portland . • • involves • • • 'oneway busing' of minority (mainly black) students from
inner-city schools to predominantly white ones • • •
(p. 6)

Another problem area rests with the continuing feeling among some members of the minority population
that the burden of the desegregation process has
been borne by minorities. (School Desegregation in
Portland, Oregon, p. 14)
However, the Portland Public Schools were found in
violation of the "Singleton Rule" in 1975 by the Office
of Civil Rights.

The "Singleton Rule" resulted from a 1970

Supreme Court decision that ruled school districts should
assign staff so that the ratio of Negro and white teachers
to other staff in each school is substantially the same as
such ratios are to the teachers in the entire school

syst~m.

The Office of Civil Rights (HEW) found Portland to have a
disproportionate concentration of minority teachers in
racially isolated schools.

The district, in order to avoid

the loss of funds, transferred all minority teachers to
achieve the ratio recommended in the "Singleton Rule."
In 1977, the Office of Civil

Righ~s ~hreatened

to
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withhold Title VII, Emergency School Aid Act (ESAA) monies
because the Portland school district was discriminating
against minority students in its suspension policies.

The

school district had to agree to change their suspension
policies in order to remain eligible for the Title VIr
federal funds for assisting school desegr.egation.

fund~

In sum-

mary, school desegregation in Portland as of June, 1977 had
employed several approaches to accomplish its objectives.
Since 1964, a voluntary transfer program (Administrative Transfer Program) has been in use to bring
about desegregation. In 1970, the Portland School
District changed attendance boundaries and embarked
on a middle school policy, citing desegregation as
part of the rationale for middle schools. In 1970,
the District also adopted a policy (which eliminated
grade levels in these schools) of converting elementary schools in the Black community to Early Childhood Education Centers. This policy has since been
classified by the District as part of its desegregation efforts.
(Eguity for the 80s, 11/78, p. 43)
Analysis of Desegregation Policy-Portland Style: 1962-1977
In the first stage, problem identification, different
groups in the community (NAACP and the Committee of 125)
raised the issue and defined the problem for the school
board.

The board appointed a blue-ribbon panel, the Schwab

committee, to formulate a course of action.

The Schwab

committee developed a set of recommendations which the
school board adopted as its desegregation plan for the
Pcrtland school district.
of the policy process.

That was the legitimation phase

The application stage was the
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Model Schools, a compensatory education program, which was
implemented from 1965 to 1970.
Administrative

TranS:~2l:'

The other part was the

Program which began in 1965 and

was still operational in 1981.
The goals of desegregation were the reduction of the
concentratiorl of minority students as well as improved
education.

Criticism arose from the minority community

about the Model Schools program because the racial composition of the predominantly minority schools did not change.
The Model Cities Education Committee (1968-69) and the
Citizens Committee for Better Schools (1969) had both
called for an end to the Model Schools and a cross-busing
approach in which both white and black students would be
bused.

Although there was no formal evaluation of Model

Schools, segments of the community did call for major
changes in the desegregation programs.

(In 1972, the City

Club did a formal evaluation of the Model Schools program,
finding that it was ineffective.

But, by that time, the

program had been discontinued.)
The school board did not accept either set of recommendations, but did reformulate its desegregation policy
by hiring a new superintendent who presented his "Schools
for the 70s" plan.

The superintendent and the board were

the chief actors in altering the desegregation plan,
although citizens were consulted through the series of
public hearings.

This second desegregation plan focused

"

,,I

..... , ..
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on reorganization of the schools and a continuation of the
Administrative Transfer ?-rogram.
The Schools for the 70s plan was adopted (legitimated) in March, 1970.

During the implementation stage of

this plan, financial problems arose (defeat of tax levies)
which resulted in further modification of the plan,
especially with the development of the middle schools.
Community opposition to middle schools slewed down the
process even further.

At the same time, the federal and

state governments were redefining "acceptable limits" in
desegregation with an increased emphasis of reducing the
concentration of minority students under 50 percent i.n any
school.
Due to the inability of the school district to reorganize into K-5, 6-8, 9-12 desegregated schools, the board
moved to reduce racial isolation through an increase in the
Administrative Transfer Program and the conversion of
Albina schools into Early Childhood Centers.
the superintendent

~~lieved

The board and

that such programs were sound

educationally, and would promote progress in reducing the
numbers of racially isolated schools.
The school board was guided during this time period
(1970-77) by several criteria.
ordered desegregation plan.

One was to avoid a court-

Second, it did not want to

consider cross-busing, because of the fear it would result
.,

.1

in white flight from Portland to suburban schools. (Interviews, 8/27/80, 7/31/80, 9/8/80)
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Like voluntary programs elsewhere, Portland's "administrative transfer program which involved for the most part
minority students, desegregation has not produced change
through the city schools."
One expressed fear is that the white community's
heretofore generalized acceptance of desegregation
may be threatened if a heavier burden is placed on
whites in the future implementation of desegregation. (School Desegregation in Portland, Oregon,
9/77, p. 14)
This historical analysis of desegregation policy has
identified the critical participants in the policy process,
as well as reported the changes in the desegregation policy
process.

In addition to knowing who the participants are

and the issues, it is nAcessary to consider the impact of
the desegregation policy en Portland's citizens and their
view of the policy in 1977.

The next

chapte~

analyzes

community dissatisfaction with the desegregation policy in
the summer of 1977.

CHAPTER IV
COMMUNITY DISSATISFACTION WITH
THE DESEGREGATION POLICY
If the previous chapter demonstrated the efficacy of
the early policy model, initiation-implementation-evaluation,
we can now see the concept of dissatisfaction coming into
playas the next important variable, the community's inter-

I
I

vention, is examined.

In this chapter an analysis of the

sources of community dissatisfaction will be made from the
perspectives of the community, board, and school district.
Dissatisfaction with the school district's desegregation plan had been present since the first plan was initiated in 1965.

In June, 1977, a policy change was proposed

to the school board, because Jefferson High School had
passed the 50 percent minority enrollment limit during the
1976-77 school year.

According to the state board's

guidelines, Jefferson was a racially isolated school.

In

an effort to lower minority enrollment, it was proposed
by the board that children from Boise and King grade
schools not be allowed to attend Jefferson High School,
but would be assigned to Lincoln and Wilson High Schools.
Boys and girls from two mainly black neighborhoods
would be forbidden to enroll at Jefferson High
School under a draft policy submitted to the
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Portland school board. Such a student would have
to attend another high school which had about
average enrollment of black students.
(Oregon
Journal, 6/8/77 1 p. 3)
The goal of the Boise-King (6/77) plan was to further
desegregation efforts in Portland's schools and to meet the
State Board of Education requirement that no school's
enr",:lment exceed a maximum of 50 percent minority students.
Also stated was a goal to prevent and eliminate racial
isolation of minority children

(Atte~dance

Area and Trans-

fer Policy Drill, 6/6/77, Sl'>.ction B, Paragraph 5).
The proposed policy change was announced at the end
of the school year.

Between June 6, 1977, when it was

introduced to the board, and July 25, 1977, when the board
finally acted on the policy change, community dissatisfaction over school desegregation surfaced through several
local groups.
Community Reaction
Several community groups were aware of citizens'
complaints about the current desegregation efforts.

The

education committee of Metropolitan Human Relations Committee (MHRC) had discussed a review of the district's desegregation policies and practices, as it had not been
evaluated since the Schwab committee study in 1963-64
(Interview, 6/10iBO, 6/17/80b).

The MHRC education com-

mitteemet with the superintendent and several board
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members to discuss the Boise-King redistricting proposal
in July, 1977.
They recommended that the school board make no
decision on the controversial desegregation amendment until at least 2/78 • • • In the interim the
district (should) involve the community in the
sharing of information and planning. (Portland
Observer, 7/21/77, p. 1)
Schools for the City, a citizens' education advocacy
group, had raised the question of how desegregation was
doing in Portland the year before.

The League of Women

Voters also had informed themselves about the issues surrounding desegregation.

(Interviews, 6/18/80b, 6/19/80b)

Through the interest of MHRC and the concerns of one
board member over the progress of desegregation, a small
group of parents and Northeast community residents began
meeting Saturday mornings at King school to discuss a number
of problems with the desegregation plan: curriculum, discipline, transportation, recruitment of minority teachers,
and Jefferson High School.

Several weeks after this

group began meeting, the concerned board member brought
the "redistricting" proposal to a meeting.

The community

group was very interested in x·ssponding, but due to the
timing, were concerned as to how they could inform parents
at the end of the school year.

They decided to formally

organize and called their group the Committee for Quality
Education for All Children.

A long-time Northeast community

resident, active in Model Cities, became chairperson.

In
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order to spread the word to other affected parents, the
committee contacted Jefferson High School groups; requested
to testify at the next board meeting; and sent out a mailing to civil rights and human relations groups, and the
media; informing them of the Committee's opposition to the
proposed policy change.
The "Friends of Jefferson" had been active for several years.

They represented parents, students, and

community residents committed to the improvement of Jefferson High School.

They joined with Boise parents and Boise

Neighborhood Association's Education committee to oppose
this proposed change.

As part of the coalition with the

Committee for Quality Education, they discovered that white
flight was

.'

son.

respo~sible

for the racial imbalance at Jeffer-

"The outflow of majority students from the Jefferson

feeder schools to other high schools is the primary reason
for the increasing percentage of minority students"
(Observer, 7/21/77, p. 1).
When the school board member presented the redistricting proposal on June 6, 1977, the district had not anticipated any opposition to what they considered more of a
"boundary change than a policy change which requires no
community input" (Observer, 7/21/77, p. 1).

The first

sign of community opposition came from the media coverage
of a press conference called by the Committee for Quality

.1

Education for All Children.
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A proposal which, in effect, would bar some black
students from attending Jefferson High School
• • • is under fire from a group of black leaders
and parents. The group, Committee for Quality
Education for All Children contends that the proposal • • • unfairly puts the burden for racial
desegregation of Jefferson on black students.
(Oregonian, 6/21/77, p. 1)
Some board members and central school administrators met
with selected black leaders before the proposal's second
hearing at the July 13, 1977 board meeting.

These black

leaders, after hearing an explanation of the new attendance
proposal, advised "the school personnel that they meet \'lith

I

the Committee for Quality Education for All Children and
affected parents before making any decision on this proposal."

The school district did not get support for the

proposal from the black leaders who attended this meeting.
(Observer, 7/7/77, p. 1; Oregonian, 7/25/77)
On the night of July 13, 1977, the board delayed the
public testimony on the policy change until the end of
their regular agenda.

The result was an angry reaction

by "the sixty persons who waited more than three hours to
be heard" (Oregonian, 7/15/77, p. c1).

Fifteen persons

spoke with four groups presenting written testimony as
well.

The speakers asked the board to reject the proposed

policy change and to involve the "entire community in planning an integration program that is acceptable to the
ccmmunity" (Letter fr("'m Committee for Quality Education to
the board, 7/13/77).

Rather than decide the issue that
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evening, the board called a special meeting for July 25,
1977 which would be devoted entirely to the desegregation
policy change.
The media was very involved in covering this issue.
The Oregon Journal (7/20/77), in an editorial entitled
"It's Time To Take a New Look," pointed out that part of
the black community's opposition to the new plan was due
to the way the schcol board had handled the proposal.
"The plan was announced without consulting beforehand the
community immediately affected or the community at large,
both ·of which have much at stake in the

vitali~y

of city

schools."
The Oregonian (7/23/77) reported that "a coalition
of community groups has asked that the board appoint a
citizen committee to study alternatives to the proposed
change in the desegregation plan" (p. A8).

The Oregonian

(7/24/77) also discussed the reason for the community's
opposition:
They are objecting to the method proposed to achieve
the goal--mandatory busing of a predominantly black
segment of the Jefferson high school attendance
area to Westside high schools, Lincoln and Wilson.
(Oregonian, 7/24/77, Sunday Forum, p. D1)
The July 25, 1977 meeting was attended by 200 people,
so many that the overflow from the board room moved to
standing room only in the halls (Observer, 7/28/77, p. 1).
The superintendent opened the meeting by reading a prepared
statement.

He said:
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the district has the responsibility to make policy
decisions that do the right thing. The right
thing for Portland is desegregation and this is
the direction the Board o~ Education has followed.
We have made a significant number of attendance
area shifts. Few or none of them have been without opposition. Typically, they were for the
reason of sustaining efforts to follow the desegregation plan of the district. This plan is to
carry out a constructive desegregation program.
Obviously, the effort has been to accomplish this
without disruption of a court order.
(Portland
Public School memo to Board of Education, 7/25/77,
p. 2)

The superintendent recommended that the board request that
the NAACP, Urban League, and Metropolitan Human Relations
Commission address the Jefferson imbalance issue.

He also

recommended the deferral of a decision to 12/15/77 because
"I think it impractical to proceed at this time • • .
without some support from groups who are traditionally committed to the goals that are involved here" (Portland Public School memo to Board of Education, 7/25/77, p. 5).
He also commented that
I am very troubled when influential groups and
individuals take exception to proposals based on
the amount of criticism voiced rather than on the
merits of the issue. This comment was interpreted
by many as a slap in the face at dissenting citizens. (Oreg~nian, 7/26/77, p. AI)
The audience response was immediate.

The chair of the

Committee for Quality Education said "we resent the implication that we are rabble rousers" (Board minutes, 7/25/77).
A representative from the Boise neighborhood said the
superintendent had "insulted the community who gav"e up
their time voluntarily to be involved," and that the "black
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community will not accept certain groups to make decisions.
We want a voice in the decision."

(Board minutes, 7/25/77)

The NAACP representative objected to the naming of
the three organizations.
You should have asked
be on the committee.
from the community as
three organizations.

the neighborhood who should
Try to get some feedback
to whether it wants those
(Journal, 7/26/77, p. 1)

The other two organizations, MHRC and Urban League, both
had representatives at the meeting.

MHRC agreed to accept

the challenge, but did not agree with the Board's decision
to "restrict input to Jefferson when the program needs to
be studied in depth" (Board minutes, 7/25/77).

The Urban

League speaker expressed his concerns about the process.
You didn't wait to hear our recommendations. The
NAACP, Urban League, the Metropolitan Human Relations Commission represent the black community.
The process is merely dumping the issue back on
blacks, saying you come up with something better.
Why not create a commission of all individuals
and let the chips fall where they may? (Board
minutes, 7/25/77)
The board voted unanimously to ask the three organizations
to develop their own proposal for Jefferson by December 15,
1977.

Several board members and the superintendent also

expressed the hope that other groups would be involved in
addition to the three named organizations.

However, there

was no clear statement from the board as to whether these
three groups should examine the entire desegregation program.

(Board minutes, 7/25/77)
The board decided to create an independent group,
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rather than appoint a blue-ribbon panel like the Schwab
committee, for several reasons.

As citizen distrust of

government increased, blue-ribbon panels had become suspect
for too close a relationship with the administration.
(Interviews, 8/20/80, 9/8/80, 8/12/80)

The board, faced

with community opposition to its proposal, needed to get
a genuine, independent look at desegregation policy.

It

was felt that would not happen with a board-created or
board-controlled group.
Individual board members had various reasons for their
support of an independent study group.
citizen input

W~8

One believed that

necessary even on controversial issues

(Interview, 8/12/80).

Another thought that if reasonable

people, committed to integration, would examine the desegregation program, they would support the current program
(Interview, 9/8/80).

A third view, also substantiated in

the media, was that the board's decision was an indignant
reaction to community outcry over the handling of the
Boise-King plan (Interview, 8/26/80).
Regardless of the intent of the board and the superintendent, the three groups were committed to involve the
whole community in addressing the problems with the desegregation programs (Interview, 6/17/80b).
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Factors Contributing to Community Dissatisfaction
Community Perspective
According to one analysis of political change, people
need to act at the right time
on the right issue
with the right leaders
and the right people
in the right place. (Barber, 1969, p. 166)
community people who testified before the school

boa~d

in

July, 1977, all agreed that the proposed policy change was
the culmination of a series of decisions on desegregation
that primarily affected the black community (6/18/80a,
6/18/80b).

It was the right issue, but the timing of the

proposed policy change was awkward.

It carne at the end of

the school year, when many people were making summer plans.
The timing may have presented initial difficulties, but the
right peoplA and leaders were ready to address the issue
(Interviews, 6/11/80, 6/19/80b).

"The issue was volatile,

tangible and visible" (Interview, 6/17/80b).
Jefferson was the symbolic black high school which
a number of black and white parents were committed to preserving, as was the school district which had invested
thousands of dollars in order to improve educational opportunities and to attract more white students.

A policy

change that affected only Jefferson High School by transferring only black students out of Jefferson had a strong
impact in the black community.

Some felt this was an
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effort to get rid of Jefferson, the "bad, black school"
(Interview, 6/20/80).

Others feared that the policy change

would result in the elimination of all grade schools in
Albina, because the proposed change would mainly affect
Boise School, the only K-8 school remaining in Albina
(Interview, 7/24/80).
Others saw the proposed policy change as an overt
sign that the district was in serious trouble.

The board,

for the first time, proposed ,a desegregation policy change
based solely on race (Interview, 9/15/80).

The black com-

munity saw the board reacting to a crisis, and that their
solution would once again affect black students (Interview,
6/17/80a).

More importantly, the nature of the policy

change indicated that the board was not following their
announced desegregation plan, but had reacted to the crisis
with emergency measures (Interview, 4/18/80).
The two board meetings in July, 1977 also provided
an outlet for parents' complaints about desegregation
(Interviews, 6/10/80, 9/15/80, 9/19/80).

The community's

presence at the board meetings made the issue visible to
the greater Portland community because of extensive newspaper and television coverage.

These parents learned that

other people were concerned about the same issues.
The leaders of the groups opposing the "redistricting"
plan felt that this was a

cri~ical

and timely issue.

The

black community's attitude on the busing issue had changed
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(Interview, 7/25/80) and the school district was unaware
of these changes (Interviews, 6/2/80, 7/25/80b, 9/8/80,
9/21/80).

The changes were reflected by the questions

being asked about the issue: is there data that shows that
d~segregation

provides quality education for black chil-

dren?" (Committee for Quality Education, Board minutes,
7/25/77).
The Oregonian described the change in the black
community as
After 14 years of school desegregation, the focus
of black concern has turned from fighting for the
right to attend white majority schools to examining what happens to black students after they get
there.
(Oregonian, 11/16/78, p. Bl)
There was a new group of younger black leaders, several
of whom had been involved in Model Cities and the War on
Poverty community act}.on programs in the 1960s.
Another factor was community awareness.

Through the

efforts of groups like the Committee for Quality Education,
Black Concerned Parents, and Jefferson High School parent
groups, the black community was more aware of the issues.
There was also growing white liberal dissatisfaction with
the board's direction on desegregation.

Some city-wide

education groups had decided to examine those areas.
(Interview, 6/19/80b)
Citizen involvement has been present in other government arenas in Portland.

Citizens were very active in the

campaign and election of a major in 1974 who encouraged
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citizen involvement in budget planning, economic development, and crime prevention.

Thrr... i..Lgh Model Cities and then

the neighborhood association movement, citizens were
involved in making decisions about housing, freeways, and
neighborhood revitalizat'ion (Interviews, 4/18/80, 8/6/80b).
During the 1970s in Portland, a cadre of experienced community organizers developed who believed that citizens
could make a difference in solving community [,tatters.
Board Perspective
Board members offered several explanations for the
community's response to the proposed policy change on
desegregation.

Although citizens had testified against the

district;s desegregation plan during the 1970s hearings,
the current board was surprised by the degree of opposition
of the black community to the proposed "redistricting" plan.
One board member attributed some of the community reaction
to the presence of someone on the board who was willing to
raise questions, which in turn encouraged dissatisfied
citizens to do the same (Interview, 8/26/80).
Another board member thought the desegregation
language ill-advised.

Fifty-one percent black made a school

"racially isolated," but not fifty percent white.

Also,

Jefferson, because of the district's financial investment
in making it a magnet school, was a success and black

1

children wanted to attend it (Interview, 8/20/80).

I
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A long-time board member identified several historical and political factors which contributed to the black
community's dissatisfaction with the prevailing desegregation policy.

(1) The City of Portland had a commitment to

neighborhood revitalization.

There was tension between the

need to plan city-wide desegregation and the retention of
the neighborhood primary school, which is vital to neighborhoodness.

(2) The experience of Model Cities, Office of

Economic Opportunity - Community Action Programs (OEO-CAPS)
and affirmative action had demonstrated the positive results
that black group action could bring.

(3) The nature of

black leadership had been changing in Portland with an
influx of younger blacks with successful experiences with
direct action programs.

The board was not in touch with

this emerging black leadership.

{4; The district had been

making slow progress on desegregation, due to the defeat
of the tax levies and time-consuming reorganizational
efforts.

Both blacks and whites reacted negatively to

these delays.

(Interview, 9/8/80)

School District Perspective
School district staff also recognized that leadership
in the black

co~unity

had shifted and that the district

failed to involve the newer leaders in desegregation
planning.
expres~ed

Also, a second generation of concerns was being
on the part of community members who had been

participating in desegregation efforts.

Questions as to
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what difference does it make if a black child attends a
desegregated school had become a primary concern.

(Inter-

view, 6/2/80 and Committee for Quality Education, Letter
to Board, 7/25/77)
The national picture had been changing as well as the

I

local scene.

Politically, the country had moved through

the conservative period of the Nixon presidency, in which
there was increased support for anti-busing position.
Nationally, civil rights leadership was divided, as more
blacks were supportive of community control of schools.
Locally, the traditional civil rights organizations were
no longer "unequivocally" supportive of desegregation, as
they had been in the 1960s.

(Interview, 8/28/80)

The board was accustomed to making decisions in a
consensus framework.

Previously, it shared its plans with

representatives of the black community and had public
hearings at its board meetings.

It assumed that the com-

munity could reach consensus on the issues, but there was
no consensus on this issue.

The desegregation issue had

changed in the minds of a number of black participants.

The

black community was dissatisfied and through organizing
various segments of the community, spoke out strongly
against the policy change.

The Coalition facing the board

was the product of conflict, not consensus, decision-making.
The school system responded to this conflict by ask-

1

ing some traditional civil rights organizations to
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recommend a solution to the problem.

The board, acting

from a consensus perspective, still believed reasonable
people would see it their way, after some study of the
situation.
In suwmary, segments of the community had expressed
a strong interest in studying the desegregation plan in it$
entirety.

The board's response was to ask three organiza-

tions to make recommendations on the Jefferson situation
by December 15, 1977.

The next chapter will discuss the

formation of the Coalition and its decision to expand its
mission to study the entire desegregation plan.

The

second section will analyze the policy intervention, using
Rothman's (1968) models of community organization practice.

1

i
CHAPTER V
ANALYSIS OF THE POLICY INTERVENTION
Before this chapter provides an overview of the
critical events in the life of the Coalition (8/77 to 9/79)
and an analysis of the policy intervention, the environmental setting of the policy intervention, Portland School
District #1, will be examined.
In 1977, Portland was a city of approximately 380,000
people with a total metropolitan population of over
1,000,000.

School District #1 served an area covering most

of the city of Portland, as well as some unincorporated
areas contiguous to the City.

The district was organized

into three Administrative Areas, which operated with relative autonomy (Figure 4)

("Portland Public Schools: 1950

to 1977," Portland Bureau of Planning, April, 1978, p. 1).
Demographic changes had affected Portland Public
Schools during the previous decade.

Since 1969, Portland

school enrollment has declined to 57,000--a drop of 27
percent.

("Portland Public Schools: 1950 to 1977," p. 1)

Other characteristics of the school district are: over half
of the schools in use were built before 1950; nine schools
were closed since 1970; and only two out of ten of the
special levies since 1970 have been approved.
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PORTLAND PUBLIC SCHOOLS
BOUNDARIES MAP - ELEMENTARY & HIGH SCHOOLS
Shaded Araas Indicate
Three Administrative
Areas - K· 12

5/70
Public Information Dlpartmlnt
Portland Public Schooll
John H. Nillor, DiNdor

.Figure 4. Portland public schools boundaries map-elementary and high schools.
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A recent study of Portland's schools indicated a
growing financial problem.
The general population remains relatively constant
at approximately 380,000, but is now composed of a
smaller number of school-aged children and a greater
number of both elderly people and young adults without children. (p. 3)
With the general population remaining constant, the
average tax burden since 1970 has increased little
more than the rate of inflation. However, the cost
of educating each student has soared, increasing at
a rate of 14% each year, roughly twice the rate of
inflation during the same period.
This rate of increase is partly attributable to
increased services required by State and Federal
legislation, smaller class sizes, and improvements
of t.eacher and other employee workinq conditions
and benefits. (p. 9)
("Portland's Public Schools:
1950-1977")
The biggest factor influencing change in the schoolaged population was the continued preference among homeowners for suburban locations.
The City is losing families with children to its
suburbs through net out-migration. Also, families
with children who move to the SMSA [Standard Metropolitan Statistical Are.::-] tend to settle in suburban areas. ("Residential Mobility Study for
Portland, Oregon," Office of Planning and Development, April 17, 1978, p. 10)
This decline is expected to continue as Portland Public
Schools now graduates more students than it enrolls in
kindergarten.
The other important factor fer Portland schools
desegregation plan was that the enrollment decline has
been mainly white families.

In 1970, black students were

9.2% (or 7,008) of the district's total enrollment (1979
Enrollment Report, Portland Public Schools, p. 24).

In
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1979, blacks represented 14.7% (or 7,910) of the total
enrollment.

The number of black students increased only

slightly, but the percentage rose due to the loss of white
students from the district.
1979-80 was 23.2%.

Total minority enrollment in

("Superintendent's Annual Report to

Board of Education on Racial Balance," Portland Public
Schools, 1980, p. 4)

Prior to 1970, the school district

only kept figures on black enrollment as the minority
enrollment figure.
The black population was concentrated in Northeast
Portland.

In 1979-80, seven Northeast grade achoo1s--

Boise, Eliot, Humboldt, King, Sabin, Vernon, and Woodlawn-exceeded 50 percent minority enrollment and according to
the state guidelines, were considered racially isolated
schools ("Superintendent's Annual Report to Board of Education on Racial Balance, 1980, p. 21).
Since 1970, the district and board had used the
combined approaches of Early Childhood Education Centers,
Middle Schools, a magnet high school program at Jefferson,
and the Administrative Transfer program to promote desegregation in the schools.

Although it had not been success-

ful in resolving the problem of racially isolated schools,
a result of housing discrimination patterns, the district
had worked to reduce the number of black students in
racially isolated schools.
The district believed it had a successful
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desegregation program.

It stressed the educational divi-

dends of the various desegregation programs to both the
black and white community.

In 1976-77, 700 white children

voluntarily were bused to Early Childhood Centers (Oregonian, 11/12/78, p. Bl).

There were 1,700 volunteer

children in the Administrative Transfer program (90% of
whom were black).

An additional 800 students were "invol-

untary transfers Ii as there was no upper grade center in
their neighborhood.

Some of them had been assigned to

middle schools, but there was dispute over the actual number who had not been reassigned.

The school district

claimed that only 350 really were "involuntary transfer,"
whereas the Coalition maintained that the figure was
closer to 700 students (Oregonian, 11/24/78, p. Bl).
Another factor in the desegregation accomplishments,
was that desegregation had not involved any major litigation, nor had there been any serious opposition from any
segments of the white
been financial.

co~unity.

The real constraints hyd

With the defeat of the tax levies in 1971

and the resulting delays in middle school conversion, the
district made the Early Childhood Centers and the Administrative Transfer programs the major components of its
desegregation program.

As federal and state requirements

for school desegregation progress increased, the district
and board acted to diminish the racial isolation of certain
schools.

The Boise-King redistricting plan was one such
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response.

(Interviews, 8/27/80, 9/8/80, 6/2/80 and "Super-

intendent's Annual Report to the Board of Education on
Racial Balance," 1980, pp. 5-6)
The emphasis of the district's desegregation plan
had been that of racial balance.

A district spokesman

said, "the purpose of busing blacks to a large number of
schools is to have better racial balance in all our schools"
(Oregonian, 11/15/78, p. Bl).

The district wanted to

reduce the number of

schools.

all-whit~

Although the dis-

trict emphasized the educational benefits of Early Childhood Centers, Middle Schools, and the Administrative Transfer Program, there was no evaluation of these programs or
of the students who participated in them.
To date, the school district has no conclusive testing data on black achievement inside predominantly
white classrooms . • • • the district only recently
set up a testing program able to measure the effect
of school desegregation on black achievement.
However, school officials have determined that
the pre-, ~nce of black children in white classrooms
has not lowered the average white achievement
levels--a conclusion which is consistent with
national findings.
(Oregonian, 11/16/78, p. Bl)
Several district staff explained that achievement data was
not collected because the primary goal of school desegregation was social, not educational.

In fact, assessment

might detract from the goals of the desegregation plan,
\'fl'hose emphasis

\'las

on racial balance.

(Interviews, 8/27/80,

9/3/80, 7/23/80)
Academic achievement was the very issue that the
black

co~~unity

had begun to view differently.

After
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fourteen years of school desegregation, many black parents
were concerned with the quality of experience black children were receiving.

Other issues were: discipline prac-

tices, teacher attitudes, and transportation.

Specific

complaints of the black community during the summer, 1977
board meetings reflected their concerns.

For some, it was

the treatment that black children met at the "receiver"
schools where they were bused.

Generally, it was felt that

the administration, teachers, and children were not prepared to teach or relate to black

child~en.

A growing concern was the number of minority Administrative Transfer students who were suspended or expelled
at these receiving schools.

Minority student suspensions

were three times the percentage of white students in 197778 (Equity for the 80s, 1978, p. 95).

Problems with trans-

portation included stories of children who missed the bus
and missed school for the day, and of children waiting in
the rain until school opened.

Because of the distances

involved, parents couldn't participate in school support
activities and children
activities.

couldn'~

stay for after-school

(Oregonian, 11/16/78, p. B1; Interviews.

6/11/80a, 6/12/80, 7/16/80a, 7/24/80)
Criticism of the desegregation plan was growing
because of the black community's own experiences.

A black

parent in a letter to the editor expressed one perspective

J

I
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on the problem.
I am not against a positive plan that is fair and
just to all students. Black, white, and others.
I am against forcing black "children to be bussed
and making all schools in the model neighborhood
[Albina] early childhood centers. I felt at the
recent School Board meeting that the superintendent insinuated that I, as well as others have
disagreed with him, am against desegregation.
(Portland Observer, 8/18/77, p. 2)
Segments of the black community were dissatisfied with the
effects of the desegregation plan on their children.
Black leaders, buttressed by the city's white liberal establishment, have charged that creation of
the centers has unfairly fo:\:ced a predomillantly
black group of students to be bused out of their
n~ighborhood schools, while transfer into the
centers have remained voluntary for white students.
(Oregonian, 11/24/78, p. El)
Many blacks began to question the equity of one-way busing
to achieve desegregation.
The conflict over the redistricting plan in the summer of 1977 showed the growing gap between the school system
and community over desegregation.

The school system felt

that without the pressure from major community groups, they
had gone as far as they could in implementing school desegregation.

The board and district believed they had demon-

strated strong and progressive leadership in implementing
a board-initiated plan.

They were proud of the fact that

they had avoided a court suit or strong opposition from
white conservative community forces.

Their attitude can

be summed up "we've done as much as can be done in a communitylike Portland."

Thus, they were genuinely surprised
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when the black community reacted so strongly to the June,
1977 redistricting proposal.
The problem surfaced because the black community was
asking different questions and responding to different
constituencies than the school system.

In addition to the

goal of equal educational opportunity, they wanted to see
evidence of educational
planning.

qualit~l

and equity in desegregation

The challenge the board and superintendent gave

the community was, in essence, to see if the community
could construct c.: better plan wi thin the framework of state
and federal limitations.
The school district and these issues were the setting
fer the policy intervention by the Community Coalition.
Next, this chapter presents a description of the activities
for school integration during the life of the Coalition.
Chronology of Coalition Activities*
Phase I: 8/77-1/78
On August 23, 1977, an interim committee, composed
of representatives from the Urban League, NAACP, and Metropolitan Human Relations Commission voted "to form a broadbased coalition that would make recommendations to the
School Board for implementation in the desegregation program" (Coalition minutes, 8/23/77).

Open letters of

*Appendix D, Chronology of Coalition, 9/77-9/79
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invitation were sent to organizations and individuals
inviting their participation in the study.
me~ting

At the first

(9/1/77) the coalition" became the Community Coali-

tion for School Integration.

It established an organiza-

tional structure of a Task Coordinating Committee with
several subcommittees for Research, Resources, and Community
Involvement.
Between September, 1977 and January, 1978 the Coalition initiated and pursued the following tasks: (1) defining
its relation with the board and district, (2) obtaining
funds for staff, (3) conducting research on the Jefferson
situation, and (4) getting the community involved in the
study and the Coalition.
The Coalition clearly wanted to be independent of the
school system.

At the same time, it needed access to

school data and financial assistance.

The Coalition was

able to obtain funds from the city and county for staff
salaries.

The school district agreed to provide space,

secretarial and telephone services, and a set amount for
reproduction costs of the study.

It also agreed to make

data available to the Coalition.

A research coordinator

was hired in late November and an office was opened in a
local school annex.

In addition, the Coalition asked for

technical assistance from various other agencies: HEW,
Northwest Regional Educational Laboratory, and the General
Assistance Center for Desegregation.

The resources of these
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agencies were limited to providing technical assistance to
local school districts.

As an independent organization,

the Coalition could not receive direct assistance.
Instead, the Compensatory Education staff at the Oregon
State Department of Education served as the major technical

•

resource for the Coalition •
Invitations for membership in the Coalition were
repeated during this time, including a news-release in all
papers on 9i23/77 and 11/23/77.
committee assignments.

Members selected their own

The research committee began to

research and prepare its response to the SChOOL board on
the Boise-King plan.

The Coalition as a whole agreed to

meet twice a month.
The Community Involvement Committee recommended that
a series of community forums be held to begin a dialogue
between blacks and whites and to provide a means for people
to discuss integration issues.

Three forums were held in

November and December, 1977 at Jefferson, Wilson, and
Lincoln High Schools.
The Coalition presented its recommendations to the
school board in writing on December 15, 1977.

The board,

in its January 9, 1978 meeting, voted to "accept the Coalition report and to drop further consideration of the BoiseKing Redistricting Plan" (Board resolution X-4l89).

The

key factor was the Coalition's research finding, based on
an analysis of school data, that Jefferson was no longer

I
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"racially isolated."

The second finding was that if all

of the white students who should be attending Jefferson were
doing so now, the minority enrollment would be only about
27 percent (Coalition statement to board, 12/15/77).
Phase II: 1/78-1/79
The Coalition stated to the Board that its Boise-King
recommendations were a first step in its overall study of
desegregation in the Portland Public Schools.

The board

in resolution X-4189 (1/9/78) responded by voting to
"stro"ngly endorse the contin".ling efforts of the Coalition."
The work of evaluating the entire desegregation program began.

The research committee, with the two :cesearc;h

staff, examined national desegregation options

a~,

well as

analyzing the effects of Portland's current programs.
Twelve more community forums were held in the winter of
1978.

The community input from the forums became p.::a,rt of

the evalua.tion of the desegregation program.
In the spring of 1978 the Coalition extended its
deadline until November, 1978, in order to include the
results of a survey to be conducted of students, parents,
and staff participating in the Administrative Transfer p:cogram.

The summer of 1978 was spent finalizing research

options and analyzing the survey results.
The resources committ.ee continued to work on securing
necessary funds.

A prominent business leader agreed to
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solicit funds from the business community.

Approximately

$4,000 was raised from ten major businesses in the Portland
area (Coalition memo, 6/13/78).

Both the city and county

extended their share of Coalition salaries, as did the
school district on its in-kind

contrib~tions.

In addition,

the school district and State Department of Education paid
a pri.vate research firm to conduct the survey.

Many of the

Coalition members also made contributions to continue the
study.
III the fall of 1978, the Coalition took its desegre-

I

gation options out to the community, as well as to meetings
with its member organizations, for a second series of
forums.

The Coalition in its three November meetings voted

on individual recommendations for its final report.

This

report was presented to the board in two meetings on November 27 and December 4, 1978.

The next three board meetings

(12/11, 12/18, and 1/8/79) provided time for public testimoney on the Coalition's report as well as the superintendent's response.

The board voted on January 22, 1979 to

accept nine of the Coalition's recommendations, but it
rejected the major recommendation on school pairing.
(Board resolutions X-6118-6127, 1/8/79 and 1/22/79).
Phase III: 1/79-9/79
By January, 1979, the Coalition had lost its staff
and office space due to the end of its outside funding.
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When the Coalition met after the board's action, it was
again a volunteer organization without staff, space or
budget.

The reaction of the Coalition's membership to the

board's decisions on its report ranged from angry frustration to cautious optimism.

The Coalition did attempt to

reorganize and establish new objectives.
This phase was characterized by a variety of rapid
changes in the local school district.

The Coalition was

not able to continue its active role in desegregation advocacy.

An analysis of the events and the changing role of

the Coalition will be explored in the next chapter, Impact
of the Policy Intervention.

A list of some of the events

that occurred during this time period follows:
1. Legal complaint filed with Office of Civil Ri.ghts,

HEW;

2. Two new school board members elected;
3. Coalition team visited Seattle desegregation
program;
4. Coalition began and ended meetings with district
about resolutions;
5. Board member died and Coalition co-chair appointed;
6. Black United Front emerged;
7. Long-time school board member and initiator of
Jefferson reorganization plan resigned;
8. Boycott of schools by Black United Front proposed;
and
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9. Board approved short- and long-term resolutions.
Between January, 1979 and September, 1979 four new board
members were

~dded

to the school board, changing its orien-

tation on various school-community issues.
supportive of the Coalition.

All four were

In July, 1979, a black advo-

cacy group, the Black United Front, emerged and called for
a boycott of the schools unless the board acted to alter
desegregation policy in Portland (Portland Observer,
7/12/79).

On September 4, 1979, the school board voted to

change the direction and nature of Portland's desegregation
policy.
This summary of the activities of the Coalition provides the background for the analysis of the policy intervention.

Another important factor influencing the type of

policy intervention was the membership of the Coalition.
This next section describes the background of the members
and their orientation towards

desegre~ation

in Portland.

Description of Coalition Membership
The Coalition had individual and organizational memberships.
tive.

Each organization was permitted one representa-

In addition, other organizational members could join

the Coalition as individual members.

This analysis is a

composite of several interviews with Coalition members and
staff (6/10/80, 6/20/80, 6/16/80, 6/17/80, 6/1B/80a, 7/14/80,
7/25/BOd) plus material from the Coalition files, such as

I
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membership lists, as of 10/11/77, and Coalition minutes.
The Coalition was a diverse organization representing
different racial groups, residential locations, occupations,
and previous organizatiorial experiences.

Coalition member-

ship was approximately sixty percent white and forty percent
black.

Of the twenty-six organizations that joined the

Coalition, one-half of the organizational representatives
lived in Northeast Portland, eight lived in Southwest Portland, and three lived in Southeast Portland.

Of the indi-

vidual members (seventy-two), twenty-eight lived in Northeast Portland, twenty-six lived in North Portland, three
lived in Southeast, and eleven lived in Southwest.
members gave no address.

The

T~sk

Four

Coordinating Committee

was composed of nine blacks and five whites.

Geographi-

cally, there were seven from Northeast, four from North,
and three from Southwest.
Most of the Coalition members were adults.

Some high

school students did participate in the community forams,
the survey, and gave testimony on the final report at the
board meetings, but for the most part, the Coalition was
composed of adult advocates for the interests of children.
Interviews were conducted with twenty-nine Coalition
members and two staff members.
blacks were interviewed.

An

Sixteen whites and thirteen

occupational breakdown of those

interviewed shows the highest number, eleven, held government positions.

The remaining categories of employment
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were: five, community activities; three, parents; two,
teachers; two, private sector; two, social services; and
one each in law, higher education, ministry, and research.
Geographically, they were representative of the entire
Coalition membership: seventeen lived in Northeast, four
in North, seven in Southwest, and one in Southeast.

All

but one of the Task Coordinating Committee members were
interviewed.
Fourteen of the twenty-nine were involved in the
community's opposition to the Boise-King redistricting plan
and initiated the formation of the Coalition.

Nine members

were appointed by their organizations to work with the
Coalition.

Five of the twenty-nine interviewed were not

consistently involved throughout the eighteen months of
research.
The Coalition was an interracial coalition composed
of individuals and organizational representatives (see
Appendix E).

Within the Coalition there were subgroups who

tended to vote the same way or share the same point of view
regarding integration.

Membership in these subgroups over-

lapped, but the purpose of identifying these subgroups is
to illustrate the range of perspectives within the Coalition.

(Interviews, 6/10/80, 6/20/80, 6/16/80, 6/17/80b,

6/18/80a, 7/14/80, 7/25/80d)
Among whites there were three major subgroups: "westside liberals," inner Northeast "new integrationists," and
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North/Northeast "old-timers."

The "West-side liberals"

were people involved in organizations like the City Club,
Schools for the City, and a variety of liberal causes in
the city.

Other Coalition members believed the whites had

access to the city power structure.

They were resented for

this power connection, but at the same time Coalition members expected them to use it on behalf of the Coalition.
(Interviews, 7/24/80, 7i16/80a, 6/18/S0a, 6/12/80)

These

"liberals rt were very active in all the t!ornmitt,6es.
Their counterpart on the east side of Portland were
the "new integrationists."

These were mainly professionals

who had moved into the successfully integrated neighborhood,
Irvington, and who were strongly committed to integration,
as were the west-side liberals.

They were perceived by

other Coalition members to have worked hard for their
neighborhood grade school, but not for the rest of the
Northeast schools.

Several of the families were bi-racial

or had adopted a minority child.

They were more affluent

and though';: to have more power access than the other
Northeast participants.
The North-Northeast "old-timers" lived in neighborhoods that were part of the old Model Cities area, but had
not yet been touched by the ';revitalization" boom of Irvington.

They had integrated in a dif f eren t \1ay, i. e., mainly

they were whites who had not left as blacks moved into
their neighborhoods.

Many of these whites became committed
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to achieve the best education for blacks and whites in
their local schools.

Increasingly, they saw the issue as

that of "class, not race."

The parents' groups from Jeffer-

son High School were an example of this group.

They, like

the blacks, felt the school system did not listen to them.

•

J

This group tended to identify with the black perspective •
Generally, they felt and were perceived to have less access
to

pow~r

than the other white subgroups involved in the

Coalition.
A bi-racial group, the "human relations professionals,"
was composed of blacks and whites who had a long-term commitment to the improvement of race relations in the c:i.ty.
These blacks and whites through their jobs had access to
resources and the power structure which they used to further
the Coalition's work.

Their work experiences made them

more willing to push the issue further politically than
the "west-side liberals."

They played a strong facilitating

role in the Coalition.
There were three major subgroups of blacks, the
second generation

"ne\'~

leaders," the first gel!era tion "his-

torical leaders," and black "activists."
leaders" there was a range of backgrounds.

Among the "new
The young

"comers" were members of traditional civil rights organizations, but they were willing to use different methods to
achieve desegregation than the historical leaders.

They

were skilled professionals with organizational experience

99

in social change situations and provided much of the lead-'
ership in the Coalition.

Some were black professionals who

participated because of their jobs.

A third group, the

"activist" blacks, were outspoken and willing to push the
Coalition as far as they could.

They served as lead-point

persons and were frequently on the cutting edge of an issue.
Their insights generated a lot of conflict within the Coalition, but also served to communicate the anger and frustration of years of struggle over this issue with the school
system.
'The "historical blacks" were long-term fighters in
the cause of integration.

Their style was different as was

their experience, than that of the "new leaders."

They had

a long history of struggling for better educational opportunities.

Their backgrounds were in the churches and

traditional civil rights orgaI"izatio!"!s.

They were a moder-

ate force in the Coalition and bridged the gap between the
"new leaders" among the blacks and the west-side and inner
Northeast white liberal groups.
Based on information from the interviews, a pattern
of decision-making emerged in the Coalition.

The "west-

side liberals" and "new leaders" were the leaders in forming
the agenda, pushing issues, and strategizing the organization's direction.

The "new leaders" and North/Northeast

"old-timers" voted together on the issues while the "westside and inner Northeast liberals" were the

oth~Z'

voting
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bloc.

The mediators were the bi-racial "human relations

professionals" and "historical leaders" who moved between
the two voting blocs to resolve' the conflicts.

(Interviews,

7/14/80, 10/13/80; see Appendix C, question on roles)
The Task Coordinating Committee, which reviewed all
sub-committee work and then referred it to the whole Coal ition for final action, had representation from each of the
subgroups, but the "new leader" blacks were the majcritYf
holding seven of the fourteen committee positions plus the
support of two representatives from the North/Northeast
"old-timers."

The experiences and perspectives of individ-

ual members and their influence on the direction of the
Coalition needs to be included in the analysis of the
policy intervention by this community organization.
Factors Shaping Community Organization
Intervention (Rothman, 1968)
Goal Categories of Community Action
The two official goals of the Coalition were adopted
at its first meeting.
1. To identify common concerns of the community in
connection with desegregation in the Portland
School District. • • • the goal being to insure
equal educational opportunities to maximize each
child's potential.
2. To request of the Portland Public School Board
a complete statement and analysis of desegregation policy and practices from 1965 through 1977
in order to enable the coalition to realistically make recommendations to the Portland Public
~chool Board.
(CC3I minutes, 9/1/77)

. JL.
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Rothman identifies two kinds of goals in community organization models: task and process.

A task goal, as defined

by Rothman, is "the completion of a concrete task or the
solution of a delimited problem pertaining to the functioning of a con-.rt1unity social system" (1968, p. 477).
second goal of the Coalition was a task goal.

The

The Coali-

tion planned to develop recommendations for the Jefferson
situation and then, study the entire desegregation program's
practices.

Process goals are "concerned with a generalized

or gross capacity of the community system to function over
time"" (1968, p. 478).

The Coalition's first goal, to ensure

equal educational opportunity, is more of a process goal.
The Coalition's goals reflect the social reform model
of community organization.

(See Figure 5.)

The Coalition

wanted to modify the existing desegregation policy through
its study and recommendations.
pursu~d

The reason the Coalition

this task was to ensure equality of educational

opportunity, a "process," a social action goal which in the
long run involves a "shifting of power relationships and
resources."

However, the Coalition did not see itself as

making "basic institutional changes r

"

but "problem-solving

a sUbstantive community issue" which was affecting the
minority community.

(Rothman, 1968, Definitions, p. 477)

Seventeen out of the twenty-nine Coalition members interviewed listed the task goal as the major goal of the
Coalition.

Other members were divided among three
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*

Task goal:
-Social prov1s10n
study , make
for disadvantaged
recommendations group (task goal).
for change of
policy.
Inequity ------ ----- Substantive
social problems
, disadvantaged
I populations.

1. Goal categories
of community action

Shifting of power relationships & resources:
basic institutional
change. (task or
process goal)

2. Assumption
concerning co~~unity
structure & problem
conditions

Disadvantaged ---------populgtions, social
injustice, deprivation, inequity.

3. Basic change
strategy

Crystallization of
issues & organization
of people to take
action against enemy
targets.

Coalition
politics

4. Characteristic
change tactics &
techniques

Conflict or contest
confrontation, dire~t
action, negotiation.

Research: ----- --- Employment of
fact-finding
facts , persuasion
& recommendato apply pressure
tions for
on appropriatE!
change
decision-making
bodies.

5. Salient
practitioner
roles

Activist-advocate
agitator, broker,
negotiator, partisan.

Coalition
builder,
researcher

Coalition-builder,
fact-gatherer.

6. Medium of
change

Manipulation of mass
organizations &
political processes.

Work with
community
groups

--- Manipulation of
voluntary associations & legislative bodies.

7. Orientation
toward power
structure

Power structure as
external target of
action: oppressors
to be coerced or
overturned.

Power center
--- Neutral view
influenced thru of decision-making
persuasion
centers in "gatekeeper" terms.
Influence thru
persuasion 'lor
pressure.

8. Conception of
constituent population & role

Population as ---------- Coalition
victims; role as
members both
employers or members.
acted for others, but also
had constituent
members.

9. Assumptions
regarding interests
of communi~y subparts

Conflicting interests
which are not easily
l'econc ilable: scarce
resources

10. Conception of
the public interest

Reality-Individualist.-- ---------------- -- RealistI Individualist.

1

Reconcilable
interests

----- Organization
of. coalition of
concerned interests.

Population at
risk; Act on
behalf of that
population.
-- Interests
reconcilable or
in conflict.

Figure 5. Comparison of the community
coalition with two models of community
organization practice. (Rothman, 1968)*
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additional goals: quality education, integration without
undue stress on blacks, and equity in desegregation.
Equal educational opportunity, the Coalition's process
goal, had three components: equity, quality education, and
desegregation/integration.

For some, equal educational

opportunity was providing quality education for all children.

However, there was growing concern that desegregation

schooling did not mean quality education for black children.
(Interview, 6/17/BOb; Oregonian, 11/16/BO, p. B1, 11/20/BO,
p. B1)

There was no evidence of increased achievement in

test scores and there was evidence of disciplinary problems,
e.g., the "out of compliance decision" by the federal government in July, 1977 over discriminatory disciplinary
practices (Oregonian, 11/16/80, p. B1).
Some Coalition members had a commitment to integration,
but only if it was accomplished without undue stress on black
children (Interviews; 7/25/BOb, 7/24/BO, 7/21/BO, 9/15/BO).
Finally, there was support of desegregation programs, but
the overriding issue became how they were desegregated.
the desegregation plan equitable to all students?

Is

The Coa-

lition members and the black community did not think one-way
busing was equitable (School Desegregation in Portland, Oregon, 1977; Interview, 7/21/BO; Oregonian, 11/12/BO, p. 1).
Four hundred citizens who participated in the Coalition's
forum series listed inequity as the major issue in school
desegregation in Portland (Coalition Report, 3/1B/7B, p. 1).
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Assumptions Concerning Community Structure
and Problem Conditions
Coalition members felt very strongly that inequity
in school desegregation was the substantive social problem.
The policy was inequitable because black children bore the
greatest burden.

The social reform model assumptions about

the community structure "include both substantive social
problems and disadvantaged populations."

The Coalition was

closer to the social reform model as few members described
the community as "comprised of a hierarchy of privilege and
power, the social action model orientation" (Rothman, 1968,
pp • 4 77 I 48 8) •
The Coalition assumed that if it documented the
inequity, the board and superintendent would change the
inequitable policies.

As the research committee began to

document the degree of "scattering" among minority children,
Coalition members felt the practices were so clearly
inequitable that once documented, it would be incumbent upon
the school district to changes these practices.

(Interviews,

7/10/80, 6/19/80b, 6/18/80a)
Basic Change strategy
The basic change strategy of the social reform model
"involves the coalition of concerned interests" (Rothman,
1968, p. 488).
strategy.

The Coalition exemplified this basic change

The process of building an interracial coalition
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began as a result of the three invited community organizations extending an invitation to all community groups to
participate in the study.

These three organizations saw

the need for broad-based community involvement in this
study.

(Interviews, 6/10/80, 6/ll/BOa, 6/ll/80b, 6/l7/BOb)
One hundred and ten people carne to the first meeting

of the Coalition.

I

They selected the name, Community Coali-

tion for School Integration, because they wanted a name
that was "progressive and positive" (Interview, 6/l7/80b).
The Task Coordinating Committee which functioned as the
executive

committee~

was broad-based, reflecting racial,

residential, and occupational diversity.
The Coalition's first task was to develop a group
that could work together.

It was one thing to say that

this was an interracial organization; it was another to
work as one.

Several Coalition members commented that

initially there was distrust, which had to be overcome,
between blacks and whites, but also between the east and
west-side whites.

One approach to this issue was to select

two co-chairs, one black, one white, for each committee.
Two-way communication on the issues took time because
many whites were unaware of the changes in Albina schools.
Blacks were insistent that the whole community be involved
in this study because it was a city-wide problem, not just
a problem of the black community.
6/ll/BOb)

1

(Interview, G/ll/aOa,

· I·
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One perspective on the group process was described in
the following:
The group was varied in age, ethnic background,
economic background and geographic location.
Therein lay its strength. Therein, also lay the
difficulty of coming together as separate individuals with many different perspectives and experiences. The dynamics that operated within that
organization was really thrilling to observe.
[In the beginning, a simple planning of a panel
seminar at a high school would take four hours for
the Community Involvement Committee. And then we
got so that we could do our work in an hour's time
which felt like a reasonable leugth of time.] But
for volunteers to go week after week~ sometimes
twice a week, and spend four hours an evening.
You understand there was something very significant
occurring or they wouldn't have done it for eighteen
months.
C~edibility had to be established.
The process
of examining an issue and arguing the issue rather
than getting angry at the person who was taking
an opposing position to yours--that was a very
important learning process. Learning the difference between feeling and facts--that feelings are
facts, as well as data. And the people who were
accustomed to thinking and speaking in terms of
feeling came to value those folks who could translate their feelings into communicable information
that could become part of the report. If you are
going to permit someone to corn~unicate your feelings, you have to trust the ~~rson who is doing
the translation. (Interview, 7/10/80)
The Coalition also established a democratic decisionmaking process.

The members wanted the entire body to make

the final decisions.

The working committees would submit

recommendations to the Task Coordinating Committee which
in turn would ask the entire Coalition to take final action.
The Coalition saw the need to "educate ourselves first,
then others in the community" (Interview, 6/17/80b).

The

decision-making process allowed much of the work to be done
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in the committees, but the entire membership would participate through the final vote.

This process allowed the

Coalition to act as one voice when making outside presenta.tions.
A coalition representing diverse interests involved
trade-offs as well as listening to other people's points
of view.

There was complete agreement among interviewed

Coalition members that the process was one of the most
democratic of any group.
everyone was heard.

The meetings were long because

When it came time to vote, especially

on controversial issues, people were either ready to compromise or to accept the results because their voice had
been heard.

Also, individual groups were free to pursue

their own goals outside of the Coalition.

If the Coalition

could not agree on an issue, an individual or group might
decide to work on it.
Characteristic Change Tactics and Techniques
Social Action (p. 477)

Social Reform (p. 488)

Change tactics are:
confrontation, direct
action or negotiation.

Change techniques use in large
measure campaign tactics, the
employment of acts and persuasion to apply pressure on
appropriate decison-making
bodies.

(Rothman, 1968)

The Coalition's strategies generated much of the
debate and controversy over style and substance in the
greater

commun~ty.

Was the Coalition composed of social

f
lOB
activists or a more traditional group of reformers?

One

board member characterized them as proponents of the "politics of confrontation" (9/8/80).

For Coalition members,

they were operating very much within the reformist mode of
change.

The Coalition believed it was practicing consensus

politics.
The test for strategy selection, according to one
member, was "Is this strategy relevant to our goals?"
(Interview,6/19/80c).

The strategies the Coalition

employed were: research (data gathering and analysis),
community involvement, media suppport, and lobbying.
Research
The Coalition was committed to a comprehensive and
high quality research effort.

It hired two research staff,

both with previous experience with desegregation.

One had

worked as a research assistant on a year-long participantobserver study of the first year of desegregation in a
Portland elementary school.

The second person had been

involved in a desegregation struggle in an eastern city
school system, as well as having worked for integrated
housing as part of a national movement.

The Research Com-

mittee divided into subcommittees to analyze all parts of
the desegregation program.

The

fou~

major subcommittees,

Legal, Demographic, Policy and Plans, and National followed a research outline that targeted the following areas
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for study:
1. Desegregation efforts of other cities--specifically, role of the community;
2. Legal constraints--federal and state regulations;
3. Administrative Transfer programs;
4. District magnet programs;
5. Multi-cultural preparation;
6. Staffing;
7. Early Childhood Education Centers;

s.

Curriculum--e1ementary, middle school, and high
school; and

9. Housing.
In order to evaluate the desegregation program, the Coalition had to know what the district knew plus be knowledgable about the national desegregation efforts.

As one

member explained, "You can't advocate for change, if you
don't know what you want to change" (Interview, 6/l0/S0).
In addition to the work of the staff and the Research
Committee, community forums were a source of information
regarding people's experiences with desegregation.

Forum

participants' comments were part of the data base.
The Coalition was dependent on the school system for
all local school data.
adequate data.

There were some problems obtaining

As one school district employee explained:

Until recently, the school district had set up no
program to evaluate the effects of desegregation on
student achievement.. The reasons • • • were myriad.
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The objectives of the desegregation program were
primarily social objectives, he said. It was
probably assumed in the first years of the program
that its effectiveness (in. improving black achievement) would not be so great.
I also think there was an honest fear that if you
began emphasizing achievement, then that might be
used as a reason for terminating the program.
For the past two or three years, the school
superintendent really wanted to have a testing
program, but we found ourselves in such a data disarray that we couldn't do it. (Oregonian, 11/20/78,
p. B1)
The "disarray" grew out of several problems.

(1) The dis-

trict had no city-wide testing program, other than the
METRO Tests, a locally developed achievement test.
tests· were given only at grades 3, 8, and 11

~nd

These

could not

be used for desegregation evaluation because they did not
follow students from one grade level to another.

(2) Also,

each of the three administrative areas has used different
tests at different times of the year, which makes comparison impossible.*
(3) Another problem was in the area of keeping adequate records.

The district which was decentralized into

three administrative areas, had no student numbering system
so that individual students could be identified and followed as they moved from one school to another.

(Inter-

view, 7/23/80)
*Use of a new measurement system began district-wide
in 1980. A three-year data base has been established which
will be available for analysis in the fall of 1980, so that
achievement data can be used in the future.
(Oregonian,
ll/10/7t)
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The Coalition, with the assistance of the district, .

I
I

developed a survey which an independent research firm used
to interview all participants in the Administrative Transfer program.

In sum, the Coalition's research was based

on analysis of local school district data,

co~~unity

input,

review of desegregation research nationally, legal precedents, the Administrative Transfer survey, and a review of
all aspects of the district!s desegregation programs.
The Coalition's recommendations were resubmitted for
review to a series of community forums in the fall of 1978,
as well as to the participating organizations.

The entire

Coalition voted on the final recommendations for the
board in November, 1978.

Additional discussion of this

process is found in the section, Assumptions Regarding
Interests of Community Subparts.
Community Involvement
The second major strategy of the Coalition was to
involve the entire community in an examination of past
desegregation programs and a decision on the direction of
future desegregation programs.

Community education

a~d

community involvement were the two approaches pursued in
order to generate public awareness of and support for the
need to change the situation.
series of community forums.

The Coalition held two
The first series involved

fifteen meetings and approximately 400 persons participated.

(Coalition report, 3/78)

The purpose of these
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forums was to gather information from the community as to
the nature of the problems with desegregation programs,
and about peoples' views of what the priorities in desegregation should be.

The four priorities they named were

inequity, interracial understanding, quality education,
and neighborhood integrity.
pp. 128-29)

(Equity for the 80s, 11/27/78,

The second series of forums was held in Fall,

1978 at twelve schools.

The Coalition presented various

desegregation plans for community response.
cptio~s;

Of the various

a one-year transfer program received support from

59% of the ,...hite participants and 70% of the blacks.

For

pairing of grades 1-4, white support fell to 42% "acceptable" and 55% "unacceptable," as compared to black support,
72% acceptable.

On

p~iring

grades 5-8, white support rose

slightly to 45% "acceptable," but 50% still found it unacceptab1e.

The black figures were 76% acceptable and 18%

unacceptable.

(Equity for the 80s, CCSI, 11/27/78, p. 142)

The Coalition recommended a combined pairing approach, but
it acknowledged that the one-year required t.ransfer idea
received significant support from participants who attended
the public forums.
Under either program, a concept which received broad
public support--the concept of keeping students from
a particular neighborhood together as they go
through school--wou1d pertain. Considering the two
from a purely economic view, the pairing plan, involving far fewer schools than the one-year plan,
is preferable because transportation costs would
lower. (Equity for the 80s, 11/27/78, p. 85)
Transcripts of .both series of

for~ms

are contained in the

113:

appendices of the Coalition's final report, Equity for the

I

80s (1978).
Another way the Community· Involvement CommitteE:
involved the communi t:{ was through social gatherings.

The

Coalition sponsored two parties on May 19, 1978 and November 4, 1978.

Four hundred and fifty people attended the

first party.

The parties were an opportunity for Coalition

members to work together on an informal basis.

Several

people commented that washing dishes was a great way to
work out geographic and ethnic differences (Interview,
6/19/8.0b).
cians.

The parties attracted city and county politi-

The party was an opportunity for community-building

among Coalition members, as well as with the broader community.
The Community Involvement Committee also established
a speaker's bureau which provided speakers to organizations
to explain the study the Coalition was doing and to solicit
support from various groups as the Coalition prepared its
final recommendation.
Media
A third strategy involved work with the media for
extensive coverage of the Coalition's activities.
of the community education

proce~s

Part

was to make all citizens

aware of the issues in desegregation.

Coalition members

believed one of the problems was that desegregation

choi~es
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~~Tere

not openly discussed in the past.

One role the Coali-

tion played was to expand the discussion both in terms of
the number of participants as well as the scope of the
issue.

The media was an important part of this strategy.
Four newspapers, the Oregonian, Oregon Journal,

Portland Observer, and Willamette Week, covered the Coalition.

The television stations also regularly covered

Coalition meetings and forums, and did a special series
on the issues.

The Portland Observer offered the most

continuous coverage of the Coalition in articles and editorials.

The Oregonian education reporter was released

from regular assignments for four months to research indepth the desegregation program.
The

O~egonian

(Interview, 9/21/80)

carried a twelve-part series analyzing deseg-

regation in November, 1978, right before the Coalition
presented its report to the board.

One television channel

showed a four-part series on its evening news in February,
1978, focused on desegregation, and on educating the public
about the community forums.

During the time from November,

1978 to January, 1979, there was extensive coverage by the
newspa.pers, television, and radio on the Coalition's recommendations.

Willamette Week ran lead stories for three

weeks in December, 1978.

The Oregonian and Oregon Journal

gave front-page coverage as well as editorial support to
the work of the Coalition.

In January, 1979, a local tele-

vision news analyst did a three-day series on the evening

i15
news which was supportive of the Coalition.

The news media

very consciously tried to show the school system the amount
of community support behind the Coalition.

(Interview,

9/19/80).
Lobbying
Coalition members question how effective their lobbying efforts were.

In fact, some Coalition members prefer

to describe their efforts as more persuasion than lobbying.
One Coalition person said, we were informing people to get
support (7/25/80a).

The Community Involvement Committee

met with city council and county commission members several
times to keep them advised of their progress, as well as
to solicit support for their proposals (Community Involvement minutes, April, 1978).

Small groups also met with

school board members between Spring and Fall, 1978 to
apprise them of their work.

Several school district staff

were asked to read draft reports for discussion and comment.

The lobbying/persuasion effort was fairly low-key

in the attempt to keep all the people aware of the Coalition's study and recommendations.

(Interview, 9/15/80)

The Coalition did want the city and county politicians'
support and endorsement of the final report.

They also

inform:-;d and asked for support from member organizations.
It was a "soft" approach of communicating and sharing ideas
with the board--in essence, "cultivating the board."
(Interview, 7/14/80, 8/6/80)
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Other Strategies
The

pr~mary

strategies of the Coalition characterize

it as a "social.l reform" organization.

However, some of

the tactics the Coalition· considered but did not adopt
reflect more of a social action approach.

The direct action

tactics of a boycott and legal action were considered after
the board's rejection of the

scho~l

pairing plan.

On a

March, 1979 visit to Seattle; the Coalition team learned
that a successful boycott by blacks had contributed to
that school systemls adoption of a mandatory plan (Interview, 7/16/80).

Legal research was done to explore the

possibilities of a lawsuit, but the conclusion was that
it would be difficult because of the district's record of
voluntary desegregation (Interview, 7/16/BOb).

The Coali-

tion as a whole decided net to take legal action, but
several individuals did file a complaint with the Office
of Civil Rights in January, 1979 regarding the "disproportionate burden" issue.

(See Impact chapter.)

Because of the policy that individuals and organizations could pursue thei.r own objectives in desegregation,
the Coalition decided not to play an "ombudsman" role of
trying to respond to all the concerns 0f the black community
regarding education.

The fear was that the Coalition would

become too diffused from its major goal.

Also, that it
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would lose credibility if it were constantly getting side-·
traced on other issues.
There were two vacancies on the board between January,
1978 and November, 1978.

The Coalition did not back candi-

dates, but a small group of Coalition members supported
a black candidate with a compatible educational philosophy.
They were not successful in ·.getting their candidate
\.

appointed because the board selected another black candi-.
date.

The selection process indicated, however, the divi-

sions within the black community and that no black would
represent the entire black comrnunity.*
The reaJ. struggle over tactics was more a matter of
tone and style.

One faction within the Coalition wanted

to use confrontational tactics--"to embarrass the Board
publicly" (Interview, 6/16/80).
of abuse was perfectly clear.

They thought the record
The struggle was between

confrontive and conciliatory styles.

Some wanted to be

clear and indicting--to call the administration "racist."
Others sought a more conciliatory model of communication
and advised against "burning our bridges" (Interview,
6/18/80).

These differences were not solely based on race,

since many of the North/Northeast "old-time whites" agreed
with the "new leader" blacks in assigning blame to the

*For further discussion of this appointment struggle,
see Wi11amette Week, 10/2/78 and Portland Observer, 8/10/78,
8/17/78, 8/24/78.
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school system.

Some "historical blacks" agreed with "west-

side white liberals" that they could still work with the
school system (Interviews f 7/10/80, 8/11/80, 6/19/80b).

I

Some Coalition members liked the confrontive mode, while
others liked a more conciliatory role.

Regardless of

individual preferences, the Coalition agreed that it had
to confront the district and board with the findings of
the study and advocate strongly for its recommendations.
Salient Practitioner Roles
Rothman (1968) identifies various roles a community
organizer employs while working in an organization.

This

study asked Coalition members to describe the ro1e(s) they
played.

There is overlap as several people described them-

selves as playing more than one role.

Under the social

action category, five described themselves as activistadvocates, two as brokers, and one as a negotiator.

Under

the social reform category, eight described themselves as
coalition-builders (mediators) and five as fact-gatherers.
In addition to these categories,· four people saw
their ro3.e as that of "facilitator," two people as "interpreter," and about six people played an "organizer-p1annerstra'tegist" role.

The mediators-faci1itators-negotiators

played a critical role since they spent much of their time
listening to the different opinions of the members.
task was to "calm people down, to bring people back

Their
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together, and to help people with opposing styles to hear
each other" (Interviews, 7/10/80, 7/14/80, 7/25/80b).
Many Coalition members felt the leadership played
a significant role as "the glue that held the Coalition
together."

At meetings everyone had a chance to speak.

(Interview, 6/11/80b; Willamette Week, 12/25/78)

The diver-

sity of individuals and organizations made it imperative
that everyone work together on the key issues.

One way

the Coalition encouraged its members to become involved
was through committee assignments.

That way, each person

could learn about the issues firsthand at the committee
level and then reconsider issues at the full Coalition
meetings.
An

overriding characteristic of the Coalition was

its commitment to the democratic process.

It served as

an alternative model to the school district in that it
allowed the coromunity and
agenda.

it~

membership to determine the

Some people voiced their opinions strongly, but

"people eventually put away their private agendas, became
part of the Coalition process and struggled to reach an
acceptable compromise on our Board recommendations" (Interview, 7/10/80).
Medium of Change
Activists in the social action model "create and
manipulate mass organizations and movements and influence
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political processes" (Rothman, 1968, p. 482).

I

The

coalition-builder "manipulates voluntary associations and
legislative bodies" (Rothman, 1'968, p. 488).

The coa:i..ition

addressed two arenas: formal organizations in the political
process, and voluntary associations.
"Manipulation of formal organizations and of data,
the social planning model" was primary in the Coalition's
operation

(Rothman, 1968, p. 477).

Coalition members were optimistic about this approach
because the school board had accepted and implemented the
Schwab committee repoLt.

Its line of reasoning was:

If the Coalition does responsible research, the
board will accept our recommendations. The Coalition is a responsible, commited group of citizens
similar to those who researched and wrote the
Schwab report. ( In ter'\T iew, 7/10/80)·
Coalition members met with board members and district staff
periodically in an attempt to keep everyone informed of
its progress.

(Interview 6/18/80c; Coalition minutes)

They were committed to play by the rules, i.e., submit
reports on time (Interview, 9/15/80).
In retrospect, some Coalition members noted the political naivete concerning its research approach (Interview,
6/19/80b).

The Coalition was not prepared for the "po1it-

icalness" of the process (Interview, 7/21/80).

It didn't

understand the need for more people with clout to be
involved (Interview, 6/18/80c).

Although Coalition members

met with school district staff, board members, and city and
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county politicians, it decided not to lobby or negotiate
with the board prior to the final recommendations (Inter-

I

I

views, 6/17/80, 7/21/80).
Some Coalition
naive.

member~

may have been politically

Others, however, decided to support the research

and recommendation approach as the most viable at that
stage of events and recognized that community support would
be critical for the acceptance of the report.

The Coali-

tion did not consider the social action model of "influence
the political process" until after the board's rejection
of the school pairing plan.

(See Chapter VI for further

discussion.)
Not all Coalition members supported the research
format as a way of changing the board's policy.

However,

the major focus of the Coalition from January, 1978 to
January, 1979 was on collecting and analyzing data.

The

Community Involvement Committee and the Task Coordinating
Committee recognized the need for support from influential
groups for their final recommendations.

Although the

Coalition received support from a variety of community
groups, there were some important community segments
missing.
Every successful desegregation plan has happened
because city and business leadership gave it their full
support (Kirby et al., 1973).

Although the Coalition

sought support from these groups, it received only limited
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endorsement from the business, political, and religious
community segments.

There were individual exceptions.

Two city commissioners did support the Coalition's report
with written testimony before the board; the Chamber of
Commerce joined the Coalition; and the regional ecumenical
religious body endorsed the Coalition's findings.

Other

people with power and influence were noticeably absent.
One Coalition member suggested that business, politi-

I

cal, and religious leaders speak out only in crisis situations where harm may occur in the community (Interview,
7/21/80).

The Coalition documented the problem but evi-

dently it \tlas not perceived as being at the crisis stage.
Another possible explanation was that the business and
political community was generally supportive of the board
and superintendent.

"The superintendent didn't let anyone

know he had a problem," explained one Coalition member
(Interview, 6/19/80c).

In addition, the board's and super-

intendent's attitudes about the Coalition made it difficult
to approach some business people (Interview, 6/19/80b).
Some members of the business community did contribute
financially to the work of the Coalition, but did not publicly support the Coalition report.
The Coalition was most successful with its "manipulation of voluntary associations l' (social reform model)--in
essence, its own member organizations.

The Coalition

was able to get support for its findings and recommendations
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from most of its member organizations.

Not every

tion supported the school pairing concept.

organiza~

Several groups

supported the overall value concepts of the report, but
not the specific recommendations.
Orientation Toward Power Structure

I

The historic development of the

desegr~gation

issue

in Portland was an important factor in how members viewed
the power structure.

The Coalition began with the research

change strategy because that was what the board asked them
to

do~~study

situation.

and make recommendations about the Jefferson
Second, they adopted the research strategy

because the Schwab committee report had been accepted.

But

unlike the Schwab report which began with a blank slate
of desegregation accomplishments and was able to make
recomendations about what to do about segregated schools,
there was a thirteen-year history of desegregation programs
for the Coalition to evaluate.

The school system, the

families, and the neighborhoods involved in the desegregation program had been affected by the experience.

The

board and school district generally were pleased with their
progress.

Some black parents had begun to question its

success, while others continued to support the programs.
(Interviews, Oregonian, 11/10/78-11/20/78, Portland
Observer)
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How people perceive the power structure has a great
deal to do with their previous experiences in trying to
make changes in the system.

Many Coalition members

to the social reform orientation.

a~cribed

They saw the power struc-

ture as that of "gate-keeper" and that its power center
could be influenced through persuasion or pressure.

In

contrast, the social action model sees the power structure
aa an external target of action.
be coerced or overturned."

The

"oppre~;sors

need to

Some Coalition members and,

later, the Black United Front shared this view of the Portland power structure.

(Rothman 1 1968, p. 483)

Portland has had considerable citizen involvement
in city politics during the 19705.
tions have been involved in

Neighborhood associa-

communit~l

development plans;

the citizens advisory committee of the Downtown plan and
numerous City Club reports all have influenced politics
and policy.

The success of the Schwab committee and experi-

ences with city-wide citizen action led Coalition members
to see the power structure, the school board and superintendent as open. to influence.

Some Coalition members

were skeptical and thought there was a need for stronger
action.
Although the Coalition began with this social reform
orientation, it changed during the process cf persuading
the board.

Coalition people began to lose confidence in

this approach.

One member commented on the "frustration

l2.~

because no one took the concerns seriously."

Neither the

board nor superintendent wanted to discuss "how do we make
it work better?" (Interview, 6/l9/80b).

People with City

Club and Schools for the City background had successfully
used persuasion in past approaches to power structures.
They were

~~rprised

when the board expressed resentment

over their criticism when their attitude seemed to be-we don't want to answer questions about desegregation policy.

(Interviews, 6/l9/80b, 7/10/80)
Although the persuasion approach was not successful

with the board, Coalition members offered these explanations for that failure.

The power structures does not res-

pond the same way to the black assessment of the problem,
as it does to a white assessmen·c.
The interaction with the

~oard

(Interview, 7/21/80)

was not a static process.

Perceptions were constantly in flux.

One board member felt

that the Coalition was not interested in discussions
because the board was not able to dialogue with Coalition
members (Interview, 9/8/80).

Board members were not accus-

tomed to the independent, adversarial style of the Coalition.

Coalition members felt that the board and superin-

tendent were threatened by the differences in style.

The

interactions quickly became an issue of personalities and
positions.

One board member believed this happened because

two or three school system people were interacting with a
core Coalition group on the issues, and that the discussions
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and decisions became more a matter of personality than the

I

issues involved.

Increasingly, the Coalition described

the board and administration as "arrogant, paternalistic,
entrenched, unresponsive and close-minded" (Summary of
interviews, CCSI).
Coalition members began the study assuming that the
school system knew what it was doing in desegregation.
information became difficult to obtain

~nd

As

errors in school

data were revealed, respect for the district staff eroded
(Interview, 6/17/80b).

For some Coalition members it

increased their feelings of paranoia--the district had
deliberately set out to destroy the black community.
Coalition

me~bers,

Other

who assumed the board was composed of

liberal; progressive people, saw a power structure which
wore blinders and did not look at the consequences of its
actions.

(Interview, 8/6/80)

As the recognition of the political nature of the
educational process evolved, people grew dissatisfied with
Coalition actions.

Some were upset at the compromises made

over the research report in order to have acceptable recommendations for the board (Interview, 7/25/80a).

Others

hoped that the more powerful whites (those with past experience of influence with the district) would accomplish the
needed changes.

Their hope was replaced by anger when that

did not happen.

Coalition members, although recognizing

that the power structure was closed to their questions,
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still hoped the board would accept all its recommendations.
The Coalition hoped its unity, strong community support,
and research findings would be enough to convince the board.
One newspaper report commented:
Clearly, the Coalition has a couple of things in its
favor. While Portland long has possessed its fair
share of racists, such people are not currently in
power on the school board. A close observer suggests
that the 'principal motivation in board members' decisions on such an issue is "what's basically acceptable."
And it's clearly not socially acceptable to be perceived as racist at this point in Portland's history • • •
Additionally, some moralists will say the Coalition
has a clear moral issue on its side: 't.he unfairness
of requiring one community to travel to get an education without making a similar requirement of others.
Social acceptability and moral issues, however,
may not be enough to get the coalition the result it
wants. (Ronald A. Bue1, "The Pclitics of Pairing,"
Willamette Week" 12/11/78, p. 6)
Some Coalition members felt "The district may have underestimated us because we were nice people.

Sometimes we

worry too much about being nice" (Interview, 6/12/80).
The Coalition pursued the nice, liberal, progressive game
of change with the board as its target and then did not
win all that it wanted.
Conception of Constituent
Population and Role
The CoaU.tion moved in and out of the Social Action/
Social Reform definition of its constituent population,
the "community at risk."

One view was that the community

constituents were a population "suffering at the hands of
the broader community and thus in need of support" (Rothman,
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1968, p. 484).

The black at-risk population was the pri-

mary target of the Coalition's advocacy efforts.

However,

for some Coalition members, the entire community, black
and white, was affected by the inequitable desegregation
policy.

Coalition members advocated for their own children

as well as the community's children.
Over two-thirds of the Coalition members interviewed
identified the black community as the population at risk.
The Coalition began in order to redress the grievances
against the black community.

As the research findings were

shared about one-half of those interviewed identified the
entire community as the secondary target.

They argued that

the entire community benefits from desegregation and that
whites need integration.

So, a secondary target was advo-

cating for an integrated society.

(Interview, 6/l9/80b)

The Coalition was not viewed as paternalistic in their
relationship to minority constituencies.

In constrast,

the Committee of 100, Schwab committee, and Schools for
the City were groups "doing it for or acting on behalf of
blacks."

Acting on behalf of the population at risk is

more in the tradition of the social reform L..ldel.

"A com-

mon mode of social action involves activity by a group or
coalition of interests which acts vigorously on behalf of
some outside client group which is at risk" (Rothman, 1969,
p. 488).

The Coalition worked hard to advocate for its own
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constituencies.

One perspective was that the black commu-

nity, through its involvement in the Task Coordinating
council and Research Committee never gave up control or
surrendered its advocacy for black children.
7/21/80, 7/25/80c, 9/15/80).

(Interviews.

This reflects the social

action model, "the client group, whether employers or constituents, is in the position of determining broad goals
and policies" (Rothman, 1969, p. 487).

At

th~

same time,

the blacks needed white support i:'nd advocacy (Interview,
7/21/80).

Another perspective was that whites did advo-

cate with blacks and for black children, but they also saw
desegregatioll as a community problem.
advocates for integration, as well.

Many of them were
(Interviews, 6/19/80b,

7/10/80, 7/25/80a, 8/6/80)
Assumptions Regarding Interests
of Community Subparts
The social action model assumes that interests among
community subparts are "at variance and not reconciliable,"
while the social reform model assumes that the "interests
may be reconci1iable or in conflict" (Rothman, 1968, pp. 485,
488).

The majority of the Coalition people interviewed said

that conflicting interests were reconciliable which fits
with their orientation to the power structure as being
permeable to persuasion.
Internally, the members of the Coalition found they
were able to reconcile their differences as a group.

There
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were several reasons for their ability to reconcile different interests within the Coalition.

The organization of

the Coalition provided an escape route.

Organizational

members could present their own perspective, but if their
organization disagreed, they could withdraw from the vote.
Despite their own preferences, members worked as a group
on desegregation issues.

(Interview, 7/30/80)

All the Coalition members joine:d because "som3 thing

I

had to be changed."

The st:aff and committee members used

the community forums to identify underlying values that
people shared and then built a value consensus on the issue
o:E equity.
ported.

Equity was a value both blacks and whites sup-

(Interview, 7/25/80d)

within the Coalition.

Differences were negotiated

Whites werEl interested in integra-

tion and multi-racial experiences; blacks were interested
in quality education.

The whites discovered that blacks

were not opposed to integration, but not at the expense
of destroying black neighborhood schools.
7/25/80b, 7/25/80c)

(Interviews,

Given these different priorities, the

hottest debate focused on the recommendation about school
pairings at a November, 1978 Coalition meeting.

The recom-

mendation read:
"The district should pair each of the seven predominantly minority schools in the district with one
or two predominantly white schools in a manner that
will comply with state guidelines on racial balance."
The League of Women Voters representative said that
pairing with only one or two schools was 'too limiting' and that she thought more students should have
the opportunity to attend integrated schools than
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such a system would allow.
It was a black teacher who responded most forcefully to that motion. 'I'm more interested in the
welfare of the children who are being scattered all
over the city. When black" children are divided up,
the achievement level is lower. When people are
together, more people support each other. I'm not
interested in trying to give all the white people
the experience of having one or two in their school.'
(Wi11amette Week, "Politics of Pairing," 12/11/78,
p. 6)

Although Coalition members were committed to a resolution of conflicting interests between the board and themselves, they increasingly

realiz~d

it was a one-way street.

The board was not able to hear the citizens on this issue.
(Interview, 6/19/80a)

Another member described Portland

as a city of "civilized politics."

The modus operandi is

not to admit to problems, but to resolve situations in a
gentlemanly way.

(Interview, 6/17/80b)

The Coalition did

play by the rules of the game, but not always in the style
to which the school power structure was accustomed.
The board and superintendent were not used to being
challenged by parents and other non-educators who were
knowledgeable on the issue to be decided.

The board was

used to negotiating with teacher unions and other educational professionals.

It also was accustomed to citizen

advisory committees who were normally consulted after the
fact and, in some instances, did not clearly understand
th8 problems.

For example, the Title VII, ESAA Citizen

Advisory Committee responsible for desegregation planning,
was unaware of the scattering and other issues the
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Coalition raised.

If it had been informed or more involved,

it might have asked for the kind of data the Coalition
obtained.

(Interview, 6/17/80)

Portland's political style was not one of confrontation.

As the Willamette Week described the evening of

the Coalition's board presentation:
It was a scene to remember. It was big-time racial
politics come to Portland, a city that somehow had
escaped the intense backlash and explosive fireworks
that have come out of school integration in many
other American cities. (12/11/78, p. 1)
A Coalition member describing Portland politics, said,

"Most· of the: outs when they want to deal with educational
issues, it's by way of appeal and appeasement syndrome.
They appeal to the good will and knowledgeability of the
insiders and the insiders accede to that if it makes them
look good or if it's in their interests" (Interview,
6/17/80b).
The kind of negotiation that characterized

~he

Coal i-

tions' reconciliation of conflicting interests did not occur
between the Coalition and the school system.

The Coalition

decided not to negotiate prior to the board presentation.
It had chosen to persuade the board to adopt its recommendations by the strategy of an united front with considerable
community support.

The board and superintendent confronted

with a pairing proposal that they considered politifcally
infeasible, chose not to negotiate, but rather to accept
all the Coalition's other recommendations except the one on
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school pairing.

(Int~rviews,

7/31/80, 8/12/80, 8/27/80,

9/8/80)
During that critical time in December, 1978, there
was community

re~ognition

of the need for negotiation.

The mayor offered his services as a mediator between
the board and citizen's coalition, sensing trouble
between ~~e two groups would develop. The board
melLIDers turned him down. 'It's a legitimate issue
for the city t.o get involved in,' argued the mayor.
The board chairman--who up to a point welcomed
the mayor's advice--said the mayor's services as a
mediator simply were not needed. 'The board di~n't
think that that was the best way to get at the
problems,' said the chairman.
(Oregonian, Forum,
2/1/79, p. B7)
By this time, neither the board nor the Coalition wanted
the mayor's involvement (Oregonian, Letter to the Editor,
2/79).

The newspapers and television media maintained a

level of support for the Coalition's recommendations.

The

media hoped by focusing attention on the need for the
business and political community to back the desegregation
proposals that such support might develop (Interview,
9/19/80).
The Coalition testified in response to the superintendent and asserted its willingness to negotiate (Coalition
response, 12/18/78).

The board, while emphasizing the

common ground between the Coalition and themselves, would
not accept the pairing proposal (Interview, 9/8/80i Oregonian, 1/23/79).

The board accepted the superintendent's

judgment that the pairing plan would not work (Interview,
8/12/80).

There was one vote for the Coalition's plan.
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The Willamette Week pointed out the board's dilemma:
This political hot potato being dropped in their
laps wash't ex&ctly welcom~. This had been a rugged
year for the board, with members under fire on a
number of fronts. At one point, a petition was distributed to recall the board. And four of the seven
members are up for election in April.
(12/11/78,
p. 1)

One board perspective was that the Coalition had failed
to consider the "political sensitiveness" of the issue.
The Coalition, by focusing on equity, represented blacks
and whites already committed to desegregation, but it did
not address the silent majority or white reactionaries who
were llot always supportive of desegregation plans.

For

example, the PTA was not able to support the pairing plan,
although the PTA representative to the Coalition personally
supported it.
12/11/78).

(IntervieTtl; 6/19/80c: Willamette Week,

The board, on the other hand, focused on the

voting public, the business community, and middle to upper
income areas in Portland.

The Coalition did not have

enough of these kind of people participating to convince
the board that a mandatory, school pairing program would
not result in white flight.

(Interviews, 8/12/80, 9/8/80)

Conception of the Public Interest
Both the social action and social reform models' conception of the public interest is "realist-individualist."
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:I

This view stems from the fact:
Of having no control of, and little access to,
a central decision-making ~pparatus in the
community, and usually comprising a small minority of the population, special interest groups
can only be effective confronting others, sometimes attempting to make ad hoc coalitions and
alliances in the community market place.
(Rothman, 1968, p. 486)

.:
i

Two-thirds of the Coalition members interviewed, described the Coalition as representative of the public interest.

For some members the Coalition offered a "vision for

public education,"

whil~

others saw it as a public interest

group with a special focus on education.
7/10/80).

(Interview,

Some felt it began as a special interest group,

but moved to a public interest group as it recruited people
from diverse backgrounds.

Another perspective was that

the Coalition represented special interests, people committed to desegregation, but made an effort to include all
elements in the community (Interview, 6/2/80).

The Coa1i-

tion did not include conservatives, pro-neighborhood school
groups, the business establistlment, and some segments of
the black community.

The Coalition was composed of a

number of special interest groups, but because of the
nature of the issue, they joined together to work for their
perception of the public interest.

(Interviews, 6/11/80,

7/10/80, 7/25/80d)
The issue was how to achieve equity in desegregation?
The solutions needed support from the entire community.
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The reality in Portland was that whites were not concerned
about desegregation since it was a voluntary effort for
them, unlike the blacks' experiences.
City Club report, 1980)

(Interview, 6/11/80;

The challenge the Coalition

accepted was to open up the decision-making arena to the
entire community on the implementation of desegregation.
Working primarily with social reform tools, the
Coalition tried to educate the community to the desegregation reality in Portland, Oregon before any changes could
be made.
In the

ne~t

chapter, the impact of the Coalition as

an advocacy organization and its recommendations on the
school system and the greater community will be examined.

1

CHAPTER VI
IMPACT OF THE POLICY INTERVENTION
Did the intervention by the Coalition have any impact
on the desegregation policy of the Portland Public Schools?
In trying to answer that question, this study will look
at short-term and long-t.erm impacts on the board, school
district, the Coalition, and the community.

The focus of

the impact analysis will be on changes in the formal rules
of the educational syst.em that affect children at risk
(laws, regulations, court decisions, school district plans)
and the educational practices affecting th6se children
(service denials or implementation of mandated services).
(Moore, 1980)

The third area of analysis of the impact

of this policy intervention is whether the advocacy organization altered the complex network of activities at the
federal, state, school district, and school levels that
critically shape services to children.

The rationale for

this third criterion is that past research on educational
intervention shows that for new laws and court decisions
to be implemented, appropriate changes must take place in
dozens of interrelated activities carried out by public
officials and educators at the federal, state, school district, and school levels.
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A Carnegie Corporation report on Child Advocacy

an~

the Schools (1980) points out that child advocacy has
developed as one response to breakdowns in the implementation of educational programs for children at risk.
Advocates argue that implementation failure occur
because laws are not vigorously enforced, because
rigid organizations continue old habits in the face
of new program ideas, because political pressuras
at various points in the implementation process
dash the promise of new programs. They argue that
reforms will improve services to children on a wide
scale only when vigorous independent organizations
press the educational system to carry them out at
each point in the implementation process, in each
important activity in the network of activities
that shapes services to children.
The Community Coalition for School Integration was
an advocacy organization working to change the local school
district's desegregation plan.

It established two goals:

tl) "to ensure equal educational opportunities to maximize
each child's potential through the process of identifying
common concerns of the community in connection with desegregation" and (2) "to make recommendations to the School
Board on needed changes in the desegregation policy, after
an extensive analysis of the present desegregation plan"
(eCSI minutes, 9/1/77).
The Coalition, as documented in the last chapter,
did involve the community through (1) its own membership,
(2) the two series of community forums, and (3) extensive
media coverage in identifying the concerns and problems
the community had with the desegregation plan.

The
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Coalition also made recommendations regarding Administration, Student Transfer plan, Curriculum, Teacher Training,
Student Discipline, Minority Hiring, Minority Teacher
Placement, Integrated Housing, Advisory Boards, and Future
School Board Relationship with the Coalition.

The school

board accepted all of the recommendations except the Student Transfer plan.
The school pairing section of the Student Transfer
plan recommended:
The school district should use school pa1r1ng as the
major means to accomplish desegregation/integration.
The District should pair each of the seven predominantly Minority schools in the District with one
or two predominantly White schools in a manner that
will comply with state guidelines on racial balance.
(Equity, 1978, p. 87)
Initial Impact of Coalition Report
Before exploring further the impact of the Coalition's
recommendations, it is important to examine the board and
district's response to the school pairing plan.
it rejected?

Why was

Their rejection was a critical factor in the

nature of the impact that the Coalition's work had on the
desegregation poli=y.

The student pairing plan was impor-

tant to the Coa1ition ' s demand for equity in desegregation.
From the start, the Coalition had made it clear that
the student transfer, or pairing recommendation,
was the one it cared about, the crucial part of its
report. (Willamette Week, 12/25/78, p. 1)
The superintendent provided the first indication of how the
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district viewed that particular recommendation.

In his

preliminary response to the Coalition's report (12/11/78)
he said "that the:: pairing idea "appears to be a considerable
overreaction in view of the extent of the problem it is
intended to solve ll (p. 25).

He did not make a recommenda-

tion on the student transfer section, but added that "there
are serious logistical problems with the pairing proposal
that have to do with numbers of students, size of facilities, and racial percentages" (p. 24).

His third area of

concern was "the Coalition's proposal on pairing would
reverse a series of decisions that were approved by the
Board after extensive community involvement and support"
(p. 28).

The Coalition wanted to substitute its student pairing
plan for all the desegregation plans in operation because
it believed it was a more equitable

plan.

The Coalition

was concerned that upper grade level students from some
Early Childhood Centers in Albina had no middle school of
assignment.

The irony, as the superintendent pointed out,

that it was board policy regarding community acceptance
of middle schools that converted two of the Albina schools
into Early Childhood Centers rather than middle schools •
.",~'

He said, "Both of these buildings were sui table for middle
school use.

The communities rejected the idea after much

discussion.

Both favored the establishment of Early

Childhood Centers instead" (Memorandum: Superintendent
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Response, 12/11/78, p. 28).
In addition to his administrative concerns over imp1ementation of the plan, the superintendent did not think
it was a plan, but more of an "ideological conviction."
The fact that the Coalition did not name a single school
demonstrated the political naivete of Coalition members,
as they could not bring themselves to discuss which schools
might be involved.

(Interview, 8/27/80)

The Coalition responded to the superintendent's concerns on December 18, 1978.

They challenged the superin-

tenden't's nUI'nbers, based on keeping the racial balance
70/30 and on the total number of children involved in the
schools, not just those who would be bused.

The assistant

coordinator of the Coalit:ion ::refuted the Superintendent's
statement that 15,000 students would have to be bussed to
pair schools at a 70/30 ratio" (Portland Observer, 12/21/78,
p. 1).

The Coalition's estimate was approximately 5,000,

a number based on a 50/50 ratio which is the district's
current policy for the Albina schools.

The Coalition

reasserted that the plan is workable, but the "bottom line
is the willingness of the Board to assign white students
to the Albina schools" (Coalition response, 12/18/68, p. 12).
The Oregonian underlined the challenge:
The board must face an issue that the school administration has largely avoided--mandatory busing of white
students to Albina schools to complement the present
system of mandatory busing of many black students out
of Albina. (12/19/78, p. B1)
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Part of the battle was over numbers.

The Coalition claimed

it would involve 5,000 students and the superintendent said
12-15,000 students would be bused.

There were differences

on how many minority stt..!de!!ts were "involuntary transfers."
It finally carne down to whose numbers did you trust.

The

coalition (12/18/78) cautioned the board to look carefully
at the district's statistics because they contained errors
and were based on different racial ratios.
The Willarnette Week (12/25/78) analyzed the numbers
argument.
The Superintendent's technique crumbles with a closer
look. If you turn to the analysis provided by his
own staff, and change the ratio away from 70-30 but
keep all the schools under 50 per cent minority
enrollment, the pairing works out fine within the
guidelines suggested by the Coalition.
There are 3,557 resident minority students in the
predominantly black schools. In an analytical paper,
the school district chose 14 westside shools with
a total of 5,119 nonblack students and spaces for
6,375. If you pair each of the predominantly black
schools with two predominantly white schools, the
numbers work out as follows: Bus half the black
students, or 1,778 students. Bus less than half, or
2,147 of the white students, making the percentage
of black students in the seven Albina schools 45.3
and the percentage of black students in the 14 white
receiving schools 37.4. In short, the arithmetic
works if you make it work, and the Superintendent's
plan is nothing more than a straw man. (p. 1)
Meanwhile, the school board had not discussed in publie its reaction to the Coalition's proposals.

On Decem-

ber 29, 1978, the chairperson of the school board addressed
the City Club on "The State of the Schools."

The first

public statement by a board member on the Coalition's plan
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indicated that the pairing plan was in trouble.
It appears that the pairing proposal of the Coalition has at least three principal elements which
depart significantly from the School Board's
integration program.
1. First, the Coalition calls for middle schools
to be established without regard to the Board's
community acceptance policy. The School, on the
other hand, has not sought to impose middle
schools over the opposition of the parents of
the cluster, but to encourage parents to reorganize into middle school clusters to improve
the educational programs.
2. Second, the Coalition calls for three middle
schools to be established in Albina. We hav,e
placed middle schools on the periphery of Albina.
Furthermore, under the Coalition proposal at laast
two early childhood centers would have to be con.verted to middle schools even though the buildings
are being remodeled for early childhood center
use with full support of the local school advisory
committee.
3. Third, the Coalition proposes that the attendance area of non-resident children (principally,
majority children) at the Albina schools, including the early childhood centers, be mandatory.
I do not favor the pairing proposals made by the
Coalition. I do not think the pairing proposals are
wise or likely to lead to greater equity or integration. (City Club, 12/29/78, pp. 18··19)
The philosophy underlying the district's emphasis on the
voluntary approach to desegregation was underscored in this
speech.
For example, in the absence of a court-ordered plan,
it is not improper, and indeed it is wise, to place
middle schools in locations, as we have done, where
community acceptance has made the transition possible,
on the periphery of Albina, and then to ask that
children, white and black, gather at these locations,
by bus if necessary, for improved educational programs. (City Club, 12/29/78, p. 20)
On January 8, 1979, the school board voted to adopt all
the resolutions regarding the Coalition's recommendations,
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with the exception of student transfer.

On January 12,

1979, the board chairperson sent a letter to the Coalition

chairperson asking for the Coalition's participation in
discussing how to "flesh out the general directions these
resolutions indicate" (Letter from board chairman).
The boa:.:-d had deferred action on the "pairing" proposal until the January 22, 1979 meeting so that they could
emphasize the common ground they shared with the Coalition
(Interview, 9/8/80).

There were two meetings with the

Coalition between January 8 and January 22 so that the
board could outline the resolution on pairing that they
would present at their next meeting (Interview, 9/8/80).
The headline on the front page of the Oregonian (1/23/79)
describes the act.ion of the board:
'Pairing'

"School Board Rejects

Propo~al."

The Portland School Board Monday night adopted a
desegregation motion that rejects school pairing,
proposes eventual establishment of middle schools
in Albina, and relies heavily on present desegregation methods to bring about more equity in the
district's school integration efforts. (p. 1)
Board resolution X-6184, in rejecting the Coalition's pair"ing plan, stated:
The Board • • • does not believe that the pa1r1ng
proposal of the Coalition will either assure greater
equity, increase interracial understanding, and
improve educational quality, or further the District's integration programs.
(Board minutes,
1/22/79)
The board's resolution did address the "scattering" issue
as it committed itself to "reduce substantially the
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scattering of minority students"; second, to "consider ways
within the board's existing policy to establish middle
schools for students in the Boise, King, ELiot and Humboldt
schools attendance areas w ; and to "increase attendance of
white students in the later primary grades at Early Childhood Centers" (Oregonian, 1/23/79, p. 1).

These were all

issues raised by the Coalition.
The Coalition had failed to convince the board that
the pairing plan or mandatory assignment of white students
to Albina schools was necessary to achieve greater equity.
The board reaffirmed its commitment to work for greater
equity within the framework of its own desegregation policy.
A variety of reasons contributed to the majority vote of
the board against school pairing.

(One board member was

absent that night, so the final vote was 5-1 in favor of
board resolution X-6l84.)

The board member who supported

the Coalition's pairing plan said it failed because Chapman and Ainsworth, two predominantly white west-side
schools, would have been bused to Boise, a predominantly
black, east-side school.

(Interview, 8/26/80)

Past board

decisions on middle schools had involved the same kind of
problem:

people were always interested in schools of

higher status than lower status.

The decision to pair

schols involved having to make class and race assignments
(Interview 8/26/80).

A COclition member echoed this
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thought.
The board believes that the white community won't
accept programs to end injustice if those programs
involved busing white students into the black community • • • But the more I know Portland, the
more I think you sell white citizens short.
(Oregonian, 1/23/79, p. 1)
Several board members who voted for the board resolution
had accepted the school district's nlmIDerS and the superintendent's assessment of the unworkability of the plan
(Interviews, 8/12/80, giS/SO).

One board member believed

that the Coalition's efforts had created the right climate
for the development of a cross-busing plan, but the support
for such a plan never materialized from the community,
newspapers or the board (Interview, 8/12/80).

Another

board member felt the survey data from Administrative

l

Transfer program participants confirmed that the present
plan was doing a good job, so why vote to support the
Coalition's proposal which would involve major changes
(Interview, 8/7/80).

The COf"J.ition had not convinced

another board member that they had done their political
homework regarding the impact of pairing on the white community.

This board mewher found the Coalition to be

politically naive because aU. its emphasis was on equity
and it ignored the previous desegregation efforts of the
district (Interview, 7/31/80).
Once the board had made the decision, there was little
room for negotiation.

Each side continued to issue public
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statements which made "behind the scenes" or "off the
record II conversations extremely difficult.
6/2/80)

(Interview,

The board made the decision they thought was most

viable and the Coalition objected.

A Coalition spokes-

person said in response to the board's decision, "If you
try to give us a solution that doesn't involve white people
actively, you aren't giving us an equitable solution.

It

is still one-way busing" (Oregonian, 1/23/79, p. 1).
The impact of the board's rejection devastated the
Coalition.

Even though their other recommendations had

been accepted, the membership felt it had failed to obtain
a more equitable solution.
The first few months after the board's rejection of
the pairing plan, the Coalition was directionless, angry,
and divided.
disappointed.

One member said, "we were exhausted and
The white liberals were angry and the blacks

felt they'd been kicked in the face.

Instead of turning on

the board and the school district, we turned on each other"
(Interview, 7/25/80).

The Coalition had lost its staff

and had no strategy ready for operation after the board's
decision.

All the attention and work of the Coalition had

gone into the presentation of the report.
7/14/80)

(Interview,

Coalition members were burned-out and wanted to

rest after the energy they expended during the two months
of board presentations.

(Interview, 6/10/80)

Some members

felt that they had accomplished what they set out to do--
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research and recommend.

Others, from the past months'

experiences, conclude.d that it was essentially a political
process.

It was going to take more than study and facts

to change the desegregation policy.

There was a growing

feeling that the changes would not occur with the present
board.

(Interviews, 6/10/80, 7/25/80b)
A television news analyst, in a January 23, 1979

commentary, assessed the school board decision.
In its resolution, the school board deals directly
and firmly only with middle schools. It seems to
promise a middle school in Albina and possibly a
second nearby. Otherwise, the present program is
not disturbed. In the lower grades, the burden of
desegregation continues to fallon Black families.
When the Board's hard commitments are sifted
from its soft language, the resolution remains a
middle school policy, which has been the centerpiece of district pulicy for ten years. The plan
is likely to produce some marginal gains in deseg~egation.
It is by and large a middle school program, not a desegregation program. (Transcript
from NBC local affiliate, Evening News, 1/23/79,
pp. 2-3)
The Oregonian had not supported the pairing proposal, but
had favored the other Coalition recommendations.

After

the board decision, the Oregonian urged the board and Coalition to continue the negotiation on the basic issues.

It

criticized the lack of public discussion by the board on
the substance of the proposals and suggested that in the
future discussions on improvements in the integration program should be held in the open (1/23/79).
Three weeks after the board meeting, another Oregonian
article noted that the Coalition still planned to push for
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'equity' in busing.
The coalition, which took shape in the summer of
1977 out of the anqer of the black community over
a plan to step up forced busing of black students,
has to view the :rejection of it:; pairing plan as
a setback. (2/11/79, p. D3)
Although the Coa.lition members were discouraged with the
board's response, they announced that the Coalition "will
continue to prod the district to re-examine its policies,
perhaps enlisting support from the city and state.

Right

now, it's regrouping" (Oregonian, 2/11/79, p. D3).
The Coalition took several actions in February, 1979.
They decided to reopen their membership which had been
frozen since the previolls fall.

They redefined their

mission to include monitoring of the district's performance
on the resolutions.

They reviewed complaints filed a.ga.inst

the district with the Office of Civil Rights by a group
of minority educators and parents.
join the complaint.

They decided not to

They also decided not to endorse candi-

dates for the April, 1979 school board elections, but
encouraged individual members to get involved.

A Coalition

spokesperson explained the reason behind these various
decisions.
We have a very delicate coalition, which is commited
to improving people's attitudes toward integration,
and we can agree on that. • • • If we start supporting candidates solely on their positions on desegregation, we'll lose some people and reinforce the
board's belief that we are a radical group • • • The
Coalition's role now will be less activist and more
consciousness-raising. (Oregonian, 2/11/79, p. D3)
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The Coalition divided over which strategy to pursue.
A small group of merobers, mostly white with occasional
black participation, decided to pursue a monitoring role
with the district over the implementation of the resolutions.

Subcommittees were formed on student discipline,

curriculum, teacher training, and housing.

(CCSI Minutes,

3/22/79) •
The Coalition began to fragment.

People who wanted

to work at the monitoring role became involved in that.
People who wanted more act.ion, legal or political, chose
that route.

(Interview, 6/l1/80c)

General attendance at

meetings began to falloff and black participation lessened.
Black Coalition members thought that
political action was needed.

direct,

mo~e

Several filed a complaint

with the Office of Civil Rights; others worked in the
school board campaigns to defeat the incumbents.

Still

others became involved in organizing the Black United
Front, a black advocacy group.

One Black United Front/

Coalition participant described the difference in strategy
between the Coalition and Black United Front.

Coalition

members were concerned about "doing tbings that would make
the board feel good.

The problem was that the board wasn't

going to do what we wanted them to until we got the leverage
that would make a politician move" (Interview, 7/21/80).
During this time, the Coalition wrestled with defining its role, strategies, and purpose as an organization.
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One Coalition member observed we were not at "the end of
a process, the fight was just beginning" (Interview,
6/17/80a).

This time, however, the Coalition was not agreed

on the course of action.
In sum, the initial impact of the Coalition's recommendations was:
1.

Acceptance of nine recommendations and rejection

of one, the pairing plan;
2.

Board and district "working sessions" with Coali-

tion representatives on resolutions;
"3.

Coalition pursues monitoring and educational role;

4.

Black Coalition members and other members of the

black community seek a more activist strategy to implement
changes; and
5.

Defeat of two incumbenets who had supported the

board's resolutions by two candidates who were supportive
of

th~

Coalition's plan.
Long-Term Impact
What was the impact on the formal rules and the

educational practices of the school system that affect
children at risk?

Were there any changes in the network

of activities at the federal, state, school district, and
school levels that critically shape services to children?
These criteria were used in an "applied research study
concerning the effectiveness of independent child advocacy
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groups focused on the public schools" (Moore, 1980, p. 1).
The Coalition's impact will be analyzed in light of. its
effectiveness in improving services to children and al tering the complex network 6f activities (Figure 6).
Educational Practices

Formal Rules

"Improve Services to Children"
COALITION:

BLACK UNITED FRONT:

oreduction in scattering
oinitiation of evaluation
and data gathering in
areas of:
suspensions
achievement for A.T.
students
oteacher evaluations
'reorganization of desegregation program

ofreedom of choice for
black children in
schools
oboard appointment
°N.E. middle school
oshort- and long-term
resolutions on
desegregation plan

Individuals:
ofile OCR complaint
Network of activities
oelectoral and appointive changes on school board
'Coalition and Black United Front set the stage for
further changes, still in process
Figure 6. Policy impact of Coalitiono

Educational Practices
The Coalition identified several major problems in
Portland's desegregation practices which directly impacted
children: the issue of "scattering," the fact of disproportionate suspension rates for minority students, and lack
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of achievement and other educational data on Administrative
Transfer students for evaluation purposes of the program.
In its

reco~~endations,

the Coalition asked the district

to respond to these problems.

It made the board aware of

the policy impact of its incremental decisions on desegregation.

The Coalition dramatized the issues to the board

and corrununity with its visual presentation of the fact of
liscattering"--thirty-nine buses drawing up every morning
to King School which would scatter 451 children to thirtynine schools (Equity for the GOS,I 1978, p. 44a, Figure 1).

The school district took action on these issues.
First, the school district now collects achievement data
on black and white students, including the Administrative
Transfer students.

The district also provides suspension

data by age, sex, and race so that evaluations can be made
of the district's progress on discipline practices.
view, 1/8J.)

(Inter-

The Metropolitan Human Relations Corrunission

has conducted ian outside evaluation of district statistics
on suspension for the past two years

(Analysis of Suspen-

sion and Enrollment Patterns Among Portland Public Schools,
1977-78 and 1978-79 ) •

In addition, the American Friends

Service Committee initiated an education research and
action project to provide case advocacy to families on
school discipline practices as well as to monitor the
district's record as regards minority children.

Both of

these community groups became involved in this issue as a
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result of the Coalition's research and recommendations on
this issue.

(Interviews, 6/20/80, 7/21/80)

The Coalition's school pairing recommendation was
designed to solve the problem of "scattering" which its
research had documented.

The board rejected the Coalition's

proposal because "the board does not believe that the pairi.ng proposal of the Coalition will either assure greater
equity, increase inter-racial understanding, and improve
educational quality, or further the District's integration
program" (Board resolution X-6184, 1/22/79).

However, the

board did agree to "reduce substantially the number of
receiving schools to which children from a particular
neighborhood are transferred, while preserving appropriate
latitude for parent choices of schools" (Board resolution
X-6184, 1/22/79)

0

The Coalition appointed a

subco~nittee

to work with

the district and board to develop a plan to reduce scattering.

By April, 1979, the district had worked out standard-

ized school assignments for King I and Humboldt upper grade
students.

(Interviews, 8/27/80, 9/8/80)

ent reported on the progress to the board.

The superintendThe superin-

tendent agreed with the Coalition that scattering reduction
is only viewed as an essential step, not the total
of desegregation problems.

sol~1.tion

However, "the standard and

optional school assignments on the attached list will be
implemented immediately by personnel of the district

.l
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charged with

re~!?onsibi1ities

for school assignments and/or

transfers" (Memo to Board of Education, 4/24/79, p. 1).

In

August, 1979, the superintendent again reported that "the
number of receiving schools for new students has been
reduced by 65% for 1979-80.

That is 45 schools instead of

the 168 schools identified by the Coalition for the 1977-78
school year" (Memo to Board, 8/29/79, p. 35).

The number

of children affected by these decisions were the 1,413
"voluntary transfer students," as well as the 351 black
students for whom no grade level was available (the involuntary transfer students) (Superintendent's response to
Community Coalition for School Integration, 12/11/78, p. 3,
Chart H).

One school district staff person commented that

in order to reduce the scattering "we ended up matching
schools.

We did more pairing than we thought we'd do"

(Interview, 8/12/80).
One of the most significant changes was in the teacher
evaluation procedures.

Board resolution X-6121 on Standard

of Performance in Multi-Ethnic Education expanded the
criteria on which a teacher's performance was based.
The competent teacher in subject with multi-ethnic
dimensions includes appropriate multi-ethnic themes
in lesson plans and instruction, including historicalor other information as to cultures having
significant impact on the world, nation, or community. (Board resolution X-6121, 1/8/89)
This criterion was added in

th~

Spring of 1979 as part of

teacher evaluations and continues to be used as of April,
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1981.

This action was one of the more significant changes·

with long-reaching implications for district personnel,
according to a district staff member (Interview, 12/10/80).
There were also administrative changes as a result
of the Coalition recommendations.
was centralized.

Desegregation planning

The Office of the Assistant Superintend-

ent for Community and Staff Development had a 50 percent
increase in staff and acquired more authority to monitor
and implement tile desegregation program.

The creation of

the positions of Director of Desegregation Programs and a
Coordinator of Student Transfer programs has resulted in
better record-keeping and the machinery to evaluate the
results of current desegregation efforts.

(Interviews,

8/12/80, 12/10/80)
Network of Activities
Network of Activities refers to the forces that shape
services to children.
For new laws and court decisions to be implemented
whose purpose is to benefit children at risk,
appropriate changes must take place in dozens of
interrelated activities carried out by public officials and educators at the federal, state, school
district and school levels. (Moore, 1980, p. 6)
The Coalition and, later, the Black United Front, had
a major impact in changing the political structure of the
school district.

In a related effort, two Coalition mem-

bers, through the filing of a complaint with the Office of

'~

,
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Civil Rights, tried to obtain its assistance changing the
desegregation program.

This section will discuss both

these changes.
Much of the changes wrought in the educational practices began in the Winter of 1979, but the defeat of two
incumbent school board members in April, 1979 signaled
the possibilities of more changes.

The board chairman's

reaction to the defeats highlighted the problems that lay
ahead.

"I'm sorry to lose the only minority member of the

Board and the two women on the Board, • • • the loss may
hurt the Board's ability to deal with desegregation issues
in a way that is credible to the minority community"
(Oregonian, 4/4/79, p.

1,.

The women had both supported

the board's rejection of the pairing plan.

The remaining

woman board menilier was recovering from a heart attack.

The

two new board members had supported the Coalition's work,
but were not in agreement with the pairing plan.

They did

support the citizen process and the research findings on
the problems in desegregation policy.
Most Coalition

~embers

and many of the board and

school district staff believe the Coalition's report contributed to the election of two new board members.

Coali-

tion members attribute the defeat of the incumbents to the
awareness that changes were needed on the board.

Movement

on the desegregation plan would not occur without changes
on the board.

As one Coalition member explained, "We did

1

I
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not change the board policy on desegregation, but we did
change the Board" (Interview, 6/ll/80b). Newspapers keyed
the incumbents' defeat to the issue of credibility.
The school board has never before seriously challenged district desegregation policy, part of the
Schools for the Seventies plan. Indeed its wholesale agreement (with one exception) with the Superintendent's rejection of the Coalition pairi~g
proposal last winter caused it to lose more than a
little face in Portland's black and white liberal
community. Critics asked, Does a school board that
relies so much on the super.intendent's advice have
credibility? This issue of school board credibility
became the touchstone of .the recent board election,
and eventually catapulted the two new members of
the board into office. (Willamette Week, 7/16/79,
p. 9)

The Coalition laid the groundwork for the changes
that r'lere to come.

The Coalition expanded the range of

policy options and paved the way for major policy shifts,
observed one Coalition member.

"We wlere the snowplow whose

job it was to expand the level of discussion on the issue.
We proposed radical soluticms in order to get the Board to
make moderate changes" (Interview, 7/14/80).
Office of Civil
Complaint

R~.qhts

With the death of the woman board member, another
vacancy was created on the board in July, 1979.

The appoint-

ment of a new board member became intertwined with two
other events, the Office of Civil Rights ruling and the
emergence of the Black United Front.
In 1977, the Office of Civil Rights received a letter

J

.I
.I
{
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of complaint from the Oregon Minority Educators Association,
charging the district with seven violations of Title VI
because of race discrimination.

Of the seven, three areas

were scrutinized in the 1979 spring investigation: bias in
the disciplining of black students, lower achievement scores
for black students in Early Childhood Centers, and the
excessive burden of desegregation borne by black students
in Portland's student transfer-assignment program.

In

December, 1978, a companion complaint was filed by another
educational staff member,.
Coalition.

Both persons were active in the

The Coalition had decided not to join the

complaint process, but did meet with Office of Civil Rights
investigators and did supply its research findings to the
investigation.

Although the Coalition was not an official

complainant, many members hoped that the federal government
would intervene to force the board to change the district's
desegregation plan (Interviews, 7/10/80, 7/24/80).
In June, 1979, the Office of Civil Rights cleared
the Portland schools of a bias charge in school desegregationa
Because busing in Portland is voluntary, the inequity
we found is not violative under the law. Title VI
of the Civil Rights Act limits our authority to
review cases of discrimination only to places where
there is a legal obligation to desegregate--in other
words, where there is a court-ordered remedy to
prior findings of discrimination. • • • although we
identified discrimination in Portland, it comes from
a voluntary remedy to correct deficiencies in a system whose problems we hadn't even previously

160
identified. And technically we just don't have the
authority to act on it. (Interview with Virginia
Balderrama, acting director of Region X, Office of
Civil Rights, Willamette Week, 7/16/79, p. 9)
At its all-day planning session on June 30, 1979, the
Coalition explored strategies for responding to the federal
ruling.

They asked an attorney to check the legality of

the ruling and to see if it could be appealed.

The Coali-

tion also held a press conference and issued a public
statement in response to the Office of Civil Rights ruling.
The district was exonerated on a technicality; its
plan was considered voluntary because it is not the
product of a court order. HEW's letter of findings
similarly vindicates the District based on the
Department's interpretation of what constitutes
'gross' inequity--the measure for which is not clear
in the letter.
This does not alter the fact that Black children
continue to be discriminated against under Portland
Public Schools desegregation program. (Press
release, Community Coalition for School Integration,
7/12/79, p. 1)
At the July 12, 1979 Coalition meeting, members discussed
the feasibility of filing a complaint based on the Acts of
Segregation which they had documented in their press
release.

They debated the question: "Can we be both coop-

erative and confrontational?

The group view was that it

is not smart politics to alienate ourselves from the district.

Members were urged to report back to their own

parent organizations to keep an active support of the
Coalition alive" (Coalition minutes, 7/12/79, p. 1).
This decision not to file a complaint was a critical
turning point in the life of the Coalition because the

J
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blacks already had organized the Black United Front and had
called for a boycott.

The Coalition, while recognizing the

frustration that gave rise to the formation of the Front,
could not decide whether to take a more ac:ivist stance.
From this point, it was the Front which pushed for and
achieved changes in the formal rules and educational practices of the district regarding its desegregation policy.
Black United Front
The Black United Front, on July 12, 1979, called for
a boycott of the Portland Public Schools.

Theco-

chairperson explained the reasons behind this decision.
The ultimate indignity is that the Federal Government has done nothing, and apparently will do nothing,
although it acknowledges that the District's program is discriminatory.
It is now up to Black parents to find solutions
for themselves • • . • become more involved and take
a more active role in the education of our children.
(Portland Observer, 7/19/79, p. 1)
The Black United Front (BUF) boycott demands reflected
Coalition research and recommendations.

The central issue

was the scattershot busing of black students to white
schools.

School administrators claimed they had made sig-

nificant progress in reducing the scattering since it was
first exposed by the Coalition, but boycott leaders called
the approach "piecemeal" and claimed that a
plan was needed.
.....-

1

(Oregonian, 7/29/79)

co~prehensive
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Board

Appoint~ent

In the midst of the board's negotiations with the
Black united Front, the board was also reviewing applicants
for the vacant position •. A board review panel recommended
three white women for the post, which angered the black
community even further (Portland Observer, 7/12/79).
were five black applicants who were turned down.

There

At the

August 6, 1979 meeting, two blacks were added to the finalist list.

The appointment was a critical one to the future

direction of the district.
A majority formed by the added vote of this appointment, for instance, could give the district's desegregation pI.ogram a radically new direction • • • But
the fight for the majority-making vote--nothing less
than a struggle for the control of school district
policy--is on. Next week will tell which voting
bloc--the traditionally pro-superintendent triumvirate or the newer, more critical members of the
board=~will claim the balance of power in the future.
(Willamette Week, 8/13/79, p. 1)
The candidacy of the black co-chairperson of the Coalition
and now a leader in the Black United Front boycott received
endorsements from the Oregonian, Willamette Week, -and the
Portland Observer.

(Portland Observer, 8/9/79)

On

August 13, 1979, before an audience of 200 citizens, the
board appointed the Coalition co-chairperson and then
heard its most veteran member immediately announce his
resignation, creating anc)ther vacancy on the board.
"It's a whole new ball game now," said one member of
the audience as the reconstituted board began dealing with
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a response to the demands of the BUF (Oregonian, 8/15/79,
p. F1).

The new members (two elected, one appointed) plus

the one member already supportive of the Coalition, gave
the new majority to

~~e

board.

(Note: The additional

vacancy on the board was not filled until after September,
1979, when a young woman, active in city-wide youth affairs,
was appointed.)
On August 28, 1979, after lengthy negotj.:'I.tions between
the Black United Front and the

boar~,

the school board

voted to change the district's long-standing desegregation
policy.

An Oregonian editorial described the board's

actions.
:rhe School Board's plan responds positively to almost
all published objectives of the coalition seeking
to end isolation of blacks in public schools and
fragmentation of black communities as a result of
school policies.
Many of the remedies can begin without delay. For
example, additional grades would be added at Eliot
and Humboldt schools, which are early childhood
centers; 351 black students who have no assigned
middle schools will be able to choose among three in
North and Northeast Portland; and parents whose children are in the district's Administration Tra.nsfer
Program will be notified immediately that their
children can return to the neighborhood primary, middle or high school.
Other changes that will tar~ longer: developing
a comprehensive plan on all aspects of the integration program; planning and implementing one, and
perhaps two, middle schools in Albina; and creating
a broadly based monitoring group to serve as the
voice of parents and children who may experience
difficulty in receiving equitable treatment.
The central points, though, are that the School
Board, by its actions, has acknowledged that the
system has been unfair in the burdens blacks have
had to shoulder in desegregation and has moved
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strongly--not in a token fashion--to remedy the
injustices. (8/30/79, p. B6)
The black community responded by deferring the boycott to
allow the district time to implement its decisions.

As

school opened, 300 black students left the Administrative
Transfer program and returned to inner-city schools.
(Oregonian; 9/5/79)

The new policy, freedom of choice for

black children, was greeted by black BUF members as the
"beginning of a new day."
The formal rules had been changed, not by the persuasive tactics of the Coalition, but by the direct action
tactics--a proposed boycott--by the BUF.

The Coalition

never resumed an active role with the district and in
June, 1980 formally dissolved as an organization.

It

divided its remaining funds in a way that reflected the
pluralistic diversity of the Coalition--half went to
establish an dward for the new middle school students who
wrote the best essay on integration, and the other half
to the BUF to continue its work for educational change.
(Coalition minutes, 6/3/80)

CHAPTER VII
FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS
The purpose of this chapter is to discuss t.he applicability of the dissatisfaction theory of governance to
a theory of educational policy intervention and the contributions of the findings from this case study to a theory
of pclicy intervention by citizen advocacy groups.
The problem statement which generated this study
of policy intervention by a citizen's advocacy organization
was "How do citizens intervene in the policy process to
address perceived inequities?"

It is recognized that there

are others who can and do intervene in the policy process,
but the focus of this study was on citizen action as an
intervention strategy.

The dissatisfaction theory of

governance was the framework to analyze the developmental
process of citizen dissatisfaction.

What does this

theoretical framework contribute towards an understanding
of citizen intervention in the policy process?
Dissatisfaction Theory of Governance
The findings of the study support Iannaccone and
Lutz's dissatisfaction theory of governance as a way of
explaining the .developmental process of citizen

.1
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dissatisfaction with school desegregation policy in Portland
from 1963 to 1977.
p. 26.)

(See Chapter

I, Theory Framework,

The school board, the legal authority, made its

initial commitment to desegregation with its acceptance
of the Schwab committee report and the initiation of Model
Schools and Administrative Transfer programs.

In 1970,

the board and superintendent did alter elements of the
desegregation plan with the Schools for the 70s plan.

That

plan reorganized the district, converted schools in Early
Childhood Centers, middle schools, and later, magnet high
school programs.

A critical part of reorganization was

the establishment of Area Citizen Advisory Committees.
There is some evidence that from 1965 to 1977 the
board and district became closed to outside criticism and
suggested changes in the desegregation programs.

In 1969,

two groups, the Model Cities Education Committee and the
Citizens Committee for Better Schools, both urged the
board to adopt a cross-busing plan and to give citizens
a stronger role in the school decision-making process.
The Area Citizen Advisory Committees can be seen as the
board's response to their recommendations, but the ACACs
did not have the degree of autonomy and independence that
the community groups had recommended (Oregonian, 1/13/69,
p. 16; 3/15/70, p. 34).
The failure of the tax levies and community opposition
to middle schools made the district more dependent on policy

167
changes that lay within its sphere of operations.

T~e

exception was the Early Childhood Centers, which did require
citizen consent.

The district conducted no evaluations

of any of its desegregation programs.

It relied on the

area citizen advisory committees for community input.

There

is research by Gittell (1979) and others (Boyd and
Shea, 1975) suggesting that the presence of advisory
committees serves to buffer

sc~ool

policy makers from

parents' interest groups.
Gittell, for example, found that in those school
systems in which mandated advisory committees were
present, administrators restricted their contacts
with the public to such groups. They defended this
practice with the claim that such committees were,
after all, representative of parents.
The buffering effect is not limited to the behavior of school administrators. Frieburger's (1976)
study of school governance in a m~dium-size Massachusetts city revealed that school boards were three
times more likely to consider presentations made
by school advisory councils than voluntary parents'
organizations.
(Davies and Zerchykov, 1981,
pp. 287-88)
The strongest indicator of the board and district's
attitude toward external questioning of its desegregation
policy was their reaction to community opposition over
the Boise-King redistricting plan in June-July 1977.
Newspaper coverage of the board meetings and interviews
with board, district, and Coalition members for the purposes
of this case study all attested to the feelings of anger
and resentment on the part of the board, district, and
community members alike.

The

corr~unity,

in particular
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members of the black community, were upset that they had
not been consulted before the policy was proposed.
Part of the ill feeling comes from the way the
school board has handled the proposal. The plan
was announced without consulting beforehand the
community immediately affected or the community
at large, both of which have much at stake in the
vitality of city schools.
(Oregon Journal,
7/20/77, Editorial)
The board and district's response was described in an
Oregonian article:
In a comment interpreted by many as a slap in the
face at dissenting citizens, the superintendent
said he was 'very troubled when influential groups
and individuals take exception to proposals based
on the amount of criticism voiced rather than on
the merits of the issue.' (Oregonian, 7/26/77,
p. AI)
Some community members, later Coalition participants r said
their motivation to join the Coalition and to work for
changes in the school desegregation

poli~y

stemmed from

the board and district's disrespectful attitude, as evidenced at the July 25, 1977, board meeting.

(Interviews,

6/12/80, 7/21/80, 7/24/80, 7/25/80b)
In addition to the gradual closing of the system
to external

questic~s

need to be examined.

and criticism, two other factors
These factors are the changes in

the community's view of desegregation and demographic
changes in the school-aged population.
The black community from 1965 to 1970 objected to
the Model Schools program because it did not desegregate
the schools.

~he

implementation of the Schools for the

I -.
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70s plan began to reduce the percentage of students in
racially isolated schools.

The percentage of black students

in Albina grade schools after their conversion to Early
Childhood Centers did decline, e.g., Humboldt grade school
before conversion was 87% and after conversion was 51%
(Oregonian, 11/12/78, p. Bl).
With the conversion of Albina grade schools to Early
Childhood Centers, the practices of school desegregation
began to impact the black community's view of desegregation.
Early Childhood Centers may have improved the educational
program at local schools and attracted some white students,
but it cost the neighborhood their grade schools.

There

were incidents where black children could not attend the
cent~rs

because all the spaces for all local children were

filled (Interview, 7/16/80a).

Administrative transfer

children told their parents of racial incidents on the
bus, in school, and after school at their receiving schools.
Some parents became disillusioned with the Administrative
Transfer program, as their children did not have successful
experiences at these new schools.

These were concerns

of black parents as they comprised the majority of Administrative Transfer students.

People began to question if

busing was enough or if the quality of education at the
receiving schools should not be examined.
This questioning of busing and the doubts about
desegregation did not develop in isolation.

Nationally,
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President Nixon had expressed opposition to busing and
major media sources had covered the community of Boston's
opposition to school busing.

Throughout the country,

blacks realized it was mainly they who got on the bus,
not whites.

Ironically, the Early Childhood Education

Centers were attracting whites, but they were also a symbol
to the black community in Portland of a school system that
changed. black neighborhood schools, but not other areas
of the city.

As the Office -of Civil Rights noted in its

1977 report on School Desegregation in Portland, Oregon,
Another problem area rests with the continuing
feeling among some members of the minority population that the burden of the desegregation
process has been borne by minorities.
(p. 14)
Between 1970 and 1977, the percentage of black students in the school system doubled due to a decline in
white student enrollment.

The major factor in that decline

was that families were choosing homes in the suburbs rather
than the city.

The city population was increasingly elderly

and young adults (Portland Mobility Survey, 1978).

Budget

constraints were another factor in the slow development
of desegregation programs, especially middle schools and
magnet high schools.
Another factor during the time period of 19iO-77
was changes in the politics of the City of Portland.
saw the election of a young mayor who was committed to
citizen involvement in community development projects.

1974
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Many people worked on his grass-roots election campaign
and then continued their involvement in neighborhood associations, community block grant projects, crime prevention,
and economic development projects.

There was a cadre of

experienced organizers available to become involved in
local issues (Interview, 4/18/80).
All these factors contributed to the development
of community dissatisfaction with the school desegregation
policy.

The next stage in Iannaccone and Lutz's theory

on the formation of public opposition then leads to school
board· incumbent defeat.
form?

Next, how does public opposition

It is at the point of intervention that the find-

ings of this case study provide some insight into the
conditions necessary for policy intervention by citizen
advocacy groups.
The critical factors for the formation of the Coal ition and its subsequent intervention were the timeliness
of the issue, available leadership, financial resources,
and the potential of the group to generate support.

David

Truman (1950), an advocate of a system equilibrium model
of government, "believes interest groups arise in an effort
to establish a new homeostasis whenever the stability of
a system has been disturbed.

It is the disturbance that

creates the interest group" (Education and Urban Policy,
p. 156).

1
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Critical Issue and Timing
The disturbance was the community's reaction to the
Boise-King redistricting plan.

Up until June, 1977, the

community believed that the board was following a desegregation plan, adopted in 1970, even if it affected black
schools more than white schools.

The Boise-King plan

impacted the black community and some segments of the white
co~~unity

1.

in several ways:
It was the first decision based solely on race.

Jefferson was over 50% black, therefore, graduates of two
primarily black grade schools would no longer be able to
attend it.
2.

The board did

~ot

act according to its cesegre-

gation plan, which invC'lved ECECs i middle schools, and
magnet high school prosrams.
3.

The community reacted negatively to the manner

in which the board handled the proposed policy change
because the community was not asked for their opinion
beforehand (Interviews, 6/12/80, 7/21/80, 7/25/80d,
8/20/80, 9/15/80).
Another factor in motivating citizens to act is a
crisis situation.

One characteristic about schools is

that information about school issues is not widely available.

! .'
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The kind of information which can mobilize a potential interest into an actual group only occurs in
cases of institutional crisis in schooling - such
as desegregation or school' closures due to declining
enrollment. Parental reactions tend to be after
the fact, reactive and negative and episodic.
(Davies and Zerchykov, 1981, p. 187)
The community perceived there was a crisis in policy-making.
The board and district denied that it was a crisis and
seemed surprised by the community opposition (Portland
Observer, 7/21/77; Interviews, 6/2/80, 8/12/80, 8/27/80,
9/8/80).

The board became defensive and finally, out of

frustration, they asked several community groups to develop
a better plan for Jefferson.
Leadership, Resources, and
Organizational Support
After the community dissatisfaction emerged, there
were three factors which helped the Coalition develop as
an ad hoc, temporary group.

First, the issue was important

to several human relations, civil rights, and education
advocacy groups in Portland.

These organizations and their

leaders were committed to act on the Boise-King proposal.
Second, these organizations provided some financial resources and helped the Coalition obtain its own funding.

Third,

these established groups gave credibility to the fledgling
Coalition.

They sent out the first mailing to approximately

500 people in August, 1977.

Slightly over 100 people came

to the first organizational meeting of the Coalition,

1
I
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september 1, 1977.

The initial group of organizations

attracted other organizations with power and influence
plus some high status individual members (Coalition membership lists; Intervie\tTs ,6/17 /80b, 6/19/80b).

The Coalition

was able to generate support from various groups, ranging
from the Chamber of Commerce to the PTA.

Finally, it

obtained its own staff and, titrough funding from the city,
county, school district, and private sources, sustained
an eighteen-month research project.
In summary, the conditions that produced the policy
intervention by a citizen's advocacy group were the timeliness of a critical issue, available leadership, financial
resources, staff, and support from organizations and people
who had established credibility.

This finding is consistent

with other research which identifies the "backing of solidarity interest groups as a major source of power with
which to induce social change" !Dubey, 1972, p. 231).

A

similar finding is that "money, time, criticalness of issue
and coalitions were the conditions under which citizen
participation could improve the responsiveness of an agency
to the aims of particular groups" (May, 1971, p. 40).
DIS/ID/STO/OS, the dissatisfaction theory, seeks
to explain the political change and adaptation of the school
organization due to citizen dissatisfaction.

DIS is evi-

dence of community changed dissatisfaction reflected in
voting behavior leading next to incumbent scheol board

, 11'
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member defeat (ID), followed within two years by involuntary
superintendent turnover (STO) and outside succession (OS).
The study of the Coalition finds that policy-makers
who do not address citizen dissatisfaction with certain
educational practices can lead to the community's readiness
to intervene.

The outcome of community intervention in

Iannaccone and Lutz's model is change in the political
process--incumbent defeat.

Two researchers who applied

the dissatisfaction theory to an analysis of 104 Southern
California school board elections, concluded:
Based upon our findings, it appears that it is appropriate to equate democratic control over school policy
with these episodes of electoral instability arising
from voter dissatisfaction with incumbent school
board members. Further evidence is needed to see
if citizens change their orientation toward the
schools during the period immediately prior to the
onset of an incumbent defeat period.
They hypothesize that "it may take a period of
10-16 years after demographic and ideological changes
in a district, for school board member defeat and
superintendent turnover to emerge.
(Criswell and
Mitchell, 1980, p. 209)
The community's expression of dissatisfaction during JuneJuly, 1977 did not lead directly to incumbent defeat, but
to the formation of the Coali-tion and their subsequent
intervention in the policy process.
To test the Criswell and Mitchell hypothesis on the
Portland situation, it was fifteen years from 1962, when
the NAACP first challenged the district to end "de facto"
school segregation, until 1977 and the community dissatisfaction evidenced itself in its resistance to the Boise-King
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plan.

Two years later, in April, 1979, two incumbent school

board members were defeated.

The Coalition challenged

the board's desegregation policy and made the public aware
that desegregation was a critical issue in the community.
The board and district's credibility was
the process.

qu~stioned

in

The actions of the Coalition focused public

attention on the critical nature of the desegregation issue.
It made the school board accountable for the policy impact
of its desegregation decisions.

The proximity of this

public attention to the scheo1 board elections influenced
the voting public to make some changes on the board.
The research of Criswell and Mitchell (1980) called
for further evidence to identify when citizens change their
orientation toward the schools.

The actions of the Coali-

tion between 1977 and 1979 suggest that intervention by
a community organization in the policy process may be an
intervening variable in the stages of dissatisfaction.
The Coalition was a critical factor in focusing public
attention on the board which resulted in incumbent defeat.
In the case of Portland,community dissatisfaction led to
intervention which then resulted in voting behavior leading
to incumbent board member defeat.
The Coalition was successful as a citizen advocacy
organization in several important ways, as discussed in
previous sections.

It mobilized people, financial resour-

ces, its own staff, other organizations, and the media.

· ,

!
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The lack of these elements is a serious constraint to most
citizen organizations.

As one

reseQ~cher

observed,

"resource-poor groups are unlikely to secure the control
they need over resources sufficient to alter the pattern
of benefits that they receive from the political system"
(May, 1971, p. 46).
Not only was the Coalition able to build an organizational structure, but it had some success in raising the
issue of school desegregation before the entire community.
The Oregonian, the major newspaper in Portland, Oregon,
had a two-week series on the issues the Coalition addressed
in its final report (November, 1978).

All the local tele-

vision stations as well as other newspapers gave the Coal ition's final presentations front-page coverage for over a
month and television news editorials.
The Coalition was unable to change the desegregation
policy in the manner it had planned.

There were two major

factors which served as constraints: reform model of change
and the political environment.
Theoretical Implications for Polipy'_.Intervention
By Citizen A~.vocacy Groups
One year after the Coalition's intervention, a Coal ition spokesman, during an interview, commented:
We made one chief error. Once we delivered the
report to the board, we did not plan for the struggle we needed to get it through the political
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process. But for all its lack of political savvy.
• • • the Coalition was no failure. It proved for
the first time that blacks and whites could work
together in Portland without the blacks' selling
out. I think the Coalition's success is told in
the rise of the Black United Front. (Willamette
W~~k, 11/11/79, p. A4)
The primary lesson to be drawn from the Coalition's intervention is that social reform strategies should not be
used when the political and social realities call for
radical political change.

The Coalition is an example of

the liberal reform model of social change.

Coalition

members looked to the past and saw the success of the Schwab
committee, a board-appointed, blue-ribbon committee of the
1960s.

Many :)f the Coalition members were from the Port-

land liberal establishment, like the Schwab committee, and
had easy access to the school board and superintendent.
For example, Schools for the City, a major participant in
the Coalition, had monthly meetings with the superintendent
to discuss school-community issues.

Many Coalition members

also were active in the election of the liberal mayor in
1974.

Both black and white members of the Coalition had

used social reform techniques to accomplish political and
social changes in Portland.

They believed the same tech-

niques would work in the desegregation issue.
The Coalition did not analyze the nature of the
issue, its organizational constituencies, and the. political
environment in its policy intervention.

The issue of

school desegregation was and is a controversial policy.

I

J
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Nationwide, the media has provided the public with images
of Boston riots, Los Angeles school board law suits opposing court-ordered desegregation, and buses burning in
Pontiac, Michigan.

Locally, the Portland school board

and superintendent were proud of the dGsegregation plan
which had not provoked white flight or public discussion.
They were committed to its maintenance.
The Coalition did attract a diverse group of individuals and organizations, but failed to obtain support from
the business and political constituences.

Kirby (1973)

fO'Jnd'that the business community and mayor's support were
critical factors in successful school desegregation plans
in northern cities.

seattle school district, in changing

its desegregation plan from voluntary to mandatory, received
strong support from the downtown business community and
the mayor's office.

The Coalition did try to gain support

from these two constituencies.

However, the liberal mayor

was conspicuously silent and the business community provided some financial assistance, but no strong, visible
support.
Third, the Coalition misread the political environment for school desegregation.

The Coalition knew who the

critical actors were but did not apply sufficient political
pressure to gain their support.

The Coalition

b~~ieved

the political environment was liberal reformist and, thus,
it relied on reformist tactics.

Because it used only
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reform tactics, it was unable to convince the board to
change the desegregation plan.

Part of its failure lies

in its unwillingness to use direct action tactics.
The Coalition was just that--a coalition of people
who had different reasons for wanting to change the
desegregation policy.

Some of the people were unwilling

to consider direct action tactics; lawsuits or other more
political forms of change.

These were the people who had

successfully accomplished change through reform tactics.
Others less successful with reform tactics urged confrontation and direct action.

During the final days in November,

1978, as the Coalition struggled to make its final recommendations, an uneasy compromise was reached.

The Coali-

tion called for an extensive school pairing plan which
satisfied members' insistence on equity in the plan, but
the plan was to be presented in the final report.

There

were no strategies developed if the research and recommendation approach, a reformist tactic, did not work.

The

plan called for radical changes but was delivered in a
reformist style.
Local school district politics demonstrates the
nature of political decision-making in Portland.

The

Coalition documented the inequity of Portland's school
desegregation plan in practice, but was unable to change
it.

It took political and direct action intervention

tactics to chan.ge the plan.

The Black United Front, a
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black advocacy group, assessing the political environment
in the city of Portland as racist and resistant to change,
selected direct action intervention tactics.

What the

Coalition was unable to accomplish with its reform tactics,
the Black United Front accomplished with a threatened boycott and use of the Coalition's research.

The election

and appointment of four new board members between April
and September, 1979 was the other major factor contributing
to the new board's willingness to change the desegregation
plan.
'A

tics

brief review of the events in school district poli-

sinc~

September, 1979 indicates how changes are made

in educational policy.
school pairing was

The Coalition's recommendation on

unacceptabl~

because the white estab-

1ishment did not want its children to be bused to black
schools and they feared white flight with a two-way busing
.,'

plan.

Racism is not overt, but more subtle in Portland •

',~

In the Spring of 1980, when the "new board" fired the
superintendent, the business-professional establishment
began a recall movement to remove the four members who
~:

"

made the termination decision.

Although unsuccessful with

the recall, the establishment forces formed a citizen
committee to raise funds and to select appropriate candidates for the school board election in March, 1981.
of their candidates were successful.

Two

The only black school

board member, f.ormerly of the Coalition, was reelected,
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but with less than fifty percent of the vote.

Of the three

other votes to terminate the superintendent, one member did
not run for reelection, one board member was defeated, and
the third member was not up for reelection and remains on
the board.

This election leaves only two of the new board

and it seems as if the power of the board has returned to
representation of the interests of the white businessprofessional establishment.
In summary, citizen aevocacy groups, to be effective,
must be flexible about strategies and tactics, but more
importantly must analyze the political environment of the
issue as to how eecisions are made.

If the citizen advo-

cacy group is a coalition, it should decide early in its
life whether to seek consensus on its intervention tactics
or to pursue separate but mutually supportive tactics,
which recognize the
its members.

differen·~

viewpoints and strengths of

Lastly, as tha Coalition spokesperson

indi~

cated, the Coalition did not plan for the struggle to get
its plan through the political process.

Citizen groups

must be prepared for the process of change to take a long
time and to have the endurance to accomplish its goals.
Areas for Future Research
One limitation to this study of a policy intervention
by a citizen advocacy group was the time limit.
covered a

two-~ear

This study

period concluding with the board's

decision to change the district's desegregation plan in
September, 1979.

There is a need for a longitudinal

analysis of citizen advocacy intervention in the community
change process.

Such a study should evaluate the imple-

mentation of a decision, as well as the impact of the
decision itself.

For example, this study is unable to

evaluate the long-term effects of the policy intervention
which still is affecting the district.

There have been a

series of unintended and intended consequences from the
policy intervention: the new desegregation plan adopted in
March~

1980, the firing of the superintendent in June,

1980, a boycott by the Black United Front in Spring, 1980,
and a recall

mov~ment

in the Summer of 1980.

One indica-

tion of the reverberation of policy decisions is confirmed
in the work of Crisswell and Mitchell (1980) who indicate
that periods of electoral instability may last for eight
years after community dissatisfaction emerges in the form
of incumbent defeat.
In addition to a longitudinal study of specific
policy intervention by citizen groups, a comparative study
of citizen advocacy groups and intervention strategies
would test the findings of this case study.

A study of a

variety of communities might reveal similar patterns or
identify new attributes of successful intervention.
Seattle, for

exam~le,

which changed its desegregation pro-

gram during the Fall of 1978, had substantial citizen

!

1

184
intervention that included a successful boycott and a
threatened court suit.
Citizen groups continue to be involved in the educational decision-making process, whether it is as monitors
in the implementation of programs or as advocates for
policy in its formation stage (Davies, 1978).
Cohen (1978) foresees the continuance of citizen
advocacy organizations.

Whether they are official or pri-

vate, they will operate through existing channels of administration and control, using hearings, studies, litigation,
and various decision-review processes to achieve their
objectives.
Moore (1980) explains why advocacy groups will con-

I

tinue to be a factor in the educational decision-making
process.
Child advocacy has developed as one response to
breakdowns in the implementation of educational
programs for children at risk. Advocates argue
that implementation failures occur because laws are
not vigorously enforced, because rigid organizations continue old habits in the face of new program ideas, because political pressures at various
points in the implementation process dash the
promise of new programs. They argue that reforms
will improve services to children on a wide scale
only when vigorous independent organizations press
the educational system to carry them out at each
point in the implementation process, in each
important ~ctivity in the network of activities
that shapes s2rvices to children. (pw 7)
Further research is needed to test the relation of
these various factors such as focus in advocacy, permanency, multiple intervention strategies to different kinds
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of organizations in varying political settings.

A compari-

son of ad hoc, temporary self-initiated groups with mandated
citizen groups is needed. Gittell (1978) observes that
unfortunately there have been no sophisticated evaluations
comparing the role of mandatory organizations under federal
programs with self-initiated groups (1/78, p. 5).
Davies (1978), Gittell (1978), and Moore (1980) all
call for a strengthening of citizen-initiated, private,
voluntary groups concerned about the schools.
It is clear • • • that citizen-initiated community
organizations are more likely to reflect the
diversity of community interests than organizations mandated by government agencies. There is
evidence that they are more aggressive and often
more successful than government-sponsored community
groups. They are more able than governmentinitiated groups to articulate community interests
and place issues on the local political agenda.
(Davies, 1/78, pp. 13-14)
This case study of the Coalition demonstrates some
of the limits to effective policy intervention by a citizen
advocacy group.

However, citizen advocacy groups do inter-

vene in the policy process.
outcomes.

They can affect the policy

The Coalition is evidence of a specific kind of

policy intervention.

Other citizen groups intervening in

other fields of interest need to be studied to see if they
demonstrate the same pattern of intervention strategies.
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March 6, 1970; M.arch 15, 1970; March 1;J, 1970; September, 29, 1971; May 24, 197~; April 3, 1977; June 21,
1977; July 7, 1977; July 15, 1977; July 23, 1977;
July 24, 1977; July 26, 1977; July 11, 1978; November
12, 15, 16, 18, 20, a,nd 24, 1978; December 19, 1978;
January 23, 1979; February 1, 1979; Febru:.:.,cy 11,
1979; April 4, 1979; August 15, 1979; and Jl.l.nl1st 30,
1979.
Portland Observer: July 21, 1977; July 28, 1977; August 18,
1977; December 21, 1978; July 19, 1979; and all
issues January, 1979-September, 1979.
Willamette Week: April 17, 1978; December 11, 1978;
December '25, 1978; July 2, 1979; July 16, 1979;
August 13, 1979; and November 11, 1979.
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Interviews
April 18, 1980; June 2, 1980; June 10, 1980; June 11,
1980a, 1980b, 1980c; June 12, 1980; June 16, 1980a,
1980b; June 17, 1980a, 1980b; June 18, 1980a, 1980b;
June i9, 1980a, 1980b, 1980c; June 20, 1980; July 8,
1980; July 10, 1980; July 14, 1980; July 16, 1980a,
1980b; July 17, 1980; July 21, 1980; July 23, 1980;
July 24, 1980; July 25, 1980a, 1980b, 1980c, 1980d;
July 30, 1980; July 31, 1980; August 6, 1980a, 1980b,
1980c, 1980d; August 7, 1980; August 11, 1980;
August 12, 1980a, 1980b; August 20, 1980; August 26,
1980; August 27, 1980; September 3, 1980; September 8,
1980; September 15, 1980; September 16, 1980; September. 21, 1980; September 19, 1980; September 30, 1S80;
October 6, 1980a, 1980b; December 10, 1980.

APPENDIX A
INTERVIEW GUIDE
What were the events that led to the formation of
the coalition?
Why did a coalition form in the summer of 1977?
How did it become a coalition?
What was the goal of the coalition?
What were the specific complaints of the black community about Portland's desegregation effort?
What strategies did CCSI adopt to change the
situation?
How were these strategies selected?
What other strategies were considered?
How would you characterize your role in CCSI?
Activist
Advocate
Agitator
Broker
Negotiator
*Other:

Coalition Builder
Researcher
Fact-Gathering Analyst
Facilitator

Please talk about what you did.
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In your opinion, di& CCSI have support of community
groups?

If so, which ones?

How did they demonstrate their

support?
Were there others who were not supportive?

If so,

how did they not show support?
What was your view of school board members on the
issue of school desegregation in 1977 when CCSI began?
Did your view change during life of CCSI?
and why?

If yes, when

What was new view?

What was your view of school administration (central)
on issue of school desegregation in 1977?
change?

If yes, why and when?

Did your view

What was new view?

Which constituency or community grpup (S) was CCSI
trying to help?
How do conflicting groups work out their different
interests in Portland?
Was the CCSI a special interest group or representative of more general community concern - i.e. public
interest?
When the coalition made its final report to the school
board 12/78 and major recommendation on school pairing
was not accepted, what direction did CCSI take?

I
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What were the critical events in the life of the
coalition?
Is there anything that I have not asked you that
you think is very important to know about the coalition?
(success, failure, contribution, lasting impact)

APPENDIX B
INFORMED CONSENT RELEASE
I,
, hereby agree to be
interviewed in ~he dissertation research on the role of
ci tizen advocar.;;y groups in educational policy-making specific~!l~, the Community Coalition for School Integration. This research project is being conducted by Patricia
J. Rumer, doctoral candidate in the School of Urban Affairs,
Portland State University.
I understand that the study involves a discussion
of t.he events during the life of the CoalH:ion and my view
of them. It has been explained to me that the purpose
of the study is to learn how citizen advocacy groups can
intervene to change or affect the implementation of specific
educational policies in local school districts, and second,
to assess the effectiveness of such an intervention.
I may not receive any direct benefit from participation in this study, but my participation may help to
increase knowledge which may benefit others in the future.
Patricia J. Rumer has offered to answer any questions I
may have about the study. I have been assured that all
information I give will be kept confidential and that the
identity of all subjects will remain anonymous.
I have read and understand the foregoing information.
DATE:

SIGNATURE

If you experience problems that are the result of participation in this study, please contact Richard Streeter,
Office of Graduate Studies and Research, 105 Neuberger
Hall, Portland State University, 229-3423.

APPENDIX C:

KEY INTERVIEW QUESTIONS AND THREE MODELS
OF COMMUNITY ORGANIZATION PRACTICE (Rothman, 196B)

PRACTICE VARIABLES

INTERVIEW QUESTIONS

1. Goal categories of
community action

"What was the goal of the Coalition?

2. Assum~tions concerning
conununity struc'ture and
problem conditions

·Why did a
of 1977?

3. Basic change strategy

Coalit:,~on

form in the Summer

"What were the events that led to the
formation of the Coalition?
"What were the specific complaints of
the black community about Portland's
desegregation efforts?

4. Characteristic change

tactics and techniques

5. Salient practitioner
roles
6. Mediu.'n of cha.'1ge

"What strategies did the Coalition adopt?
"How were these strategies selected?
"What other strategies were considered?
·Provide examples of how change tac'tics
were used.
"After January, 1979, what direction did
the Coalition take?
"How would you characterize your role in
the Coali tion?

7. Orientation toward
power structure

"Did Coalition have support of conununity
groups? If yes, which ones? How did they
demonstrate their support? Were there
others who were not supportive? If so,
how did they not show support?
"What was your view of the school board
members in 1977 and then in 1979? View
of school adminstration?

8. Boundary definition
of the conununity client
system or constituency

"Which constituency or community group
was the Coalition advocating for?

9. Assumption regarding
interests of community
subparts

"How do conflicting groups work out
their different interests in Portland?

10. Conception of the
public interest
11. Conception of the
client population or
conatituency
12. Conception of client
role

"Was the Coalition a special interest
group or representative of more general
community concern, i.e., the public
interest

; ;"

..
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APPENDIX D
CHRONOLOGY OF COALITION ACTIVITIES: September 1977 to September 1979
PHASE I:

PHASE I I :

Aug. '77

Sept. '77

Oct. '77

Nov. '77

Dec.

Decision to form
broad-based
Coalition

Organization of
of Coalition

Locate funds.
School give
access to data

Staff hired
Community
forums

Office opens

Feb. '78

March '76

April '78

May '78

June '78

July '78

Research begins
on deseg. issues

CCSI report:
findings of
forums

Extend deadline
of final report
to 11/78

1st CCSI party

Mtgs. with city
council & county
commissioners

Discussion of
legal issues

Private fundraising

Outside firm to
do survey

Aug. '78

Sept. '78

Oct. '78

Nov. '78

Dec. '78

Jan. '79

Write-up of
deseg. options

Second series of community
forums

CCSI final vote
on recommendations

CCSI presentation to Board

Board rejection
of school pairing

Superintendent
response

CCSI office closes
loss of staff

Media focus on
forums

12 part ~eries
on CCSI & deseg.
in Oregonian
PHASE III:

Board-CCSI
meetings

'77

Recs. to board
on Jefferson

Jan. '78
Board acceptance
of CCSI recs.

Survey results

Feb. '79

March '79

A,eril '79

May '79

June '79

!!!!.!L'79

Reorganization
of CCSI

CCSI subcommittees appointed
to work with
board district

HEW visit with
CCSI

School board
incumbent defeat

CCSI planning
workshop

Decline in black
participation in
CCSI

End of CCSI/
board meetings

OCR Decision

Appointment of
Coalition co-chair
to school board

OCR complaint
filed
CCSI response
to Board

CCSI visit to
Seattle

Board member resigns
BUF call for boycott
CCSI response to OCR

August and Se,etember, 1979
CCSI statement to school board re:
need for action on desegregation
Board action:

sho~~ & long-term
resolutions

:~:~
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APPENDIX E
"WHAT IS THE COALITION?"

JUNE 1978

PURPOSE OF THE COMMUNITY COALITION FO~ SCHOOL INTEGRATION:
1. Identifying common concerns in the Portland community regarding school desegregation.
2. Developing the kind of policy recommendations that
would enhance equal educational opportunity and
thereby maximize the potential of every student
to achieve.
MEMBERSHIP: 104 indivisua1s and 38 organizations representing parents, teachers, students, administrators,
businessmen, neighborhood associations, churches and other
civic groups.
HISTORY: The Coalition was formed out of community opposition to proposed Portland School Board policy dealing with
"racial imbalance" at Jefferson High School.
On July 25, 1977, the Board asked the NAACP, the
Urban League of Portland and the Metropolitan Human Relations
Commission to develop alternative recommendations for addressing the problem of "racial imbalance" at Jefferson.
These three organizations extended an open invitation
to any group or individual to participate with them in
responding to the School Board's proposed policy.
It soon became apparent that a district wide examination of desegregation policy was necessary in order to
adequately consider the problem of "racial isolation" at
Jefferson. It had been 13 years since the blue ribbon
study of the Schwab Comrrlitt~~ (1964).
The Coalition presented its findings on the Jefferson
attendance area to the School Board on Dec. 15, 1977. (A
summary is available.) In January, the Board adopted the
Coalition's recommendation to drop the high school redistricting plan for. the Boise/King araa.
DISTRICT WIDE EXAMINATION OF SCHOOL DESEGREGATION: The
Coalition held 15 COMMUNITY FORUMS to give information
and hear the concerns of the citizens. A press conference
detailing the results of the Forums was held on March 31,
19;8. . (A summary is available.)
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The RESEARCH COMMITTEE is gathering information and
studying these areas relevant to school desegregation in
Portland:
1. Hil5tory of School Desegregation Efforts in Portland
2. Analysis of Current Desegregation Efforts in
Portland.
A. Programs
B. Legal Issues
C. Resource Allocation
D. Population and Housing Trends
E. Economic Trends
3. Analysis of School Desegregation in Other Cities
The Coalition is conducting a SURVEY of parents,
students, teachers, and principals connected with the Administrative Transfer Program,. Early Childhood Education
Centers and High School Magnet Programs. A prof'3ssional
research firm will conduct interviews of parents and principals and analyze the results of all the surveys.
POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS: Plans and recommendations for
school integration will be formulated within the Coalition
and presented to the School Board in November 1978.
FINANCIAL SUPPORT: The Coalition has received financial
support from the Portland School District, City of Portland,
Multnomah County, the business community and the individuals
and organizations that make up its membership.
Coalition meetings are open.
information.

Call the office for

The following groups and organizations are members
of the Community Coalition for School Integration:
ALBINA ACTION CENTER, INC.

CITIZENS FOR CHILDREN

ALBINA MINISTERIAL ALLIANCE

CITIZENS FOR PUBLIC EDUCATION

BOISE NEIGHBORHOOD ASSOCIATION

COMMITTEE FOR QUALITY EDUCATION FOR ALL CHILDREN

BRIDLEMlLE SCHOOL P.T.A.
CENTER FOR URBAN EDUCATION

CONCERNED CITIZENS OF ALBINA
COMMUNITY

CHURCH WOMEN UNITED

CONCORDIA COMMUNITY ASSOCIATION
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ECUMENICAL MINISTRIES OF
OREGON

OREGON MINORITY EDUCATORS
ORGANIZATION

FIGHTBACK

OREGON SOCIALIST WORKERS
PARTY

HEALTH HELP CENTER, INC.
JEFFERSON DAD'S CLUB

PORTLAND ACTION COMMITTEE
TOGETHER

KING IMPROVEMENT ASSOCIATION

PORTLAND ASSOCIATION OF
TEACHERS

LEAGUE OF WOMEN VOTERS

PORTLAND CHAMBER OF COMMERCE

MARSHALL HIGH SCHOOL
COMMUNITY COUNCIL

PORTLAND COUNCIL P.T.A.

METROPOLITAN HUMAN RELA'l'IONS
COMMISSION
NATIONAL ASSOCIATION FOR THE
ADVANCEMENT OF COLORED PEOPLE
NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF
CHRISTIANS AND JEWS
NATIONAL COUNCIL OF JEWISH
WOMEN
N.E. COALITION OF NEIGHBORHOODS
OREGON ASSOCIATION OF COLORED
WOMEN'S CLUBS

PORTLAND FEDERATION OF
TEACHERS
SABIN COMMUNITY ASSOCIATION
SCHOOLS FOR THE CITY
S.E. YOUTH SERVICE CENTER
STUDENT COALITION AGAINST
RACISM
THE URBAN LEAGUE OF PORTLAND
VANCOUVER AVENUE FIRST
BAPTIST CHURCH
WILSON HIGH SCHOOL ADVISORY
COMMITTEE

